Political Culture in Libya: A Case Study of Political Attitudes of University Students

by

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A Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Middle East Politics, 1996.

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PhD Thesis 1996

Faculty of Social Sciences

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Dedication

To my mother Najya Hashim and my father Suleiman Mahmoud.

Abstract

Empirical research in the Arab countries, based on the surveying of opinion, has been very rare. This is because the regimes in power have generally been reluctant to allow opinion to be tested. This study, however, is based on such survey research, carried out in the spring and summer of 1994 among 500 Libyan male and female students at Garyunis University in Benghazi. The survey of political culture in Libya covered a variety of dimensions, namely identity, tribe and tribalism, political participation, the role of women within society, Arab unity, Arab nationalism, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The methodology is based on stratified samples with simple random sampling, employing a questionnaire. The data is statistically analysed with the help of the SPSS computer package, and by using a number of statistical procedures, such as frequencies, cross-tabulations and cluster analyses.

The ultimate aims of this study are: First, to explore the attitudes of the students towards elements of the state ideology of the revolutionary regime; second, to investigate the extent to which political culture is still influenced by traditional, pre-regime values and ideas, reflecting the social life of Libyans before the ideological, economic and social changes since the 1960s; third, to examine the role of the regime's ideology, structures, and particularly the school system in inculcating national identity and belief in Arab unity and Arab nationalism; and finally, to examine the values of a generation which has gone through the school system and the ideological preparation camps, and see whether their values are congruent with the values taught to them in those institutions. Particular attention is paid here to views on women's rights and gender roles.

The findings of the study show that the revolutionary regime in Libya has had considerable success in creating certain values among the younger generation. The regime was most successful in inculcating its values on Arab nationalism, Arab unity and the Palestinian

problem, and on gender roles and equality between the sexes. Both males and females displayed progressive attitudes towards gender equality, but the women had the more progressive viewpoints. However, the regime has failed to create participant individuals and to develop alternatives to kinship ties. Tribes, and the family, remain an important, localist, source of identity and economic welfare. Moreover, Arabism and Islam are found to be the main source of identification. This reflects the fact that the regime's ideology intertwines Arabism and Islam.


Libya
International boundary
Baladīyat boundary
National capital
Baladīyat capital
Railroad
Road
Track
0 100 200 Kilometers
0 100 200 Miles
Lambert Conformal Conic Projection, SP: 8N/32N
Baladīyah (municipalities)
1. AN NUQAT AL KHAMS
2. AZ ZĀWIYAH
3. AL 'AZĪZĪYAH
4. TARĀBULUS
5. AL KHUMS
6. TARHŪNAH
7. ZLĪTAN
8. MIṢRĀTAH
9. AL JABAL AL AKHḌAR
Presently Libya has 25 municipalities. An unconfirmed press article reports that the municipalities were replaced with 1,500 communes in 1992.
Ionian Sea
Mediterranean Sea
Gulf of Sirdra
TUNISIA
ALGERIA
NIGER
CHAD
SUDAN
EGYPT
GREECE
MALTA
Sicily (ITALY)
Crete (GREECE)
Tripoli
Benghāzī
Valletta
GHADĀMIS
GHARYĀN
SAWFAJJĪN
SURT
AJDĀBIYĀ
ṬUBRUQ
AL JUFRAH
SABHĀ
AWBĀRĪ
MURZŪQ
AL KUFRAH
AL FATIH
DARNAH
BANGHĀZĪ

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Declaration

I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material is included for which a degree has previously been conferred on me.

An early version of some material from Chapters 4 and 8 was presented as "Changing Attitudes to the Role of Women in Society among Libyan Students" by the author at a workshop on *La question féminine* at the *AFEMAM & EURAMES 1996* conference in Aix-en-Provence, France, on 5 July 1996.

Statement of Copyright

Acknowledgement

First of all I would like to express my heart-felt thanks to my supervisor, Tim Niblock (CMEIS), for his advice and encouragement he has given during the years of my study. I would also express my deepest gratitude to David Byrne (Department of Sociology) for all the time, the support, advice and help he has given over the last three years, especially when analysing the statistical part of my work. From him I have learnt a great deal.

My special thanks must go to the 500 students of Garyunis University in Benghazi who participated in my survey. Without their cooperation, I could not have carried out the survey which this thesis is based on. I would also like to record my thanks to Omar Kraiem who, during my fieldwork in Libya from January to May 1994, helped me administer the questionnaires to the students. I am grateful to my sisters Asma, Intisar, Najah and their friends for their help and support during the period of the fieldwork and after. I would also like to thank Hawa al-Obeidi and Khiriya Kablan for assistance during this period.

This work has profited from many other valuable contributions. I would like to thank the following people (in alphabetical order), who patiently gave advice and helpful comments in the beginning of this study: Mohamed Aziz, Mohamed Zahi El-Mogherbi, Pandeli Glavanis, Raymond Hinnebusch, Stephen Welch, Zainab Zuhri.

I have been lucky in having outstanding friends while preparing this thesis, who among many other things, kept me sane (or at least tried to) by giving sound advice, feedback and general support. To Ute Bohnacker and Hans Straßl many thanks. I would also like to thank Warwick Knowles and Michaela Prokop, who have patiently read versions of this thesis and given me insightful and helpful comments. I would also like to thank the audiences at the various talks where I had the fortune of being able to present my ideas.

The work would also not have been possible without the encouragement, support and understanding which I have received from my colleagues, friends, my parents Najya and Suleiman, and my brothers and sisters, Mahmoud, Umaiyma, Mustafa, Sumaya and Hind. Finally, thank to the Libyan Secretariat of Education for their financial support during my years of study in the U.K.

English Transliteration System

In this thesis, the English transliteration system used is based on the transliteration provided by the *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. The standard place names are used as in Gazetteer No. 73 of Libya, issued by the United States Board on Geographic Names in 1973.

Letters

Consonants						**Vowels**	
ء	ʿ	ز	z	ق	q	ـَ	a
ب	b	س	s	ك	k	ـِ	i
ت	t	ش	sh	ل	l	ـُ	u
ث	th	ص	s̲	م	m		
ج	j	ض	d̲	ن	n	(long)	
ح	h̲	ط	t̲	ه	h	ا ـا	a
خ	kh	ظ	z	و	w	ـي	i
د	d	ع	ᶜ	ي	y	ـو	u
ذ	dh	غ	gh				
ر	r	ف	f				
ة	a (as in construct state)						
ال	al- (article)						

ᶜ = Superscript

Marks

A hyphen will be used after the definite "al", e.g. *al-Jamahiriyya, al-Shams, al-Qamar, al-Madina, al-Haraka.*

Presentations

N = n There is no difference between capital letters and small letters in terms of their pronunciation. The usage of capital letters follows the same rules of English,

e.g. *Muammar Al-Qadhafi* (first letters of names).

Definite articles will remain in small letters except for when they come at the beginning of the sentence,

e.g. *Al-Qur'an wa al-Sunna.*

al Definite articles in front of "sun letters" will not be changed, and the first letter after the definite article will not be doubled,

e.g. '*al-Zahf*' *al-Akhdar (*not *az-Zahf* nor *al-ZZahf*).

Taa' marbuuṭa will be normally written as "a",

e.g. *Jamahiriyya (*not *Jamahiriyyh* nor *Jamahiriyy-a).*

In the case of Idaafa, i.e. in Construct state, it will be written as "at",

e.g. *Jamahuriyyat, Baladyat, Muᶜaskarat, Harakat Thawria.*

Authors' names for references will follow the same spelling used in their publications, even though they may be different from common spelling or the spelling which used in this study.

Quotations from Arabic references will be given in the form of English transliteration.

To avoid possible confusion between the standard spelling of Arabic and the local pronunciation of Libyan Arabic, in this thesis the name of al-Qadhdhafi will always be spelled as "al-Qadhafi". Also, Qaryunis will be spelled as "Garyunis" with the *g* pronounced as in "good" in accordance with the local Libyan pronunciation.

Arabic terms and phrases in this thesis will be in *italics*, and the English translation will be in square brackets [ ],

e.g. *Zawiya* [lodge], *Lijan tathwir al-manahij* [committees to revolutionise the curricula], *ᶜasabiya* [tribal solidarity].

References to Arabic Books

In footnotes, Arabic references will appear in the following format:

Abdul Rahman Al-Bazzaz, *Hadhihi Qawmiyatuna* [This is our Nationalism], (Al-Qahira: 1963), p. 51

In the bibliography, Arabic references will apear in the following format:

Al-Bazzaz, Abdul Rahman, *Hadhihi Qawmiyatuna* [This is our Nationalism], (Al-Qahira: 1963).

Abbreviations

ASU	Arab Socialist Union
BPC	Basic Popular Congress
FAE	Faculty of Arts and Education
FE	Faculty of Engineering
FEPS	Faculty of Economics and Political Science
FL	Faculty of Law
FS	Faculty of Science
GPC	General People's Congress
GR	Grade-Level
IPC	Ideological Preparation Camps
JANA	Jamahiriyya News Agencies
L.d.	Libyan Dinar
NGOs	Non-governmental Organisations
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organisation
RC	Revolutionary Committee
RCC	Revolutionary Command Council
SNP	Degree of National expression
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Science
U.N.	United Nations
U.S.	United States
WMA	Women's Military Academy

Glossary of Arabic terms

Ahl, ᶜAyla	Extended Family
Al-Fardiya	Individuality
Al-Madina	Town
Al-Mahdiyya	Religious Reformist Order in Sudan
Al-Sanusiyya	Religious Reformist Order in Libya
Al-Wahabiyya	Religious Reformist Order in Arabian Peninsula
Al-Watan	Fatherland
Badawa	The Nomadic Style of Life
Badw	Bedouin
Baladyat	Municipalities
Basaṯta	Simplicity
ᶜAqila	Tied
ᶜAsabiya	Tribal Solidarity
ᶜAshira	Clan
ᶜUlama	Scholars, Experts
Fatih	The First
Fatwa	A technical term used in Islamic law to indicate a formal legal judgement or view
Filaha	Cultivation
Furusiya	Chivalry
Ḥadar	Sedentary
Ḥadith	A record of the saying and doings of the Prophet Muhammad, and as such is regarded by Muslims as a source of Islamic law

Hamula, Fakhda, Batn	Subtribes
Hijab	Veil
Hurma	Prohibited
Imam	Leader
Imama	A Supreme Islamic Governing Body
Jahiliya	Pre Islamic Times
Jamahiriyya	The State of Masses
Jihad	Holy war
Karam	Hospitality
Katatib	The Quranic Schools
Qabila	Tribe
Qarina	Linked
Ramadan	The Month of Fasting. The 9th month of the Muslim year
Sunna	Trodden path-The specific actions and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad himself
Taqlid	unquestioning imitation
Usra	Nuclear Family
Zawayya	Religious Lodges

1. Introduction

1.1 Political Culture: An Introduction

The concept of 'political culture' in political science has effectively emerged during the last four decades. In 1956, Gabriel Almond introduced the concept of political culture in his early attempt to offer a classification for comparing political systems. As he stated, "every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action. I have found it useful to refer to this as the political culture".[1] At some stages the term has been subject to criticism, but now attention has returned, especially in the aftermath of the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe.

The notion of political culture, however, is not a particularly new one. As Almond wrote in 1980: "political culture has been around as long as men have spoken and written about politics."[2] Almond contends that the notion of political cultural change is one of the most powerful themes of classical literature.[3] For instance, the Greeks had a cyclical theory of political change, and explained the rise and role of political constitutions in socio-psychological terms. Historically, Plato, Aristotle, Abu Nasr al-Farabi, Ibn Khaldun, Abu Bakr Ibn al-Asamm, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and de Tocqueville emphasised themes of political culture and political socialisation.[4]

Political culture is concerned with issues regarding people's knowledge and beliefs about politics, and with the attitudes that they acquire towards matters such as political ideology, orientation towards authority and political activity.

Political culture as an approach constitutes an essential means of understanding change within society. However, in the Middle East region, especially in the Arab countries, there have been relatively few studies that have dealt with political culture and political socialisation or

focused on the people's beliefs, attitudes and values towards the government or political leaders.[5] Undertaking such research in the Arab countries, especially when using an empirical method such as survey research, has been very rare. This is because the regimes in power have generally been reluctant to allow opinion to be tested.

As Suleiman indicated, many Arabs are not accustomed to answering questions put to them in questionnaire form.[6] Moreover, several types of social, cultural and political constraints are present which contribute to the difficulties of research. First, there is mistrust of outside researchers. Second, there is the absence of academic freedom in some Arab states. Furthermore, "in the few Arab countries where such research is allowed, securing a permit to conduct the research is often a long, uncertain and complicated process requiring the approval of several ministries."[7] Third, there is also the problem of 'sensitive' issues where authorities often refuse to allow research claiming that it constitutes a threat to the security of the state.[8] Fourth, the researcher has to deal with the absence of freedom of speech and freedom of expression, which may lead to respondents being afraid to express themselves in the questionnaire.

Despite these problems and difficulties, some studies have been carried out in various Arab countries.[9] With reference to Libya, studies have looked at political development, political mobilisation and political socialisation.[10] As a whole, these studies have identified some of the problems which the Libyan regime has faced in socialising its citizens, especially the young generation (school children), and have then identified some of the means that the regime has embarked upon to achieve its ends, for example through the use of school textbooks.

1.1.1 Political culture in Libya

Historically, the religion of Islam, the tribe as one of the traditional social institutions, and education have played a crucial role in shaping the political culture in Libya. In addition, the ideological factor in nation-building in Libya became a significant one since the revolution in September 1969.

Libya as a developing country and an Arab Middle Eastern state has faced a number of political challenges, especially following the revolutionary transformation. The first challenge, as perceived by the post-1969 regime, was to unite the country as one nation. The second was the dual task of undertaking both socio-economic and political changes in an attempt to build a new society. The third was to create a 'new citizen' and a 'new political culture' and to change some of the values, attitudes and patterns of behaviour which Libyans inherited from

the previous eras of Ottoman, Italian and monarchical rule.[11] Such efforts at attempting to create a new political culture obliged the new regime to embark upon a mammoth programme of political socialisation and resocialisation. Yet no empirical study has investigated the extent to which the regime has succeeded in its political socialisation and resocialisation of Libyan students.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The key issue of this thesis is to understand the influence of state ideology on the young generation in Libya. The revolutionary regime has made a tremendous effort to create a Libyan 'Jamahirian citizen', by employing the main agents of political socialisation, namely media and education. It has targeted the young generation, in particular students.

The attitudes of young Libyan citizens towards the revolutionary regime's ideology will be explored through studying the political attitudes of Libyan university students, that is the revolutionary generation. The primary data to be used comes from a survey of university students, both male and female, through a questionnaire which was administered by the researcher in Libya during the spring and summer of 1994. The research is an attempt to investigate the relationship between Libyan citizens and the political system and at the same time to find out how far the regime has succeeded in creating politically active, participatory, nationally conscious and motivated citizens with a commitment to Arab nationalism and Arab unity, and to equality for women.

This study will build upon the aforementioned works;[12] its originality stems from using university students as the test case. The educational sector has always played a crucial role in political socialisation in Libya; during the 1950's and 1960's, for example, Pan-Arab nationalism was orchestrated through the school system, which affected political life in Libya strongly and effectively.[13]

1.3 Definitions of Terms

Some of the main terms used in this study will now be defined.

Political Culture: Political culture is used in this study to refer to "people's political orientation, beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments towards the political system and its various parts, and the role of the self in that system."[14] This term will be used as a concept in

exploring the political attitudes of Libyan university students towards some elements of the ideology of the revolutionary regime in Libya. In the empirical investigation and the analyses derived from that investigation, political culture is addressed through a consideration of the set of detailed attitudes expressed by the students.

Political Participation: Political participation is used in this study to refer to "the act of taking part in the formulation, passage or implementation of public policies. This broad definition applies to the activities of any person, whether an elected politician, a government official or an ordinary citizen, who is active in any way in the production of policy within any type of political system".[15] It is not part of the definition that political participants must be successful or effective in affecting public policy, although their actions might be expected to have more than a purely symbolic function.

Political Socialisation: Political socialisation is used in this thesis to help in explaining the political socialisation process in Libya. The concept according to Greenstein can be defined in either broad or narrow terms. In narrow terms, political socialisation is the "deliberate inculcation of political information, values and practices by institutional agents who have been formally charged with this responsibility. A broader conception would encompass all political learning, formal and informal, deliberate and unplanned at every stage of the life cycle, including not only explicit political learning but also nominally non-political learning that effects political behaviour, such as the learning of politically relevant social attitudes and the acquisition of politically relevant personality characteristics".[16] This study will use the term in the narrower sense.

Identity: Identity is defined here as a sense of shared characteristics held by a group of individuals. One identity is not exclusive of others, since people can have a sense of belonging to a religious grouping, a culture, a state and a region, all at the same time. Moreover, the weight which individuals give to particular elements of their identity can change over time. The task is to assess what weight individuals give to the different elements of their identity, and how those elements relate to one another.

Tribe: Tribe is defined here as a system of social organisation which includes several local groups — villages, bands, districts, or lineages — and normally includes a common territory, a common language, and a common culture. The elements constituting a tribe may or may not be co-ordinated by formal or centralised political power. Ideally, the term 'tribe' implies a

large element of solidarity based on strongly shared primary sentiments. Such solidarity becomes contractual as the tribal organisation becomes more formally organised.[17]

Islamist, Arabist and Localist: These terms are used in this study with relation to identity. 'Islamists' are those who cite Islam as the main source of their identification, and those who are Islam-oriented. 'Arabist' refers to those for whom Arabism is the main source of identification and those who are Arab-oriented. 'Localist' refers to those for whom family, tribe and region are the main source of their identification. It is worth noting that the use of these terms here differs to some degree from the way in which they have been employed by other researchers.

1.4 The Objectives of the Study

This study will compare the actual values, identities and amount of political participation by the students with what these would be if the regime's processes of political socialisation had achieved their objectives. The study will also explore the extent to which these values, identities and political participation reflect pre-regime value systems in Libya, with particular reference to issues related to the 'tribe' and 'Arab nationalism'. In an exploratory survey-based study of this type, it is generally not considered appropriate to formulate hypotheses in the strict sense of specific testable statements.[18] In dealing with complex covariation in the real world, different models can fit the observed data. Our choice among them is determined by our historical and other qualitative-based knowledge of the world. The ultimate aims of this study are:

a) To explore the attitudes of the students towards some elements of the state ideology of the revolutionary regime.

b) To investigate the extent to which political culture is still influenced by traditional values and ideas, reflecting the social life of Libyans before the ideological, economic and social changes which have occurred since the 1960s.

c) To examine the role of the regime's ideology, structures, and particularly the school system in inculcating national identity, belief in Arab unity and Arab nationalism.

d) To examine the values of a generation which has gone through the school system and the ideological preparation camps and see whether their values are congruent with the

values taught to them in those institutions. Particular attention will be paid here to views on women's rights and gender roles.

1.5 Method and Procedures

As Bryman has suggested, social scientists are likely to create greater confidence in their findings when they employ more than one method of investigation, and hence more than one type of data.[19] This study combines both quantitative and qualitative research methods, into what Bryman refers to as 'triangulation of measurement'.[20]

In exploring the attitudes of Libyan university students towards some elements of the ideology of the revolutionary regime in Libya, the empirical method chosen was survey research.

The main part of the survey is based on a questionnaire, which was distributed to 500 university students of both sexes. Personal interviews with 15 students was conducted at the end of the data-collecting process. The reason for using interviews as another tool was to explore in more depth some of the information and answers provided by the respondents to the questionnaire.

The questionnaire comprised 62 open- and closed-ended multiple choice questions, divided into seven main categories (see Appendix A). The questions were originally written in English and then translated into Arabic. The type of sampling used in the survey was a stratified sample with simple random sampling within categories. The methods used for selecting samples and other field procedures are described in more detail in Chapter 4.

Three kinds of data sources were used: firstly, the empirical sources, that is questionnaire survey research; secondly, official Libyan publications and statistics; and thirdly, secondary material, mainly theoretical material concerning political culture, political socialisation, and identity.

1.6 The Limits of this Study

The limits of this study can be summarised as follows:

a) This study is primarily concerned with the effects of socialisation via the education system and the regime's attempts to change and create a 'new' political culture in Libyan society. It would not be appropriate (although it can provide a basis) to use the

outcomes of this study to generalise about other specific groups or strata within society such as women, workers or farmers, as the regime has endowed each with its own special role.

b) The study did not investigate the attitudes of non-Libyan students at the university.

1.7 The Significance of this Study

This study seeks to fill a gap in research about political culture in the Middle East in general and the Arab countries in particular. With reference to Libya, studies have looked at political development, political mobilisation and political socialisation, but none of them have explored the notion of political culture.

Moreover, there have been very few empirical studies in the political field in Libya in general. The contribution of this thesis is an assessment of the influence of state ideology on the young Libyan generation; its originality will stem from using university students in examining political culture. Given the lack of political attitudes studies in Libyan society, the greatest attention has necessarily been devoted to the survey findings.

1.8 Structure and Organisation of this Study

This study is divided into ten chapters. The first is an introductory chapter which states the problem, the aims of the study, methodology, and limits of the study. Chapter 2 examines the current literature on political culture theory. The focus is on research contributions from scholars who have dealt with political culture as a concept in the last three decades. Particular attention will be given to political culture in the Arab countries.

Chapter 3 focuses on the historical background of Libya, providing some understanding of factors that shaped the political culture of contemporary Libyan society. This chapter gives particular attention to the role played by education and religion and the state ideology of the revolutionary regime since 1969. The chapter also examines the revolutionary regime's use of political socialisation as an instrument to create "revolutionary citizens".

Chapter 4 deals with the survey process and the sample. This chapter describes the process of the survey which was carried out in spring and summer 1994 at Garyunis University. The chapter covers the aims and objectives of the research, data collection, selection of samples and the questionnaire design, data treatment and the statistical procedures, and the

characteristics of the sample through background factors such as the place of family residence, or parental education level.

Chapter 5 analyses and explores the attitudes of the university students towards the identity question through a number of dimensions of potential identifications, such as Arabism and Islamism on the one hand, and the traditional, localist sources of identity (region, tribe, family, city) and the state on the other hand.

Chapter 6 deals with tribe and tribalism in Libya through exploring the attitudes of the university students towards tribalism. The chapter also examines attachment and loyalty towards the tribe among the respondents.

Chapter 7 examines the amount of political participation of Libyan university students. Political participation in Libya is examined by studying the institutions for participation which the regime has created. The chapter seeks to explore the attitudes of students to their role in the political participation process in Libya, also covering the experience of participation which respondents have had within their families, at school and university.

Chapter 8 examines attitudes to the role of women in society. The chapter focuses on changing attitudes towards women in Libyan society through describing the traditional values and views relating to women on the one hand, and the ideology and policies of the revolutionary regime towards women on the other hand. Examining the image of women in the school curricula is a further focus of this chapter.

Chapter 9 explores the attitudes of Libyan students towards some Arab issues, namely Arab unity and the Palestinian issue. The chapter seeks to ascertain whether the regime has succeeded in instilling its values and some elements of its ideology related to Arab nationalism and Arab unity in the students as an important stratum within Libyan society.

Chapter 10 summarises the main themes of the study, discussions and analysis of the problems, and makes some suggestions for future research.

Notes to Chapter 1

[1] Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems", *Journal of Politics*, vol. 18, August 1956, p. 396.

[2] Gabriel A. Almond, "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept" in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (eds), *The Civic Culture Revisited*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), p. 1.

[3] Ibid., p. 2.

[4] Political socialisation is the process by which political cultures are maintained or changed. Through the performance of this function, individuals are inducted into the political culture, and their orientations toward political objects are formed. Political socialisation is a process whereby political attitudes and values are inculcated as children become adults and as adults are recruited into roles. Thus, political socialisation is a tool for disseminating political culture and all the propensities, attitudes, beliefs and values which make up that phenomenon. In essence, the latter are a consequence of political socialisation.

[5] See Tawfic E. Farah and Yasumasa Kuroda (eds), *Political Socialisation in the Arab States*, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987); see also Tawfic E. Farah (ed), *Political Behaviour in the Arab States*, (Colorado: Westview Press, 1983); and Mohamed Zahi El-Mogherbi, *The Socialisation of School Children in the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya*, (University of Missouri, PhD thesis, 1978).

[6] Michael W. Suleiman, "Foreword" in Tawfic E. Farah and Yasumasa Kuroda (eds), op.cit., p. xiii.

[7] Ibid., p. xi.

[8] For example, when the Centre for Arab Unity Studies commissioned a survey of public attitudes towards Arab unity, to be conducted in all Arab states, less than half of those states – ten out of twenty one – gave the necessary permission. Permission was given by the states Jordan, Palestine (Diaspora), Lebanon, Kuwait, Qatar, North Yemen, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia and Morocco. Ibid., pp. xi-xii.

[9] These have included studies by Tawfic Farah, Faisal Al-Salem, Ahmed Daher, Mohamed Zahi El-Mogherbi, Michael Suleiman and Kamal El-Menoufi.

[10] See Omar I. El-Fathaly *et al*, *Political Development and Bureaucracy in Libya* (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1977); see also Omar El-Fathaly and Monte Palmer, *Political Development and Social Change in Libya*, (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1980); Mohamed Zahi El-Mogherbi, *The Socialisation of School Children in the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya*, op.cit.; and Maja Naur, *Political Mobilization and Industry in Libya*, (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1986).

[11] See Omar I. El-Fathaly and Monte Palmer, op.cit., pp. 103-104.

[12] See Omar El-Fathaly and Monte Palmer, ibid.; see also Mohamed Zahi El-Mogherbi, *The Socialisation of School Children in the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya*, op.cit.; and Maja Naur, op.cit.

[13] Mohamed Zahi El-Mogherbi, (1978) *The Socialisation of School Children in the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya*, op.cit., p. 35.

[14] See Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 13.

[15] Vernon Bogdanor (ed), "Political Participation" in *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Science*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), p. 461.

[16] F. Greenstein, "Political Socialisation" in *International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences*, (New York: Macmillan Company and The Free Press, 1968), vol. 14, p. 552.

[17] Julius Gould and William L. Kolp (eds), *A Dictionary of the Social Sciences*, (Norwich: Fletcher and Son Limited, 1964), p. 729.

[18] These issues are discussed in detail in Catherine Marsh, "Adequacy at the Level of Cause", *The Survey Method, Chapter 4*, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp. 69-97.

[19] Alan Bryman, *Quantity and Quality in Social Research*, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), p. 131.

[20] The idea of triangulation is explained by Bryman thus: "researchers have viewed the main message of the idea of triangulation as entailing the need to employ more than one method of investigation and hence more than one type of data. Within this context, quantitative and qualitative research may be perceived as different ways of examining the same research problem. By combining the two, the researcher's claims for the validity of his or her conclusions are enhanced if they can be shown to provide mutual confirmation.", ibid., p. 131.

2. Political Culture: Theoretical Considerations

2.1 Introduction

In 1979, Elkins and Simeon stated that "political culture is one of the most popular and seductive concepts in political science; it is also one of the most controversial and confused."[1] This reflects the fact that the concept has been employed and debated by many scholars; through their theoretical debates they have created a considerable amount of literature on the subject. The concept has, therefore, survived a significant amount of criticism. "What is distinctive about the concept of political culture, is the enduring nature of its appeal in the face of large body of criticism."[2] The increasing attention given by scholars to the term in the last few years indicates that the concept has had a "renaissance", as Ronald Inglehart has described it.[3] Furthermore, as Almond has mentioned

> the movements that have most actively polemicized against political culture as an explanatory variable (Marxism of various kinds, and rational choice theory) now seem to have run out of steam, appear to be inclined to negotiate settlements, rather than requiring unconditional surrender.[4]

The main focus of the literature on political culture is on three regions: industrial societies, communist societies and East Asian societies. This chapter contains a theoretical review of the literature of political culture in general, but particular attention will be given to political culture in the Arab countries. The first section is devoted to an analysis of the historical development of the concept through a historical review. This part also focuses on definitions of political culture. The second deals with the criticism of the term and its rehabilitation. The third section focuses on the relationship between political culture and political socialisation.

The fourth covers the analysis of political culture in Arab countries. Finally, studies of political socialisation in Arab countries will be reviewed.

2.2 A Historical Review of Study of Political Culture

Historically, the idea of political culture has been around ever since people have written about politics. Scholarly interest in the notion of political culture goes back at least as far as Plato, when he argued in *The Republic* that:

> Governments vary as the dispositions of men vary, and there must be as many of the one as there are of the other. For we can not suppose that states are made of 'oak and rock' and not out of the human natures which are in them.[5]

Plato stressed the importance of political culture and discussed what can be termed political socialisation, i.e. political orientations coming about through education and childhood socialisation.[6] The question of education was picked up by Aristotle in his book *Politics*. He showed the importance of political culture through his description of the optimum government, which he believed came from a mixed polity. Almond states that

> Aristotle's conception of mixed government with a predominant middle class is related to what some of the modern scholars in recent years have characterized as the civic culture in which there is a substantial consensus on the legitimacy of political institutions and the direction and content of public policy, a widespread tolerance of a plurality of interests and belief in their reconcilability, and a widely distributed sense of political competence and mutual trust in the citizenry.[7]

Ideas of political culture were not just debated in the West, but were also found in the Islamic world. Abu-Nasr al-Farabi,[8] an Arab thinker, in his book *'Ara'a Ahl al-Madina al-Faḍila* [the Opinions of the People of the virtuous city], stresses the role of education and the creation of good citizenship through the education process.

Machiavelli also emphasised themes of political culture and political socialisation. He developed notions as to how political leaders should act to promote support and loyalty. Machiavelli "instructed the prince on how to act to command the respect and loyalty – although not necessarily the love – of his subjects."[9]

Rousseau also reflected on the importance of political culture and socialisation processes. He was influenced by Montesquieu, who studied French culture and society through sociological, anthropological and psychological approaches in a bid to explain the national history and political institutions of his time. Rousseau discussed political culture through such terms as morality, custom and opinion.

Another thinker who paid attention to political culture as a core idea was de Tocqueville. In his book *Democracy in America*, de Tocqueville states that

> In order that society should exist and, *a fortiori,* that a society should prosper, it is necessary that the mind of all the citizens should be rallied and held together by certain predominant ideas; and this cannot be the case unless each of them sometimes draws his opinions from the common source and consents to accept certain matters of belief already formed.[10]

As the notion of political culture has always been around, the sudden appearance of the term itself at the end of 1950s and early 1960s needs an explanation. A number of factors account for it. First, Almond suggests that the "failure of enlightenment and liberal expectations as they related to political development and political culture set the explanatory problem to which political culture research was a response."[11] Second, the development of social theory in general in the 19th and 20th centuries was crucial in prompting political culture studies. Third, the development of survey research methodology and technology in the period following the Second World War has increased the practical potential for undertaking studies of political culture.

In 1956, Gabriel Almond first introduced the concept of "political culture" as part of his formula for the classification and comparison of political systems. In the early 1960s he, together with Sidney Verba, carried out an empirical study and survey of attitudes in five countries, which was published in their study, *The Civic Culture* (1963). They defined the concept of political culture as covering the political attitudes and orientations of individuals in relation to the political system: "Attitudes towards the political system and its various parts, and attitudes towards the role of the self in the system."[12] "Orientation" refers to the internalised aspects of objects and relationships. It includes: (i) cognitive orientation, (ii) affective orientation, and (iii) evaluative orientation.[13] These orientations refer to the knowledge of individuals and their beliefs about the political system, their feeling about the political system, and their judgements of it.[14] In other words, political culture "becomes the frequency of different kinds of cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations toward the political system in general, its input and output aspects, and the self as political actor."[15] The orientations which Almond and Verba describe become the basis for the three types of political culture, which are: *parochial*, where individuals have low expectations and awareness of government and are generally not involved; *subject*, where the individuals are aware of the output of the political system but do not participate in the process of policy decisions; and *participant*, where individuals are active and involved in the political system as

a whole in both the input and output of the system.[16] This analysis shows that Almond and Verba consider political culture and its role as part of the political process.

Some other scholars have reiterated Almond's formulation of political culture. Lucian W. Pye was one of them. For Pye, political culture provides "an ordered subjective realm of politics," which is found on two levels. "For the individual the political culture provides controlling guidelines for effective political behaviour, and for the collectivity it gives a systematic structure of values and rational considerations which ensures coherence in the performance of institutions and organisations."[17] Political culture then is the product both of collective histories and individual life histories of the political system. It evolves also from conscious learning about politics. As Chilcote states, "it gives a behavioural form of analysis to such terms as ideology, national spirit, and values of people."[18]

For Verba political culture as a concept consists of the "system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place."[19] Verba suggests a number of dimensions of political culture, including beliefs and ways of identifying with politics, in particular with the nation-state; with one's fellow citizens; with governmental output and operation; and with the process of making-decisions the political output.[20] Similarly, Kavanagh defined political culture as "the values, beliefs, and emotions that give meaning to political behaviour. These are the values which create predispositions for people to behave in a particular way or which provide justifications for behaviour."[21]

Despite some differences, all the above definitions share the idea that all the values found in the political system are part of political culture.[22] Political culture is regarded as a subculture, or as a part of the general culture of society. Political culture is seen as something which can change slowly and gradually, reflecting general changes in the socio-economics and politics of any society.

2.3 A Criticism of Political Culture

Since the publication of Almond and Verba's work in the 1960s, the concept and theory of political culture has been attacked by scholars from a variety of perspectives. One line of criticism was directed at the definition of political culture. Lijphart and Pateman were prominent advocates of such criticism. Lijphart criticised Almond and Verba for their broad definition of the term political culture, going beyond orientations towards political objects to

include general social and interpersonal relations.[23] He argued that such definition introduced vagueness to the term. This vagueness could be avoided by limiting political culture as a concept to the explicitly political. In Lijphart's discussion of Almond and Verba's work *the Civic Culture*, he adhered to the narrow definition of political culture and concentrated on the "links between political culture as independent variable and political structure as the dependent variable, leaving aside the antecedent influence of the social structures and processes."[24]

Carole Pateman criticised Almond and Verba's conception of political culture on the grounds that they made political orientations and attitudes a necessary part of the political system, in so far as attitudes are linked closely to certain institutions.[25] As Street has stated, "if this is true, then it is impossible for Almond and Verba to retain the view that political culture constitutes an independent variable.[26]

Jerzy Wiatr's critique is an example of the Marxist line of criticism. He argued that Almond and Verba in their analysis missed the "relationship between socio-economic reality and political institutions, on the one hand, and the impact this relationship has on political culture, on the other hand."[27] A similar analysis was given by Pateman when she stated that Almond and Verba's "argument completely neglects the association between class and participation and implies that social status is irrelevant to which side of the balance a citizen occupies, or to the citizen's view of the rationality of action or inaction."[28]

2.4 The Relationship between Political Culture and Political Socialisation

When studying political culture, researchers should familiarise themselves with the related concept of political socialisation. The term "socialisation", according to Almond *et al*, refers to "the way children are introduced to the values and attitudes of their society."[29] Almond *et al* add that political socialisation is "the part of this process that shapes political attitudes."[30] Political socialisation, then, is the process by which political cultures are maintained or changed. Through the performance of this function, individuals are inducted into the political culture, and their orientations toward political objects are formed.[31] Political socialisation is also the source of changes in the patterns of political culture. Political socialisation is a "process whereby political attitudes and values are inculcated as children become adults and as adults are recruited into roles."[32]

Thus political socialisation is a tool for disseminating political culture and all the propensities, attitudes, beliefs and values which make up that phenomenon. In essence, the latter are a consequence of political socialisation. One of the typical definitions of political socialisation is that of Easton and Dennis, which refers to "those developmental processes through which persons acquire political orientations."[33] Another common definition, by Greenstein, stresses political socialisation as a

> deliberate inculcation of political information, values and practices by institutional agents who have been formally charged with this responsibility. A broader conception would encompass all political learning, formal and informal, deliberate and unplanned at every stage of the life cycle, including not only explicit political learning but also nominally non–political learning that affects political behaviour.[34]

The literature of political socialisation concentrates on the agents of socialisation. These agents can be formal or informal. One of the main formal agents of political socialisation is school, perhaps second in importance only to the family. The difference between formal education and the family is that education is more readily controlled by the state. It is also a "direct rather than an indirect agent of political socialisation and as such transmits its political messages in an explicit rather than an implicit fashion."[35] School as an education system is involved in the formation of culture and political culture through school curricula textbooks, and by teachers who contribute to an awareness of politics among the students. The mass media is another crucial agent of socialisation in modern societies, transmitting political information.

According to Dawson and Perwitt, the agents of socialisation can be classified into three categories: first, agents that have authority over the learner such as teachers and parents; second, agents that are equal to the learner such as age peers in school, friendship cliques, and work associates; third, agents that are political, such as contact with political authorities and voting.[36]

Political socialisation is the way through which a generation passes on political ideas, values, beliefs and pattern of behaviour to another generation. This process, as described by Almond *et al*, is "cultural transmission".[37] Political socialisation transforms the political culture of the nation. It leads the citizens, or some of them, to experience politics. Political socialisation may create a political culture where none existed before during the formation of a new nation.[38] Political socialisation thus can transfer, create or change the political culture in any society. An example would be the post-colonial emergence of nations in the developing world. In these countries

> The campaign to create a new 'political man' and a 'political religion' takes many different forms, from the Maoist extreme of cultural revolution to subtle nuances embedded in school textbooks, the media, or more blatantly, in official propaganda. In fact, the process of transforming an existing political culture or building political culture entirely new is central to efforts by numerous third world countries to embark on nation building.[39]

There are two major points related to political socialisation as a concept. The first, as Almond *et al* stated, is that "political socialisation can take the form of either direct or indirect transmission and learning."[40] The former involves direct communication of information for example by using the education process at schools. Such socialisation has been used by communist parties to inculcate the idea of "the Soviet man", or the "Cuban socialist man".[41] The Libyan experience is one of direct socialisation, where the mechanism of political socialisation aims to inculcate citizens with the values and ideology of the revolutionary regime to create the "Jamahirian man" and the "Jamahirian society".[42] Indirect political socialisation occurs "when political views are inadvertently molded by our experiences."[43]

The second point related to political socialisation is that "political socialisation continues throughout an individual's life.[44] The attitudes adopted during childhood by family influences can create a favourable image for example of a certain political party, but the formal education process or the influence of friends may change this image. Moreover, some societies have experienced events such as war or economic depression, which may have left their mark on the whole nation, having a particularly great impact on the younger generation. As Almond *et al* state, "when experiences shape and change the attitudes of older members of the society this can be political resocialisation."[45] Germany is an important example for such political resocialisation having occurred.

2.5 The Analysis of Political Culture in the Arab Countries

This section is about the analysis of political culture in the Arab countries. There are only a few studies which have dealt with political culture in the Arab countries directly. A selection of these studies will be analysed and examined. The researcher classified these studies into two categories: first, descriptive and historical approaches to Arab political culture; second, studies of the political values, attitudes, orientations and behaviour of particular groups, for example students or peasants, based on empirical research.

2.5.1 Descriptive and historical approaches to Arab political culture

Arab political culture has been analysed descriptively from a number of different perspectives. One of these perspectives has led scholars to focus on the significance of political culture for the prospects for democracy in the region. This line of analysis was taken by Elie Kedourie (1993) in *Democracy and Arab Political Culture* and Mohamed Z. El-Mogherbi (1989) in *Political Culture and the Issue of Democracy*. Kedourie used a historical approach to examine the political traditions of Islam, the introduction of Western ideas into the Middle East during the 19th century, and the ways in which those ideas took root or failed to do so.[46] He has described what he calls varieties of democratic experiences in the Arab countries. He found that one of the main reasons for the failure of Western constitutionalist traditions in the Middle East was that

> a newer Western political tradition, that of enlightened absolutism, had become familiar to the modernising Middle Eastern rulers of the nineteenth century. This other Western tradition, with its *penchant* for centralised control, chimed in much more easily with, indeed powerfully reinforced, the native autocratic tradition.[47]

Kedourie mentioned that in each of the countries which he examined, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, there were particular reasons why the constitutional experiment failed. The explanations which Kedourie gave for the failure of the constitutional experiment in the Arab countries involve measuring political culture through a historical approach rather than by measuring people's attitudes. The reason why a Western-style parliamentary democracy failed in Egypt between 1923 and 1952, he says, was that Zaghlulist populism was in competition with the rival royal court.[48] In the case of Iraq, between 1921 and 1938, the reason for failure was that the state was extremely heterogeneous and was devoid of any loyalty binding the population.[49] Also the pan-Arab ambitions of the regime excluded the Shiite and Kurdish majority, who were considered alien and dangerous. The Syrian experience of constitutional and representative government lasted for a shorter period than that in Egypt and Iraq. It continued from 1943 to 1949, but was then overwhelmed by successive military interventions, which the political elite who had taken over from the French mandatory government was powerless to stop.[50] In Lebanon, the constitution sought to maintain a balance between various groups, the army was never a threat to constitutional government and the parliamentary experience in contrast to other Arab countries like Syria. The parliamentary experience in Lebanon was affected by the country's political and military weakness. This led to a civil war between various militias which exploded in 1975 and also led to the armed intervention by two neighbouring states, Syria and Israel, in Lebanese territory.[51]

El-Mogherbi, in his study *The Arab Political Culture and the Issue of Democracy,* also focused on the relationship between democracy and Arab political culture.[52] He made use of the three types of political culture which Almond and Verba put forward in *The Civic Culture* (1963), namely parochial political culture, subject political culture, and participant political culture.[53] He concluded that Arab political culture is a subject political culture, in which individuals are aware of the output of the political system, but unaware of their role and their influence on the system. They do not participate in the processes that result in policy decisions.

El-Mogherbi emphasised that the values, orientations and patterns of behaviour which Arab individuals acquire in the early years of their lives and throughout their lives, through the agents of socialisation, create a strong relationship based on submission and authority. Arab social life is built within a framework of chains of authority and submission relations, between fathers and their children, brothers and sisters, old and young. This continues in the relationship between those governing and those being governed.[54] It becomes natural to the individuals to accept any authoritarian system. El-Mogherbi emphasised that this dominant type of political culture within the Arab society is a consequence of the socialisation process through different agents of socialisation: formal (i.e. education system and mass media) and informal (such as the family). He argued that not all values and patterns of behaviour which an individual learns have a link with political matters, but all may help in building their personality and affect their orientations in a way which later affects their political behaviour.

The submission, fear and the pattern of non-democratic behaviour characterised by the lack of free discussion and unwillingness to accept different opinions are a consequence of the process of social and political socialisation through the educational institutions and the family in particular.[55] El-Mogherbi concludes that the first step to build a real democracy in Arab societies is by changing the type of the dominant political culture based on authoritarian values and submission of the individual. For El-Mogherbi, democracy is "the right of the citizen to participate in decision-making in public affairs".[56] The task is to inculcate individuals with values which help to build a free and independent personality and create a participant political culture. This culture, which will give Arab citizens confidence in themselves, will underpin participation in the decision-making process. The change of political Arab culture needs a revolution within the educational systems, at home and in the mass media. This revolution should rebuild the Arab individual in order to change the structure of the Arab political culture towards democratic values.[57]

Another approach to Arab political culture from a general perspective emphasises the role of religion with it. Religion is seen as an important source of basic value orientation, with a powerful impact on political culture. Gehad Auda, in his study *The Islamic Movement and Resource Mobilization in Egypt: A Political Culture Perspective*, emphasised the increasing role of the Islamic movement in Egypt especially during the 1980s:

> The Islamic movement in Egypt has attempted to translate its political economic conceptions into action. The process was catalyzed by the increasing involvement of the state after 1952 in mobilising religion for political and social purposes. Democratisation processes were structurally conducive for the Islamic movement to wage a political economic war of manoeuvre against the government.[58]

According to Auda, on the one hand the Islamic movement in Egypt "facilitates the transition to democracy by liberating the sentiments and interests of the Muslim individual from domination by the modern state". On the other hand, it "captures the liberated Muslim individual into a new hegemonic set of values and principles". He points out that the "twin processes at once create an opening for democracy but prevent democracy from being realised and consolidated."[59] Auda finally stressed that the Islamic movement in its ideology and worldview accepts democracy only as a means for its advancement as a social movement".[60]

Another line looks at the relationship between Arab political culture and political development in general. Tawfic E. Farah in his study *Political Culture and Development in a Rentier State: The Case of Kuwait,*[61] used the concept of political culture to explain Kuwait's socio-economic and political development. He stated that "political culture in Kuwait is a function of its one-resource economy."

Farah attributed the successful achievements of the Kuwaiti political system to the political skills and management of the leadership of this country.[62] He concluded that Kuwait's "political culture creates a bond between Kuwaiti citizens and their ruler, with the bureaucracy promoting and strengthening allegiance to the state and its development policies."[63] He added also that families in Kuwait still dominate the social and political life.[64]

The final line of analysis of political Arab culture deals with "elite political culture". John P. Entelis, in his study on *Elite Political Culture and Socialisation in Algeria: Tensions and Discontinuities*, analysed the political culture in Algeria within a framework which differentiates elite political culture from mass political culture. The masses identify unswervingly with Islam and its religious symbols, while Algerians who deal with power and have responsibilities for the decisions of government develop a very different outlook.[65]

2.5.2 Empirical studies of political culture

This section covers studies of political culture in Arab countries based on empirical research. These studies examine the values, attitudes, orientations and behaviour of particular groups, that is, students or peasants. Kamal El-Menoufi's *The Political Culture of Egyptian Peasants* is an important study focusing on the changing attitudes of a particular group within the Egyptian society, that is, the peasants. The study was based on survey research. The purpose of his research was to "study the main variables determining the core and dimensions of the orientation of Egyptian peasants towards government authority."[66] El-Menoufi tried to clarify the extent to which the peasants' cultural attributes concerning government which existed before the 1952 revolution survived after the revolution.

El-Menoufi mentioned a number of factors affecting the attitudinal system of the Egyptian peasants towards government. The first of these was the physical environment, referring mainly to the Nile and the pattern of settlement in rural areas. Egypt is "an agricultural hydraulic society par excellence in the sense that agriculture is the main source of living and that irrigation relies almost totally on the River Nile. This necessitated, since time immemorial, large-scale irrigation projects, like canals, dikes, dams, barrages. It was difficult to achieve these projects without the interference of a central government."[67] On this point, El-Menoufi added that the Nile was responsible for the emergence of a central authority, while the landscape and the pattern of settlement provided for its tight control over the subject.[68] It can be said that the nature of the hydraulic society might be responsible for a political culture of submission and passivity within Egyptian society especially in the political culture of the peasants. The second factor was landholding. The rural socio-economic structure changed to a considerable degree during the late 1950s and early 1960s as a consequence of the reform laws of the revolutionary regime in Egypt. For instance, the percentage of small-landholdings increased from 35 percent in 1952 to 57 percent in 1965. But in general landownership remained unbalanced. El-Menoufi concluded that poverty in the Egyptian context was often conducive to passivity, alienation and subordination.[69]

The third factor was the mode of governance. El-Menoufi described the authority as highly central and personal, and strictly hierarchical. Relationship between people and government was a one-way process, with very limited popular participation, and decision-making was in the hands of the ruler. The situation remained the same in Nasser's and Sadat's Egypt. The president was the highest authority; after him came ministers, governors and mayors.[70]

The final factor was the socialisation process. El-Menoufi emphasised that in the case of Egypt, the socio-political context imposed an authoritarian mode of socialisation. The socialisation process in Egyptian rural areas has always been authoritarian and as a result has contributed to the peasants' subordination to government.[71]

El-Menoufi empirically examined some aspects of the peasants' orientations. These aspects were: the cult of authority, the personification of authority, the mistrust of authority, and excessive dependence on government. Finally, El-Menoufi concluded two main things: first, the societal milieu which the peasants experienced throughout history caused them to adopt certain beliefs, attitudes and feelings concerning government; second, the political system of the 1952 revolution failed to transform these cultural attributes.[72] El-Menoufi's work is significant for the study of political culture in Libya, especially as both it and the present study deal with the attitudes of particular groups within the society (peasants in El-Menoufi's study, and students in the present study). It is also important to note that the Egyptian revolution sought to change mass attitudes, as the Libyan revolution did.

Another area of empirical research has explored the role of religion as a factor determining the social and political positions of Muslims. Iyad Barghouti, in his study on *Religion and Politics among the Students of Najah National University*, in Nablus discussed the relationship between the degree of religious observance and the socio-political positions of a random sample of 383 students.[73] Barghouti's study showed that the male respondents were less religious than the female respondents. As he explained, the reason for this was that "the concept of morality in Islamic culture requires more of women than of men"[74] Another finding was that students in the College of Science seemed to be more religious than students of other colleges. There was a clear relationship between the social background and the religious observance of the respondents. Those who came from merchant families were less religious than those who came from a worker background. Those whose mothers were not employed outside of the home were more religious than the children of non-working mothers.

Barghouti also examined the relationship between religious observance and his sample's political positions. His findings showed that students who were arrested by the Israelis (80 percent of the respondents) were less religiously observant than those who had not been arrested. He noticed that 21.7 percent of respondents who were arrested never observed religious occasions. He was also surprised that 23.2 percent of the respondents who had been arrested always observe religious occasions. When he talked to many of the last group, he found that some of them became religious in prison or after leaving it.[75]

One of the studies which have dealt with political attitudes as part of the political culture is Raymond A. Hinnebusch's study of *Children of the Elite: Political Attitudes of the Westernised Bourgeoisie in Contemporary Egypt*. It is significant to the present study because it was based on a survey of the political attitudes of a particular group. Its aim was to explore the political ideology of the Westernised wing of the Egyptian bourgeoisie through a study of the attitudes of its children.[76] The "Westernised bourgeoisie" are the professional, business and government elements of the upper and upper-middle income strata who have received a Western education.[77] Hinnebusch's survey covered the attitudes of 145 students at the American University in Cairo in 1977 and 1978. His survey examined personal values, political identity, foreign policy attitudes, political leadership, and political system preference and socio-economic attitudes. Hinnebusch concluded from his findings that the "Westernised bourgeoisie in developing countries is unlikely to be a political monolith and it is certainly not in Egypt."[78] His survey suggests that, despite lingering differences,

> a considerable consensus on many vital matters has brought the various segments of the Egyptian bourgeoisie together. 1) Internally, the bourgeoisie prefers a secular liberal democratic capitalist course. It dislikes authoritarianism, but will acquiesce in such an order if the regime defends or advances the bourgeoisie's preferred capitalist socio-economic policies. 2) Externally, the bourgeoisie advocates a Western political alignment and economic integration into the world capitalist market, provided it is accepted by the West as a junior partner in these relations.[79]

Hinnebusch concluded that the attitudes of the respondents of his study seem to be very typical of bourgeois ideology in the Third World.[80]

The importance and interest of Barghouti's and Hinnebusch's findings for the researcher's study of political culture in Libya is clear. Both studies were based on an empirical survey of young people's attitudes.

2.6 The Analysis of Political Socialisation in the Arab Countries

This section deals with political socialisation studies in the Arab countries. As previously noted, there are relatively few studies that involve investigations of people's beliefs, values, and orientations towards politics and the political process. Similarly, there are also few studies which deal with political socialisation.

One of the most significant studies of political socialisation is Mohamed Zahi El-Mogherbi's study *The Socialisation of School Children in Libya*. Importantly, he used content analysis of the textbooks as his method. He focused on the value structure of the Libyan political leadership as revealed in school textbooks or readers used in Libya. His main assumption was

that "the school readers reflect the basic or core values which the Libyan leadership wishes to inculcate in its citizens. Further, it is assumed that the readers reflect the basic value orientations of the Libyan leadership."[81] El-Mogherbi used in his study the textbooks of the first nine grades of the educational system.

In his analysis of the textbooks, El-Mogherbi used the same categories as Ridley and his associates in their study of Communist China.[82] According to El-Mogherbi, the reading material fell generally into three major types: first, stories that were primarily informative, or informational. Second, stories that had the development of specific political attitudes as their primary intent. Third, stories whose main aim was behavioural modelling.[83] El-Mogherbi found that the readers were dominated by themes on Arab nationalism and unity, Islamic values, socialism, and social solidarity. For instance, he found that informational themes in these textbooks gave information about Arab and Islamic history and Arab countries.[84] Political themes emphasised the Arab struggle against imperialism, the Palestinian revolution, Arab unity, and achievements of the regime.[85] Behavioural themes in the textbooks focused on the importance of collective work and fostered the sense of social responsibility as well as general adherence to the teachings of Islam.[86]

El-Mogherbi found that the themes in the reading books are in congruence with the official ideology of the regime. This degree of congruence showed the concerted efforts of the regime in socialising its citizens, in his case the school children in Libya.

A similar work, which was based on El-Mogherbi's method of analysing the content of textbooks, was Amal Obeidi's study *Political Socialisation of School Children in Libya: A Content Analysis of School Readers 1979-1988.*[87] The same types of themes were used: informational, political and behavioural. Obeidi's findings showed that the regime had increased the emphasis on political themes since El-Mogherbi's study. Consider that the percentages of the three types of themes in El-Mogherbi's (1978) study were informational 38 percent, political 30 percent and behavioural 32 percent. By 1988, the percentages of the three types of themes in the Obeidi's study were: informational 36 percent, political 37 percent, and behavioural 27 percent.

Other studies of political socialisation are based on empirical work such as Tawfic E. Farah, *et al, Political Socialisation in the Arab States.*[88] This study covered political socialisation in three major Arab areas: the Gulf area, the Maghreb, and Egypt. It also covered socialisation among Palestinians. The main study which dealt with attitudes and feelings towards political authorities was Farah's study of Palestinian children in Kuwait.[89] Farah's sample covered 240

Palestinian children, between 10 to 16 years. He investigated whether and how the children support the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Yasir Arafat. Farah hypothesised that exposure to political indoctrination would raise support levels. One of the interesting findings was that Arafat was the best known and most highly supported leader among the children. Arafat was viewed different in Rosemary Sayigh's study *Source of Palestinian Nationalism: A Study of a Palestinian Camp in Lebanon.*[90] In Sayigh's study, Arafat was simply mentioned as one of the Palestinian leaders, and praised for living the "life of the people." Sayigh's findings showed a consistent tendency by the respondents to impersonalize their leaders, by referring to the "revolution" and not to individual names.[91]

Michael W. Suleiman's study *Socialisation to Politics in Morocco: Sex and Regional Factors* looked at the attitudes and orientations of elementary school children in Morocco towards politics and government. The sample covered 740 students, 366 boys and 374 girls. His research also involved "an attempt to determine their knowledge of and about political leaders and issues and their sense of identity as Moroccan nationals."[92] The findings of his study showed that there was a strong sense of identification. The loyalty and attachment to the country were high among the children. Two-thirds of them said that the Moroccan flag was the most beautiful flag and Morocco was the greatest country. Yet children were well informed and more familiar with Western leaders than with Muslim and Arab ones. Also, the findings showed that attitudes of boys and girls towards politics and politicians tended to be similar.[93]

It is clear that although political culture and political socialisation have been subject to criticism the concepts are still widely regarded as having utility. This study benefits both from the general theoretical works and from some of the studies carried out on political culture outside the Arab countries, but it links in most directly with the small numbers of empirical studies on political culture and political socialisation carried out within the Arab countries. Barghouti's, Hinnebusch's, Farah's, and El-Mogherbi's studies have raised some of the questions and issues which the researcher pursues in this study of the political attitudes of Libyan university students. No overall conclusions follow from this literature, but its value lies in showing the variety of respects in which political culture and political socialisation can be explored. Two of the studies, in particular, set the context within which the research is set: El-Mogherbi's work on political socialisation indicates clearly that the Libyan regime has sought to use the educational system to inculcate Libyans, especially school children, with the values of the regime's ideology in order to change their attitudes and opinions, while El-Menoufi's work shows that in the case of Egypt the revolutionary regime failed in its attempt

to use political socialisation to change the attitudes and opinions of Egyptian peasants. The direct concern of this thesis, then, is whether the experience with Egypt's peasants will apply to that of Libyan students.

Notes to Chapter 2

[1] David J. Elkins and Richard E. B. Simeon, "A Case in Search of its Effect, or What does Political Culture Explain?", *Comparative Politics*, vol. 11, no. 2, 1979, p. 127.

[2] Stephen Welch, *The Concept of Political Culture*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1993), pp. 164-165.

[3] Ronald Inglehart, "The Renaissance of Political Culture", *American Political Science Review*, vol. 82, no. 4, December 1988, pp. 1203-1230.

[4] Gabriel A. Almond, "Foreword: The Return to Political Culture", in Larry Diamond (ed), *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), p. ix.

[5] Quoted in Gabriel A. Almond, "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept" in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (eds), *The Civic Culture Revisited*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), p. 2.

[6] Mohamed Zahi El-Mogherbi, *The Socialization of School Children in the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya*, (University of Missouri, PhD thesis, 1978), p. 13.

[7] Gabriel A. Almond, "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept", op.cit., p. 4.

[8] Abu Nasr Al-Farabi was one of the greatest Islamic philosophers and a leading proponent of Islamic Neoplatonism. He became known as 'The Second Master' (i.e. after Aristotle). See Ian Richard Netton, *A Popular Dictionary of Islam*, (London: Curzon Press, 1992), p. 79.

[9] Richard E. Dawson *et al*, *Political Socialization*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977), p. 3.

[10] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. 2, (New York: Knopf, 1945), p. 8.

[11] Gabriel A. Almond, *A Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects in Political Science*, (Newbury Park, CA, and London: Sage Publications, 1990), pp. 140-141.

[12] Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, (London: Sage Publications, 1989), p. 12.

[13] Ibid., p. 14.

[14] Ibid., p. 14.

[15] Ibid., p. 16.

[16] Ibid., pp. 17-18.

[17] Quoted in Ronald H. Chilcote, *Theories of Comparative Politics: The Search for a Paradigm*, (Colorado: Westview Press, 1981), p. 225. See also Lucian Pye's definition of "Political Culture" in *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 12, (The Macmillan Company and Free Press, 1968), p. 218.

[18] Ronald H. Chilcote, op.cit., p. 225.

[19] Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture" in Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba (eds), *Political Culture and Political Development*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 513.

[20] Ronald H. Chilcote, op.cit., p. 225.

[21] Dennis Kavanagh, *British Politics: Continuities and Change*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 49.

[22] Kamal El-Menoufi, *Al-Thaqafa al-Siyasiyya lil-Fallahin al-Misriyyin*, [The Political Culture of Egyptian Peasants] (Beirut: Dar Ibn Khaldun, 1980), p. 21.

[23] Arend Lijphart, "The Structure of Inference" in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (eds), *The Civic Culture Revisited*, op.cit., p. 38.

[24] Ibid., p. 38.

[25] See Carole Pateman to the concept of political culture, "The Civic Culture: A Philosophic Critique" in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (eds), *The Civic Culture Revisited*, op.cit., pp. 66-70.

[26] John Street, "Review Article: Political Culture – from Civic Culture to Mass Culture" *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 24, part 1, January 1994, p. 100.

[27] Jerzy J. Wiatr, "The Civic Culture from a Marxist-Sociological Perspective" in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (eds), *The Civic Culture Revisited*, op.cit., p. 114.

[28] Carole Pateman, op.cit., p. 84.

[29] Gabriel A. Almond *et al*, *Comparative Politics: A Theoretical Framework*, (New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 1993), p. 45.

[30] Ibid., p. 45.

[31] Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 24.

[32] Ibid., p. 24.

[33] D. Easton and J. Dennis, *Children in the Political System*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), p. 7.

[34] F. Greenstein, "Political Socialisation" in *International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences*, vol. 14, (New York: Macmillan Company and the Free Press, 1968), p. 551.

[35] Ted Tapper, *Political Education and Stability: Elite Responses to Political Conflict*, (Bath: The Pitman Press, 1976), p. 38.

[36] See Richard Dawson *et al*, *Political Socialisation*, (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1977), pp. 114-189.

[37] Gabriel A. Almond *et al*, *Comparative Politics: A Theoretical Framework*, op.cit., p. 46.

[38] Ibid., p. 46.

[39] Mehran Karmrava, *Politics and Society in the Third World*, (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 138.

[40] Gabriel A. Almond *et al*, *Comparative Politics: A Theoretical Framework*, op.cit., p. 46.

[41] Ibid., p. 46. See Richard R. Fagen, *The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969).

[42] Jamahirian as a word came from Jamahiriyya (the state of masses).

[43] Gabriel A. Almond *et al*, *Comparative Politics: A Theoretical Framework*, op.cit., p. 46., p. 46.

[44] Ibid., p. 46.

[45] Ibid., p. 46.

[46] For more details see Elie Kedourie, *Democracy and Arab Political Culture*, (London: Frank Cass, 1994).

[47] Ibid., p. 104.

[48] Ibid., pp. 63-81.

[49] Ibid., p. 104.

[50] Ibid., p. 104.

[51] Ibid., p. 56.

[52] Mohamed Zahi El-Mogherbi, "Al-Thaqafa al-Siyasiyya al-Arabiyya Wa Qadiyat al-Diymoqratiyya" [The Arab Political Culture and the Issue of Democracy], *Al-Thaqafa al-Arabiyya* [The Arab Culture], vol. 16, no. 6 May 1989, pp. 6-15.

[53] See Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture*, op.cit., pp. 61-18.

[54] Mohamed Zahi El-Mogherbi, "Al-Thaqafa al- Siyasiyya al-Arabiyya Wa Qadiyat al-Diymoqratiyya", op.cit., p. 9.

[55] Ibid., p. 12. El-Mogherbi agrees with Hisham Sharabi on the role of the Arab family and the type of education system in creating submission values within Arab individuals, which leads to a subject political culture. See Hisham Sharabi, *Muqaddima li-Dirasat al-Mujtama^{c} al-Arabi* [Introduction to the Study of Arab Society), (Beirut: Al-'Ahliyya lil-Nashrr wa al-Tawuzi^{c}, 1980), p. 29.

[56] Ibid., p. 7.

[57] Ibid., p. 14.

[58] Gehad Auda, "The Islamic Movement and Resource Mobilization in Egypt: A Political Culture Perspective" in Larry Diamond (ed), *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), pp. 402-403.

[59] Ibid., pp. 403-404.

[60] Ibid., p. 404.

[61] Rentier states are defined as those countries that receive on a regular basis substantial amounts of external rent. External rents are in turn defined as rentals paid by foreign individuals, concerns, or governments of a given country .... Oil revenues received by the governments of the oil exporting countries have very little to do with the production processes of their domestic economies .... The input requirements of the oil industry from the local economies ... is so insignificant that for all practical purposes one can consider the oil revenues almost as a free gift of nature or as a grant from foreign sources. Quoted in Tawfic E. Farah, "Political Culture and Development in a Rentier State: The Case of Kuwait" in Joseph G. Jabbra (ed), *Bureaucracy and Development in the Arab World*, (Leiden: E. J. Bill, 1989), p. 110.

[62] Ibid., p. 111.

[63] Ibid., p. 106.

[64] Ibid., p. 111. This study was written before the Gulf War. The researcher suggests that it would be useful to carry out a similar study today considering the international and internal changes within the Gulf region and the effects of these changes on political, social and economic attitudes in Kuwait.

[65] John P. Entelis, "Elite Political Culture and Socialisation in Algeria: Tensions and Discontinuities", *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 35, no. 2, Spring 1981, p. 191.

[66] Kamal El-Menoufi, *Al-Thaqafa al-Siyasiyya lil-Fallahin al-Misriyyin*, [The Political Culture of Egyptian Peasants], op.cit., pp. 9-39. See also Kamal El-Menoufi, "The Orientation of Egyptian Peasants Towards Political Authority Between Continuity and Change", *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 18, no. 1, January 1982, pp. 82-93.

[67] Kamal El-Menoufi, "The Orientation of Egyptian Peasants Towards Political Authority Between Continuity and Change", Ibid., p. 82.

[68] Ibid., p. 82.

[69] Ibid., pp. 83-84.

[70] Ibid., p. 85.

[71] Ibid. p. 86.

[72] Ibid., p. 90.

[73] Iyad Barghouti, "Religion and Politics among the Students of Najah National University" *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 27, no. 2, April 1991, pp. 203- 218.

[74] Ibid., p. 205.

[75] Ibid., pp. 208-217. See Barghouti's examination of different aspects such as religious observance and culture, and religious observance and politics.

[76] Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "Children of the Elite: Political Attitudes of the Westernized Bourgeoisie in Contemporary Egypt", *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 36, no. 4, Autumn 1982, p. 535.

[77] Ibid., p. 535.

[78] Ibid., p. 561.

[79] Ibid., p. 561.

[80] Ibid., p. 561.

[81] Mohamed Zahi El-Mogherbi, The Socialisation of School Children in the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya, (University of Missouri, PhD thesis, 1978), pp. 1-12.

[82] Ibid., p. 8. See Charles Ridley *et al*, *The Making of a Model Citizen in Communist China*, (Stanford: The Hoover Institution Press, 1971), p. 19.

[83] Mohamed Zahi El-Mogherbi, *The Socialisation of School Children in the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya*, op.cit., p. 9.

[84] Ibid., pp. 65-72.

[85] Ibid., pp. 73-91.

[86] Ibid., pp. 92-116.

[87] Amal S. M., Obeidi, *Political Socialisation of School Children in Libya: A Content Analysis of School Readers, 1979-1988*, (Garyunis University, Benghazi, MA Dissertation, 1990).

[88] Tawfic E. Farah and Yasumasa Kuroda (eds), *Political Socialisation in the Arab States*, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987).

[89] Tawfic E. Farah, "Learning to Support the PLO: Political Socialisation of Palestinian Children in Kuwait" in Tawfic E. Farah and Yasumasa Kuroda (eds), ibid., pp. 171-183.

[90] Rosemary Sayigh, "Source of Palestinian Nationalism: A Study of a Palestinian Camp in Lebanon", in ibid., pp. 185-205.

[91] Jo-Anne Hart, "Arab States and the Crossfires of Allegiance: The Role of Political Socialisation", ibid., pp. 1-17.

[92] Michael W. Suleiman, "Socialization to Politics in Morocco: Sex and Regional Factors", ibid., p. 129.

[93] Ibid., p. 141.

3. The Shaping of Libya's Contemporary Political Culture

3.1 Introduction

The historical background of Libya provides some understanding of the factors and elements which have shaped the political culture of contemporary Libyan society. This chapter gives particular attention to the role played by education and religion within the historical background. It then goes on to examine the state ideology of the revolutionary regime since 1969 through three main stages: first, from the founding of the revolution in September 1969 to 1973; second, from the popular revolution in April 1973 to 1975; third, the period from 1976 to 1977 which include the Declaration of "the Authority of the People" in March 1977 to date. Finally, the chapter examines the revolutionary regime's use of political socialisation as an instrument to create "revolutionary citizens." Special attention is given to the education system as a political socialisation agent.

3.2 Political Culture in Libya: A Historical Framework

Each historical era has played a crucial role in affecting both the political experience and the political environment of Libya, encompassing the political structure of the country, the hierarchical nature of authority, and the beliefs, attitudes and behavioural patterns of the masses. The name *Libya* was given by the Greeks, firstly to an area which included most of North Africa. Secondly, the Greeks used the term *Libya* to refer to the region inhabited by the 'Berbers'. The original name of Libya derived from the name of a single Berber tribe known to the ancient Egyptians. Although the name is ancient, it was not used to designate the specific territory within the boundaries of modern Libya until the twentieth century.

The territory known as Libya is divided by the Sirte desert, which splits the region Tripolitania in the west from Cyrenaica in the east, while Fazzan in the south is effectively part of the Sahara desert. In ancient history Tripolitania was controlled by the Phoenicians and came under their sphere of influence; the Greeks controlled Cyrenaica; and Fazzan was part of the kingdom of Garamentes. The Roman empire dominated Tripolitania and Cyrenaica for almost four centuries, which became provinces of the empire.

The first major political transformation in Libyan history was in 642 AD., when ᶜAmru bin il-ᶜAas conquered Cyrenaica. Two years later he moved into Tripolitania, and later in 663 AD Fazzan was put under Arab control. The Arab conquerors settled and married Berber women. Islam was spread in the area despite the resistance of some of the Berber tribes in the desert.[1]

Throughout history, the regions of Libya have tended to look in different directions. Tripolitania was part of the Maghrib and was linked to Muslim Spain; Cyrenaica came under the political influence of the Umayyad[2] caliph of Damascus in 712 and later under that of the Fatimids[3] and the Hilalians[4]. As Naur states:

> Tripolitania belonged to Hafsid Era, oriented towards the west including Spain, while Cyrenaica came under the Mamluks together with Egypt, and Fazzan was oriented towards black Africa.[5]

In 1551, Libya became part of the Ottoman empire and remained part of it for nearly four centuries until the Italian invasion in 1911. However, there was an interlude when the Qaramanali dynasty, which was essentially an autonomous part of the Ottoman empire, declared an independent monarchy, which lasted from 1711 until 1835.

The Italians occupied Libya in 1911 and their occupation lasted almost three decades, while the decade of British and French administration gave way at the beginning of the 1950s to an independent state. Under the auspices of the United Nations, independence was gained on December 24, 1951. The new state was initially known as the United Libyan Kingdom, and later as the Kingdom of Libya. In 1969 a military coup d'état abolished the monarchy. The birth of the Libyan Arab Republic was proclaimed, initiating a new era in the modern political history of Libya.

Thus prior to the modern era of colonialism and post-colonialism, one can identify a number of features of Libyan history. First, Libya has been colonised by numerous foreign powers. These '*circles of colonialism*' were largely due to the value and importance of Libya's geographical location. Second, the main source of danger was in the North via the sea. Colonialism via the Mediterranean Sea was the primary form of conquest, thus reflecting the

strategic importance of the Mediterranean as a centre and focus of power in the old world order.[6] Third, the different political heritages and cultural links split the country into two parts: Tripolitania (and to a lesser extent Fazzan) belonged to the Muslim west (North-west Africa); whilst Cyrenaica belonged to the Muslim east.[7]

Economic factors have always played a crucial role in shaping Libyan history. Until the 1950s, Libya was an extremely poor country. In 1952, a study of Libya compiled by the United Nations described the country as ..."an excellent example of universal poverty in an extreme form."[8] Also, Higgins in 1968 described pre-1950 Libya as "a prototype of an underdeveloped country."[9] Thus, until independence Libya was one of the poorest nations in the world, with a per capita income of less than $30 per year in 1951, and $100 per year in 1960. This situation began to change following the discovery of oil at the end of the 1950s, although this was not without its own problems. As El Fathaly comments, "Wealth in itself does not produce economic or political modernisation."[10] Increased revenue from oil led to a drastic decrease in revenue from other areas of the economy, especially agriculture. It also brought about a dramatic increase in migration from rural to urban centres. As El-Fathaly states, "excessive and unguided wealth tends to generate corruption, political conflict, waste, massive urban migration, dependency on the government and the decay of the agrarian sector."[11]

To obtain some further idea of how historical factors have shaped the existing political culture, an analysis of the education system, religion and social institutions (such as the family, tribe, clan etc.) will prove useful.

3.2.1 The role of the education system

The education system in any society is directly linked with the socio-economic and political system. This is due to the potential of education to act as an instrument of support for the political system, although history has also shown examples where the education system has helped to nurture a counter-culture to the prevailing ethos of the ruling regime. A historical study of the development of the education system in Libya follows the same divisions as the study of the general history of the country, i.e. the Ottoman period 1551-1911, the Italian occupation 1911-1943, the British and French administrations 1943-1951, and the period under the monarchy.

During most of the Ottoman period, education was not a concern of the state. This began to change in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Initially education was the sole preserve

of religious institutions such as the *katatib*, [the Quranic schools], and *zawayya*[12] [religious lodges]. These institutions, which were almost self-contained local communities, taught the Arabic language, Quranic science, Islamic jurisprudence and the *hadith*. Education was thus oriented towards religion.

Education in Ottoman times suffered from a limited curriculum and the absence of opportunities for females, which reflected the wider societal discrimination between males and females. It was not until the last decade of the nineteenth century that the Ottoman regime began to introduce a more modern education system. The primary motive behind this move was to provide employees for the state, i.e. the bureaucracy and the army. This ushered in the establishment of:

a) Primary schools, which provided three years of study and were funded by private means. The pupils could study Arabic and Turkish, the Islamic religion, Turkish history, geography and mathematics. Initially these schools were located in Benghazi and Tripoli.

b) *Al-madaris al-Rushdia* [mature schools], which provided education for three years to pupils who had finished their study in the primary schools. The pupils in these schools started at eleven years and finished at fourteen or fifteen. The schools were divided into military and civilian schools. They provided a modern scientific curriculum and lessons were conducted in Turkish by Turkish teachers. The state established five schools of this type in Tripoli, Benghazi, al-Khummus, Darna and Fazzan. A separate school was established for girls in Tripoli.[13]

c) Preparatory schools, which filled the same role as secondary schools in the current education system. These schools provided four years of education in which pupils studied Arabic, Turkish, Persian and French. Turkish was the main language.

d) Technical schools. Examples of these were the *Madrasat al-Funun wa al-Sana'i*[c] [School of Industrial Arts] established in 1898, and *al-Madrasa al-Zira*[c]*iya* [The Agricultural School] founded in 1909. Both institutions were in Tripoli. There were also a number of teacher training schools providing a two-year training course set up in both Tripoli and Benghazi at the beginning of this century.

Despite the development of education in the above sectors, the Ottomans failed to develop higher education. Students who were able and had the desire to attend higher education establishments usually studied in the *Asitana* in Istanbul, *al-'Azhar* Mosque in Egypt and the

al-Zaituna Mosque in Tunisia. Such opportunities, however, were only open to the elite, i.e. those whose families were able to support them financially. Some of the institutions in the *Asitana*, such as the *Madrasat Abna' al-ᶜAsha'ir* [School of the Clans' Children] were the first choice for the leaders of tribes and clans throughout the Ottoman *vilayet* [provinces]. The aim of these schools was to prepare the students and inculcate them with loyalty to the Ottoman empire, creating elites who would become part of the state and continue to support its hegemony.[14] The Ottomans also encouraged Libyans and Arabs throughout the empire's provinces to attend military schools.

To conclude, the main characteristics of the education system during the Ottoman era can be summarised as the following:

a) The education system was based on religious education. The only centres of learning in Libyan during the early stages were religious institutions situated in a small number of cities throughout the country.

b) The education system suffered from a limited curriculum, although towards the end of the nineteenth century a wider curriculum began to appear.

c) Education remained the preserve of the elite, who had the necessary economic resources to enable their children to study. The appearance of elite education, especially in the form of higher education, constituted an attempt to inculcate the children of the elite with values such as loyalty to prepare them to be part of the state system.

The second major period was that of Italian rule, from 1911 to 1943. The Italian period can be broken down into two main eras, from 1911 to October 1922 (the Fascist coup d'état in Italy) and from 1922 until the Italian defeat in the Second World War in 1943. It is important to mention the role of foreign schools in Libya at this time. Education was an important instrument for foreign countries to spread their culture and later their domination. The Italians had in fact been active in the field of education in Libya since 1810 when Franciscan missionaries established a primary school in Tripoli.[15] By 1911 there were already twelve Italian schools in Tripoli and Benghazi, which were free of charge. The initial approach had been to penetrate Libya peacefully through economic and cultural activities; education was one of the main agents that Italy used in preparing to occupy Libya.

During the Italian occupation, the government increased the number of schools all over the country. The main purpose of these schools was to teach the Italian language and spread

Italian culture among the students. This was all part of a colonial project aimed at *Italianization*, thus creating Libyans whose loyalty and respect would be towards Rome.[16] In his description of the education system and the teaching process during the colonial period, Hajjaji wrote

> The teaching system was primarily Italian oriented. For instance, the class day was comprised of four hours, of which two hours were devoted to Arabic, in which the pupils learned to read and write about Italian culture in Arabic; the other two hours were devoted to learning Italian language and culture. It should be noted that if a pupil failed in the Arabic class and succeeded in the Italian class, he could pass to the next class but not vice versa.[17]

Italy provided nursery, primary, secondary and technical schools. There were also Italian Arabic schools which had the dual aim of attracting Arabic students to learn about Italian culture, as well as teaching Italian students the Arabic language, which would help the Italians in controlling Libya. The school curriculum and the contents of textbooks played a vital role in the overall process of Italianization. For example, one book began:

> Italy offers you a great deal, it protects men, property and religion ... Rome ruled the world in the old ages, Libya flourished under Roman rule ... God give me increasing love to Italy, my second home ... I love Italy, great love, long live Italy, let us salute the beautiful Italian flag which is our flag too ... Long live the Duce of Italy Benito Mussolini.[18]

The overall aim was thus to spread Italian culture as an appendage of Italian colonialism and to create a new generation who believed in the Italian Empire and held an admiration for fascist ideology. Libyan citizens fought against the education system and the policy of Italianization, especially during the early years of occupation, which resulted in the death of many Libyans and the loss of land for many people. They refused to send their children to Italian schools, fearing that they would lose their Islamic faith, culture and traditions. Deeb and Deeb wrote

> What at first sight appeared to have been an achievement of the Italian rule gives a completely different picture when broken down to its various parts. It is our belief that the local population in Libya reacted to the forced 'Italianization' of the colonial educator by opening as many *Katatib* or Quranic schools as possible, funded by its own personal wealth, to educate Libyan children and preserve their religion, language and cultural heritage through those institutions.[19]

Following the defeat of Italy in 1943, the education system carried the residue of both the Ottoman and Italian legacies. Additionally, during the period of British rule in Cyrenaica from late 1942 and in Tripoli from 1943, and of French rule in Fazzan the educational policy of the British-French administrations divided Libya into three units. In Fazzan the French-Tunisian curriculum was adopted; in Cyrenaica, the Egyptian curriculum was used; and the curriculum

chosen in Tripoli was the one employed in Palestine during the British mandate. After revolts by Libyans against the discrimination and fragmented nature of education, the Egyptian system was also adopted in Tripoli.[20]

The main characteristics of the education during this period (1943-51) were as follows:

Until independence in 1951, the curriculum of education was not stable, resulting in frequent and extensive changes in methods and subject matter. Education policy lacked clarity and was fragmented, resulting in differing levels of development throughout the country. Tripolitania witnessed the Palestinian system, which was replaced later by the Sudanese education system. Cyrenaica, on the other hand, experienced the Egyptian system of education. In Fazzan, the French administration failed to put much emphasis on education.

As a specific effect of the 1943-51 period, the Libyan people realised the importance of education and endeavoured to give their children the opportunity to learn. This resulted in increasing demands to re-open the schools which had closed during the war.

The British administration paid more attention to secular education and "established vocational schools separate from religious educational institutions."[21] They also brought in many teachers from other Arab countries to teach. This was one major contributory factor in inculcating Libyan students with certain political values relating to Arab nationalism and Arab identity.

Greater opportunities for education were given to female students than before. This was due, in part, to an English lady who was the principal of a girls' school and the co-operation and support of many Egyptian wives of Libyans, who tried to nurture and spread female education. This led to the establishment of a teacher training college for women in 1950, which resulted in a dramatic increase in the numbers of female teachers.[22]

Post-independence, during the monarchical period, the Libyan government regarded education as a continuing challenge. Their first step was the declaration of Education Law No. 5 in 1952. This gave everybody a right to education and made ..."education compulsory and free in the elementary schools, and free through every stage of education all over Libya." The two main universities were established (in Tripoli and Benghazi) in the 1950s.[23] The main thrust of education policy was directed towards:

a) Consolidation of an Arab education. According to the Libyan constitution, the state was an Arab state with Islam as its religion, and Arabic as its language. Therefore the

primary objective of the state in education was to direct education towards these foundations.

b) Compulsory and free education. According to Articles 28, 29 and 30 of the constitution, all Libyans had a right to education and the state would spread education nation-wide through the establishment of schools.

c) The establishment of a specialised multi-stream system addressed the needs of different groups. The education system was sub-divided into non-technical education (which had five stages) and vocational and technical education; and religious education, organised in two stages.

Despite the fact that the foundations of the modern education system were in place, the education system still suffered from a number of basic problems. Deeb and Deeb listed some of these:

> First 86.7 per cent of the total school population in 1967 was in primary schools; second, technical education had not been encouraged nor were teachers' training centres instructing enough Libyans, with the result that schools were relying more and more heavily on non-Libyan teachers; and finally small primary Quranic schools with traditional syllabi were attracting an increasing number of students every year.[24]

The role of Libya's neighbour Egypt had an important impact on the education system and the curriculum. According to Hajjaji, "a new modified Egyptian system of teaching and curriculum was agreed between the Libyan and Egyptian governments under which Egypt would co-operate in developing Libyan education by sending teachers and books."[25] Libya therefore became dependent on Egypt for materials and teachers, which in turn had an impact on the development of political ideas and beliefs amongst the student population. El-Mogherbi concluded:

> Instead of exerting efforts to create a feeling of Libyan identity and nationalism the textbooks were full of stories about Arab history and Arab Nationalism. The textbooks were written and printed in Egypt. They glorified the idea of Arab unity and the Arab struggle against imperialism.[26]

El-Mogherbi goes on to cite several examples from different textbooks which emphasise a plethora of ideas relating to nationalism and an Arab nation. Take for example a seventh grade reading book, which contained the following: "we are careful to include in this book the elements that make the Arab student feel that a new spirit exists in him, and create in his character the pride in language, Arab nationalism and Arab Nation."[27] This comes under the title '*About the Flags of the Arab Countries*', "If your country is your known state, the Arab Nation is your country. You are an Arab first. Your larger nation stretches from the Atlantic

Ocean to the Arabian Gulf."[28] Finally under the title *'I am an Arab'*, it states: "I am an Arab. Yes, I say it with all pride and happiness. I am not alone. Every Arab is my brother in language, religion, feeling and nationhood ... Yes, I am an Arab from Libya."[29]

Although the education system in Libya did evolve over time, not all changes had an equal effect on the identity and values of the population. As was mentioned, Ottoman and Italian schools were a) only open to a small upper stratum of society and b) generally not popular. A way out was religious education in Quranic schools, which helped to create a resistance culture, especially against Italy. These Quranic schools and the post-independence teaching of Arab nationalism left a strong mark on the majority of Libyans.

After the revolution, education became an important political instrument of the regime to spread its ideology among its young citizens. Further details will be given later in this chapter.

3.2.2 The role of religion

The most powerful influence on Libyan society historically was that exerted by religion. Ever since Islam and the Arabs came to Libya in 642 AD, religion has played a very important role. It "significantly affects the structure, values and attitudes of Libyan society. It is a primary unit of loyalty and identity."[30] It has penetrated the social, economic, cultural and political spheres of Libya. Religion had two somewhat contradictory effects on Libyan political culture. As mentioned, religion helped to nurture a *'resistance culture'* which helped to protect the culture of the country and maintain the language, especially during the centuries of foreign rule. On the other hand, it dominated traditional culture—affecting many aspects of politics, society, and economics. In this respect it contributed to a culture of conformity and fatalism. Therefore the importance of religion requires additional explanation.

In the course of the 18th and 19th centuries, Libya became one of the three main areas within the Arab world where religious reformist orders evolved. These included the *al-Wahabiyya* order on the Arabian Peninsula, the *al-Mahdiyya* movement in Sudan, while Libya gave birth to the *al-Sanusiyya* order. El-Mogherbi indicates that

> These orders brought about a religious enlightenment and called for the return to the early Islam and for adherence to the strict teachings of the Qur'an and the Sunna.[31]

The Sanusi order was an Islamic revivalist movement whose ascribed purpose was to purge Islam of the impurities that had accrued over previous centuries. The order was based on a network of *zawayya* situated at desert oases between Sudan and Tripolitania. The history of

the Sanusi order started in the Hijaz in 1837. A few years later it moved to al-Bayda'a in Cyrenaica where Muḥammad bin Ali al-Sanusi al-Khattabi al-Ḥasani al-Idrisi established *al-Zawia al-Bayda'a* in *al-Jabal al Akhdar* [the Green Mountain], the first Sanusi *zawiya* [lodge], in 1843. After that, the order spread across Cyrenaica, Fazzan and beyond.[32]

The principles of the Sanusiyya order are based on the ideas of its founder, Muḥammad bin Ali al-Sanusi al-Kabir [The Grand Sanusi] and can be found in his book *Iqaz al-wasnan fi al-ʿamal bi al-hadith wa al-Qur'an* [The Wakening of the Slumberer through Following the Traditions and the Qur'an] published in Cairo in 1938. Its principles were based on the idea that, "every Moslem must obey Allah, the Prophet Muḥammad and the 'ulama'; the Qur'an and the Sunna alone are the basis for the believer's life."[33] The founder rested his beliefs on the same foundation as Ibn Tayimiyya by rejecting *taqlid* [unquestioning imitation]. As Ziadeh states

> On taqlid the Grand Sanusi is very expressive. He thinks that taqlid [traditional view] is contrary to the teaching of the Qur'an and the Sunna. Citing verses from the Holy Book and sayings of the Prophet in support of the theory that every problem has a solution in the Qur'an, the author adds that the Prophet could express an opinion, which bound the community of believers, because he was guided by God, but other people had no right to ascribe to themselves opinions of this nature, i.e. binding on the community.[34]

The Grand Sanusi believed that a return to the original sources would remove all elements of friction and unite all of the religious orders.[35]

Politically, the Sanusiyya called for an *imama* [a supreme Islamic governing body] and *jihad* [holy war]. The Sanusiyya established a substantial number of *zawayya* in equatorial Africa during the late nineteenth century. These were used to resist the French. The resistance was focused on the Lake Chad region and was directed from Qiru, the order's centre, by its leader Aḥmad al-Sharif, who as the eldest member of the Sanusi family succeeded Muḥammad al-Mahdi in 1917. The emergence of al-Sanusiyya, which has been described as "an Islamic phenomenon, religious in its fundamentals, social in its effects, and political in its consequences,"[36] played a significant role in shaping modern Libya's social and political development. Similar to the *al-Wahabiyya* in Arabia and the *al-Mahdiyya* in Sudan, the *al-Sanusiyya* managed to achieve power after it transformed itself from a purely religious to a 'politico-religious' movement. The strength of the movement was based on the Bedouin tribal connection, especially in Cyrenaica and Fazzan, which furnished the order with its political foundations. The relationship between the movement and the tribal system was an important one.[37] It was the mechanism by which the monarchy, which based itself on the Sanusi order and tribal connection, later attempted to gain political legitimacy.

Islam plays an important function in the life of the individual in Libya throughout his or her life, in his/her personal relationship to the universe, private and social affairs, customs and ceremonies, and rituals prohibitions. Religious institutions and their leaders have increased their role in the social, educational and political life of Libya since the beginning of Ottoman rule. Even the war against Italian occupation had a religious component, reflecting the importance of religion to national consciousness. On a region-wide scale the call of Islam played a vital role during periods of struggle for independence, as Sharabi has written:

> Islam as both an ideology and a model of social organisation, became the natural rallying point of resistance, as exemplified in the four classic political-religious uprisings against imperialist domination – of Abdul Qadir against France in Algeria, of al-Mahdi against Britain in Sudan, of 'Umar al-Mukhtar against Italy in Libya, and of 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam against the British in Palestine.[38]

Religion reflected the homogeneity of the Libyan population. Approximately 95 percent of the population were Muslims. Furthermore, as in most of the Middle Eastern countries, Islam in Libya became a crucial factor in mobilising the people. As a political symbol,

> religion was central to Arab League efforts to motivate the Libyan public to demand independence from the United Nations Commission. A *fatwa* [declaration] was published insisting that 'voting for other than independence would be a vote against religion.'[39]

In general, then, the role of religion in a society like Libya has created special features which can be identified in people's beliefs, patterns of behaviour and values. It has woven itself into the tribal and social institutions as well as playing a crucial role in social, political, cultural and economic changes in Libya.

3.2.3 The role of social institutions

Unlike in Western societies, but as in most Arab countries, in Libya traditional social institutions such as the family, clan and tribe, have played and still play a significant role in political culture. This role will therefore be examined here.

Focusing on the family as one of these units will be useful in understanding power relations within society, given that families have exerted influence in politics from the Ottoman era up to the 1969 revolution. Some observations will be made about the Arab family in general, not just in Libya, to throw light on the features and characteristics of this social unit.[40]

3.2.3.1 The family

There are a number of significant characteristics of the Arab family. First, the Arab family is a central socio-economic unit. Barakat described this as,

> the basic unit of production and the centre of Arab social organisation and socio-economic activities. It evolved into a patriarchal, pyramidally hierarchical (particularly with respect to sex and age), and extended institution.[41]

Thus it has been the basic unit of social organisation in both traditional and contemporary Arab society. In recent times, with the state beginning to provide more extensive services for society, the family has faced a number of challenges. It still, however, plays a crucial role in education and in the socialisation of its members. It remains the main source of most of the social and cultural values, including religion and social heritage.

The Arab family is structured according to a traditional patriarchal model. The father holds the authority and the responsibility for its running. The position of the father at the top of the pyramid of authority is based on the traditional division of labour, which assigned him the role of breadwinner or provider. Reinforced by socialisation and rationalisations, this role makes him *rabb al-usra* [lord of the family or the father of the family].[42] By contrast, the role of the mother is restricted to that of a housewife who is subordinate to her husband: as *ʿaqila* [tied], *qarina* [linked] and *ḥurma* [prohibited].[43] Nowadays the relationships between family members are changing, due to such factors as the employment of women, and the migration of some members of the family to the city for education and work. Although there have been increased attempts at sharing authority and responsibility, the patriarchal and hierarchical structure of the family still remains, with stratification on the basis of sex and age, i.e. women are subordinate to men, as are the young to the old.

Barakat lists the following features that reflect the women's assigned and subordinate status in Arab society:

a) Women are secluded and segregated. Although increasing numbers of women are being educated and fill important roles and positions in the public domain, the majority continue to occupy the private domain of the household.

b) A limited number of professional careers are available to women under the existing division of labour.

c) Personal status codes discriminate against women, especially in marriage, divorce and inheritance.

d) Buttressed by religious ideology, which considers women to be a source of evil, anarchy and *fitna* [social disorder], and *kaid* [trickery or deception], values and norms are stressed that are associated with traditional ideas of femininity, motherhood, wifehood and sexuality.

e) In the resulting social climate, some women to this day suffer forced marriage, honour crimes, clitoridectomy, and other forms of abuse.[44]

Finally, although generations may not always live under one roof, there remains the tendency for relatives to live in the same neighbourhood. This reflects the extended ties of the Arab family, which leads to the development of a kinship structure in which members expect support and help from one another.

In Libya the above characteristics of the family are easily identifiable. The extended family is the basic social unit, and the head of the extended family makes the important strategic decisions in relation to future orientations such as welfare provision and education. Women are clearly dominated by men. This is so throughout their lives, beginning with the authority of their fathers and continuing with that of their husbands.

During the liberation war against the Italians, as is common in most societies when faced with external challenges, women took on a more prominent role. Anwar Basha (a Turkish officer who joined the resistance movement in Cyrenaica against Italy) described the role of the tribesmen and the participation of women as follows:

> All the Arab tribes are sending me warriors. They arrive in small bands. Each has an old rifle over his shoulder, his cartridges carefully wrapped and a kilo of flour. Each ten warriors are followed by a camel loaded with a tent serving them all. Two women of their tribe accompany them to bake their bread, mend their clothes, and clean their weapons. The women also follow them into battle, spur them on, carry off the wounded and dress their wounds.[45]

However, the role of women in Libya was limited after independence in 1951, especially with regard to their participation in politics. An analysis of the role of women in Libyan society will be given in Chapter 8.

3.2.3.2 The tribe

There is an inter-relationship between tribalism, tribal structure and religion (Islam) in Libya, which together have played a vital role in socio-economic, cultural and political development. This inter-relationship has undergone some development since the middle of the nineteenth century when the *Sanusi* order, initially a religious movement and later a political one, based its legitimacy and popularity on the tribal system, especially in Cyrenaica and the South. Libya is one of a number of Arab countries which "are significantly affected and characterised by their tribal structure and tribalism as a social system."[46]

The form of tribalism which came to exist in Libya was shaped by the two Arab tribes which invaded Libya in the eleventh century at the time of the Fatimid Caliph al-Mustansir. The two tribes were the Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaym, both of whom originated from the region of Najd in the Arabian Peninsula. Eventually, the Banu Sulaym settled in Cyrenaica and the Banu Hilal passed westwards into Tripolitania and Tunisia. Today many of the tribes claim direct descent from these two tribes, especially the Banu Sulaym.

Tribal society in Libya consists, on the one hand, of Arab tribesmen called Sa'adi, Arab-Berber tribes called Murabitun, and on the other hand 'non-Arab' tribes.[47] Here is a short description of the tribal structure for each region of Libya:

a) Cyrenaica. The tribal structure in this region consisted of Sa'adi tribes called the Sa'ada of the Banu Sulaym. Their ancestors were divided into two main branches, the Harabi and the Jabarina. The latter were also known as the 'sons of Jibrin-Jibril' and include the 'Awaqir, Magharba, Majabira, 'Aryibat, and the Baraghith (which included the 'Abid, and the 'Arafa). The Harabi tribes were concentrated in Cyrenaica to the east of Barce and beyond to the Egyptian border and included the 'Ubaydat, Br'asa, Hasa, Derasa, and 'Ailat Fayid. Also present are the Murabutin, who were either Berber or had Arab-Berber origins. They fell into two main sub-groups—the Murabitun Sidaqan and the Murabitun Bil-Barakah [holy men]. Each clan was tied to a powerful Sa'adi tribe - in other words they were under the *himaya* [protection] of a powerful tribe. However, the *himaya* system was not very strict: some of the Murabitun tribes were in a more powerful position than others, in that they had their own land and sources of water.[48] The most important of the non-Sa'adi tribes were the Taraki, 'Awammah, Qut'an, Minifa, Habbun, Shwa'ir, Jarrarra Fwakhir, Sh-haybat, Zuwaya, Awajila and Qabail.[49]

b) Fazzan. The main tribes in this area were the Awlad Sulayman, the Hasawna and the Magarha. The Awlad Sulayman were formerly one of four of the sub-tribes of the main Al-K^{c}uub, in the south of Tripolitania: the others were the Warfalla, the Tarhuna, the al-Mahamid. The Awlad Sulayman moved south in the late 19th and early 20th centuries occupying most of Fazzan to become the main political force of that region.[50]

c) Tripolitania. The main tribes in this area were the Awlad Bu-Saif, the Warfalla of Bin Walid, the Fawatir, the Awlad al-Shaykh of Zlitin, the Firjan and the Qadhadhfa of Sirte.[51]

Among the tribes which were often considered as 'non-Arab' tribes are the Berber tribes,[52] many of whom migrated into Libya from Algeria and Morocco,[53] where their largest concentrations still exist today.[54] The most important of these tribes and sub-tribes are the Hawara, Qutama, Sanhaja, Lemta, Addasa, Darissa, Nafusa, Lawata, and Zanata.[55] Berbers can be found in a number of different areas in Libya, including Jabal Nafusa [Nafusa Mountain], Aujila, Hun, Socra, Zuwara, Ghat and Ghadames.

The *Tuarig* are another non-Arab group who live in Southwest Libya in Ghat and Ghadamis. Other peoples include Black Africans who are descendants of sub-Saharan Africans and live in the desert and coastal areas, mixing with both Arabs and Berbers. The *Tabu* is another small group which lives in various places in the southern desert.

In most Arab societies, and in Libya in particular, the tribal system has had to face a number of challenges during the past fifty years which stem largely from the increase of the government presence in welfare, and the movement of people from rural to urban areas. These factors, however, do not seem to have affected the cultural role of tribes. They still play a significant role in forming identities. It is important to note that the monarchy based its political legitimacy on tribal connections.

To conclude, basic units, such as the family, clan and tribe, of a traditional society like Libya's have an important impact on the life and behaviour of individuals. Despite all of the challenges which these institutions have faced, they continue to play a major role in socialising and inculcating social norms and culture. In other words, they remain instruments of the socialisation process.

3.3 State Ideology and the Nation Building since 1969

The aim of this section is to assess the development of ideology and nation-building in Libya, with an emphasis on the period of the revolutionary regime since 1969. The development of ideology of the revolutionary regime has been framed amidst tremendous political, socio-economic and cultural changes. Ideology is what the regime has based its political legitimacy on. It has played a significant role in facilitating political mobilisation and in shaping foreign policy.

3.3.1 Development of political ideology in Libya

The main ideological slogan since 1969 is *Freedom, Socialism,* and *Unity.* From these concepts, the revolutionary leaders have developed the premises and ideals of their revolution. However, it is important to distinguish between the three stages of the revolution, which are covered below.

3.3.1.1 First stage: the founding of the revolution

The main characteristic of this stage was the role of the military, which was the instrument of change and a basic element in the authority structure. Speaking on September 16, 1969, on the 38th anniversary of the martyrdom of the great Libyan freedom fighter, ʿUmar al Mukhtar, Al-Qadhafi defended the role of the armed forces on September 1 as

> the role of a vanguard, of a commando, of a breaker of barriers and of restrictions on the toiling and oppressed masses of the people which had suffered throughout long centuries...also, the armed forces will hand over the responsibility of the Revolution to this faithful and instructive people which inspired us to start the revolution.[56]

According to ʿAṭaa and Tayim, this period can be divided into two sub-stages:[57]

a) From the beginning of the revolution until the establishment of the Arab Socialist Union on June 11, 1971.

b) From the establishment of the Arab Socialist Union until the Popular Revolution in April 1973.

In all stages of Libya's political development, political speeches have constituted an important vehicle for conveying ideas and political thinking. This was as true in this first stage after the

revolution as it was later. In his first speech after the revolution, for example, al-Qadhafi declared the revolution's aims:

> From this day forward, Libya shall be a free sovereign Republic under the name 'The Libyan Arab Republic' rising, by the Grace of God, to work, to highness, marching along the path of freedom, unity and social justice, ensuring for its citizens the right of equality and throwing open before them the gates of honest work. No oppressed, deceived or wronged, no master and no slave but free brothers in a society over which, God willing, shall flutter the banner or brotherhood and equality.[58]

Another early political speech was that of September 16, 1969, which explained the framework of the new society under the revolution. Other political speeches on different occasions helped in establishing the ideological perspective of the revolution. Particularly significant were those of 22 September 1969 and 5 November 1969.

One of the main elements which shaped the ideological infrastructure in this stage was the founding of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) on June 1, 1971. The founding of the ASU was preceded by several attempts to mobilise and prepare the masses, organising them into a "popular framework". The *Nadwa al-Fikr al-Thawri* [Revolutionary Intellectuals' Seminar] on July 5, 1970, laid the basis for the new experiment.[59] Following a debate between al-Qadhafi, some other members of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), and some Libyan intellectuals, arrangements moved ahead for the establishment of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) as a people's organisation. This was based on the Egyptian political structure introduced under Jamal ᶜAbdul-Naṣir.

In a wider sense the political and ideological atmosphere in Libya after 1969 was influenced by the ideas of Nasir's 1952 revolution. Egyptian influence on Libya and its leadership goes back to the beginning of the 1950s. Common ethnic, religious and linguistic bonds, were stressed in the newspapers and magazines which came from Egypt to Libya. As already mentioned in the previous section, the education system played a crucial role, especially since schools were staffed primarily by Egyptian teachers and the curriculum inculcated into students the ideology of the Egyptian Revolution, particularly Arab nationalism. School was the most significant factor in creating an Arab nationalist feeling in Libya. Egyptian ideological propaganda through the mass media also affected Libyan youth during the late 1950s and the 1960s, especially Radio *Sawt al-Arab* [The Arab Voice] in Cairo, which transmitted the political values of the 1952 revolution and Nasir's political speeches directly to most Arab countries. Nasir became the most admired hero among Libyans; his picture was found everywhere. Due to such influence, the Libyan September Revolution may be considered a child of the 'great Arab revolution'. The new revolutionary state followed

Egyptian experience and policies, and Nasirist ideology. Consider the following messages by al-Qadhafi to Sadat,

> After the 1 September Revolution the Libyan people accepted the Egyptian revolution from A to Z. They accepted the Egyptian anthem *Allah Akbar*, then they accepted the Egyptian flag, the Arab Socialist Union, its charter and its statutes. They accepted the slogan 'Freedom, Socialism and Unity' as well as the eagle emblem.[60]

3.3.1.2 Second stage: the Popular Revolution, from April 1973 to 1975

This period in the political development of Libya began by al-Qadhafi's speech on April 15, 1973, in the town of Zuwara. For the continuation of the revolution in Libya, he laid out five principles of 'popular revolution', comprising a programme for popular revolution which would start with the formation of popular committees in each city, village, school, faculty, university, airport, port etc. These five points were:

a) all existing laws are to be repealed and replaced by revolutionary procedures;

b) the country shall be purged of those who are politically unhealthy;

c) civil liberties shall be accorded to the proletariat, but not to those who disdain the masses of common people. Consequently, arms will be distributed to many sectors of the people who do not belong to either the armed force or the militia;

d) all those who belong to the caste of parasitic bureaucrats will be removed by the people, who ... will be the instrument for destruction of the bureaucracy; and

e) the Cultural Revolution against all that is reactionary, misleading and ruinous to young people's minds is proclaimed.[61]

One of the main features of this stage was the declaration of a cultural revolution, which was conceived of as being central to the popular revolution. The cultural revolution should turn back to Arab and Islamic values, and restore the Arab and Islamic heritage. To this end, the curricula of the education programmes were reviewed.

3.3.1.3 Third stage: the "Declaration of the Authority of the People", 1976-1977, and the subsequent period to the present day

The publication of the first part of al-Qadhafi's book *The Green Book,* in January 1976 shaped this new stage. *The Green Book* has formed the base for the Libyan political structure

since 1977. It formalises the new line in establishing a 'state of the masses'. Al-Qadhafi states that "The instrument of governing is the prime political problem which faces human communities."[62] He suggests that the solution to this is direct democracy, based on Popular Congresses and People's Committees. The creation of the Popular Congresses significantly reshaped the political system in Libya, especially once the ASU had been disbanded and the General People's Congress had assumed its functions.

The General People's Congress (GPC) was the institution where the final outcome of the discussions in the various Basic Popular Congresses (BPC) was decided. It also was the venue where the secretariats of popular congresses, people's committees, syndicates and unions met.[63] (The new political structures in Libya, the BPCs and the GPC, will be elaborated on in Chapter 7).

At the same time, as the structure of Basic People's Congresses was being developed, al-Qadhafi was encouraging the growth of the Revolutionary Committees – intended to counter some of the problems which were arising in the Popular Congresses and Committees. Al-Qadhafi at this stage noted that:

> The ministers and the Secretariat General of the General People's Congress (GPC) have prepared the meeting of the Basic People's Congresses, but despite this preparation, participation at the meeting was very low. There are Basic Congresses with 10,000 or 5,000 members, but often no more than 700 have attended the meeting... the Secretariat General of the GPC is currently studying this negative aspect and its root causes. Despite the successes of the GPC there is this problem of low attendance– not at all Basic People's Congresses, but for the most part ... and that leads to the failure of your work, because you are unable to guide the members of the Basic People's Congresses in the right direction. For this reason we are considering the formation of so-called mobilization committees which shall aid the leadership committees of the Basic People's Congresses in "motivating the mass of the people" before the Basic People's Congresses are convened.[64]

Revolutionary Committees were established in both the Basic People's Congresses and the Professional People's Congresses. This design was to counter three behavioural problems, as Palmer and El-Fathaly indicate:

> (1) the absence of sufficient revolutionary fervour among the masses, many of whom remained at least partially wedded to the past, (2) the timorousness of the masses, leading to a reluctance to impose revolutionary programs on members of the traditional elite structure, and (3) the tendency of many basic people's congresses to pursue the specific interests of their own regions without adequate concern for the general good of the country.[65]

The role of the revolutionary committees was supposed not to be permanent, they would disappear when the "state of the masses" came into existence. Further information on the Revolutionary Committees will be given in Chapter 7.

There were two main elements which shaped this stage and helped in the development of the political system. The first was the announcement of the "Declaration of the Authority of the People", issued on March 2, 1977, in Sabha. According to this document, the main tool of the transition stage of the revolution, i.e. the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), was abolished and authority was transferred to the people through new political institutions such as Basic Popular Congresses and People's Committees.[66] The document included a number of principles aimed at creating 'the state of the masses':[67]

a) The official name of Libya shall be *The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya*.

b) The Holy Quran is the law of the society in the Socialist People's Arab Jamahiriyya.

c) Direct popular authority is the basis of the political system in the Socialist People's Arab Jamahiriyya. The authority rests solely with the people. The people exercise their authority through the popular congresses, the people's committees, the syndicates, the unions, the professional associations, and the General People's Congress.

d) Defence of the homeland is the responsibility of every Libyan man and woman. Consequently, the people shall be armed and trained through general military training. Law defines the method of preparing the military cadres and the general military training.

The second element was the completion of state ideology with the publication of the second and third parts of *The Green Book*. The first part had dealt with the problem of democracy. The second part discussed economic problems, and the third part was concerned with social problems – reflecting the significance of social structure as part of the interrelationship with political structure. The theory attempted to give an explanation to issues concerning the family, the tribe, the nation, women and education, as well as covering arts, sports and social activities.

There are three main sources of Libyan state ideology and political thought of the revolutionary regime. The first source is *the Green Book*. The second source is al-Qadhafi's

Commentary on the Green Book.[68] The relationship between the first two sources has been described by al-Qadhafi through a comparison with Marxist texts, as follows:

> *The Green Book* is the beginning of the theory and its basis seems the same as the communist manifesto which started as small pages but it conquered the world at least in most countries. Later, the other books and commentary have come to explain the new Marxist theory.[69]

The third source of the state ideology in Libya is *al-khitab al-siyasi* [political discourse] This comprises all of al-Qadhafi's speeches, talks, interviews, etc. on different occasions and for different audiences, used as a direct tool to explain issues. Al-Qadhafi has made use of a number of different channels in his political discourse.

Dealing with the development of state ideology in Libya is important for an understanding of political culture, because the state's legitimacy is so dependent on ideology. It is the main cement of nation-building, and the citizenry has been the object of a particularly intense and all-embracing attempt at ideological socialisation by the state.

3.4 Political Socialisation as an Instrument of the Revolutionary Regime

The revolutionary regime needed a programme of political socialisation and re-socialisation to change the attitudes and behaviour patterns of traditional society. These patterns were, according to El-Fathaly and Palmer:

> particularistic, lacking in civic responsibility (atomistic), tribalistic, fatalistic, nonparticipatory, and engrained with the values of ascription and distrust.[70]

These values and patterns of behaviour stemmed mostly from the previous periods of rule by the Turks, the Italians and the monarchy. Former systems had maintained their control through perpetuating tribalism, sowing distrust among diverse groups, socialising the masses to be passive and fatalistic, and discouraging any form of mass participation and political involvement.[71] Nevertheless the monarchical regime also created a generation which believed in Arab nationalism through an unplanned socialisation process, the education system, based on school curricula and teachers who came from Egypt during the 1950s and 1960s.

3.4.1 Agents of political socialisation in Libya

The revolutionary regime in the early years of the revolution relied on four agents of socialisation: local administrative officials, the ASU, schools and the mass media. Yet only

the education system and to some extent the mass media had any significant impact. After 1977, the main political socialisation agents were the education system, the ideological preparation camps, mass media and the Revolutionary Committees. The informal sources of political socialisation, such as family, tribe and peer group are operating outside state control, therefore the regime could not use these agents in order to instil its revolutionary values.

The main political socialisation agents used by the revolutionary regime to inculcate its citizens (especially the youth) are covered below.[72]

3.4.1.1 The education system

Since the revolution in 1969 the education system has been employed by the state as a means for modernising and revolutionising Libyans. From the beginning, the new regime called for a change in the education system to make it suitable for the new era. When al-Qadhafi announced the "Cultural Revolution" during his famous speech in Zuwara in April 1973, he called for a revision and review of curricula. The revolution showed its commitment to education from the early days of the revolution through increasing the number of classrooms and students at all levels. Encouraging females to be educated was an important element in the education policy, to prepare them to be part of the labour force.[73]

Direct contact between the leader of the revolution, al-Qadhafi, and students at all levels was one of the main tools of political socialisation, aimed at creating a revolutionary generation with a strong belief in the revolution and the *jamahiriyya* [the state of masses]. He targeted the students through his speeches, especially at the university level.

The curriculum of 'revolutionization', *tathwir al-manahij*, started after the publication of *The Green Book* in 1976, when Libya "gradually adopted into the curricula of its social sciences the tenets of the Libyan leader's *Green Book.*"[74]. Since then the *Third Universal Theory,* which was based on *The Green Book*, became the subject of one of the main courses within the universities in all faculties, both for humanities and sciences students. All students received this course in the early years of their university studies.

In pre-university education, a new course was introduced into the curriculum programme at all school levels, namely *al-Thaqafa al-Siyasiya* [political culture], which was later called *al-Wa^{c}i al-Siyasi* [political consciousness]. The course was supervised by the *Maktab al-Itisal bi al-Lijan al-Thawria—Shu^{c}bat al-Lijan al-Thawria bi al-Muasasat al-Ta^{c}limiya* [Office of Communications of the Revolutionary Committees—Section for Revolutionary Committees in

the Educational Institutions]. The teachers of the course were often either members of Revolutionary Committees or teachers who had attended a special course, *Barnamij al-Mu'alim al-Thawri* [the revolutionary teacher programme]. The aim of the latter programme was to create a revolutionary teacher who was able through his belief in the ideology of the regime to inculcate students with the regime's principles and revolutionary ideology. The role of the revolutionary teacher was to create *jiyll al-ghadab* [generation of anger], which was anti-American, anti-Zionist and anti-Imperialist, believing in Arab unity and the liberation of all Palestine and the occupied Arab lands, in the freedom of all peoples in the world, and in the state of the masses. The course was based on al-Qadhafi's *Green Book*, but also included other elements of the ideology of the regime dealing with Arab nationalism, Arab unity, the Arab-Israeli conflict etc.

Radical changes of the education curricula, especially in pre-university education, took place in the late 1980s. *Lijan tathwir al-manahij* [committees to revolutionise the curricula] played a crucial role in changing the educational curricula. These committees included some members of the revolutionary committees and specialists (in all fields of studies), who were university staff. The committees tried to revise and review school curricula and suggested alternatives which fitted the aims of the educational process at this stage. Students at all levels received the new curricula in the academic year 1986-87. The aim of the new curricula was to reflect the political ideology of the '*jamahiriyya*', the state of masses.

Introducing militarization at schools and universities was another attempt by the regime to create the new *jamahiriyya*n citizen. The transformation of the educational institutions into military barracks was a step towards putting the notion of a "popular army" into practice.

3.4.1.2 The ideological preparation camps (Mu'askarat al-I'dad al-'Aqaidi)

Ideological preparation camps were one of the main methods which the revolutionary regime used to inculcate its citizens with the state ideology. These courses or camps, called *dawrat al-i'dad al-'aqaidi* [courses of ideological preparation] were organised at different levels, depending on the age of individuals. Students were usually the most important stratum taking part in these camps. The courses were compulsory, especially at pre-university level, and usually took place during schools' summer vacation or in the mid academic-year holiday. Students stayed between 10 days and two weeks in the ideological preparation camps attending for lectures and talks about different political subjects, either related to the ideology of the regime or issues concerning the Arab nation such as Arab unity and the Arab-Israeli

conflict. The lectures were usually given by members of the revolutionary committees or by experts. In these camps students also undertook other activities such as basic military training, sports, music and art. The revolutionary committees played a key part in this ideological preparation.

3.4.1.3 The mass media

In the early years of the revolution, the RCC was largely dependent on the media structure it had inherited from the monarchy. That structure consisted mainly of a government-operated broadcasting service, dating from 1957, and five or six private newspapers operating under press censorship. Television did not make its debut until 1968, and extensive local programming was yet to be developed.[75]

It was familiar for Libyans to listen to foreign broadcasts such as the British Broadcasting Corporation or some Arab broadcasting service. *Sawt al- Arab* (the Arab voice) which broadcast from Cairo was one of the main stations which Libyans during the 1950s and 1960s listened to, and this had a great influence on them – especially in terms of strengthening Arab nationalist and Arab unity ideas. The Libyan media failed to offer the RCC strong support for the early socialisation process. The media thus became a target of criticism by al-Qadhafi because of its ineffectiveness in disseminating revolutionary ideas. El-Fathaly and Palmer state that

> The leadership's evaluation of the media has been intensely critical, a view generally shared by the public. Time after time, Qadhafi has criticised the media's ineffectiveness in transmitting revolutionary values. His typical comments include: "we should close down" or "it is not worth a penny," or "we should put it on auction."[76]

The revolutionary regime introduced the idea of *al-iʿlam al-jamahiri* (Jamahiriyyan media) in the late 1970s, reflecting Al-Qadhafi's views about the information medium. Al-Qadhafi in *The Green Book* indicates that

> The press is a means of expression of the society and is not a means of expression of a natural or corporate person. Logically and democratically, the press, therefore can not be owned by either of these...The democratic press is that which is issued by a popular committee comprising all the various categories of society, including associations of workers, women, students, craftsmen, etc. In this case only, and not otherwise, will the press or any information medium be an expression of the whole society and a bearer of its viewpoint; and thereby the press or information medium will be indeed democratic.[77]

In practice, People's Committees are not free from control in terms of what they publish, all the information media and the mass media in Libya are supervised by the Secretary of Information, Culture and Jamahiriyya Mobilisation. There are two types of newspapers. On

the one hand, some newspapers express the views of groups such as students, farmers and professionals. This type of press is called *al-Ṣahafa al-mihaniya* [the professional press]. On the other hand, there are those newspapers which are not tied to any professional grouping, but are issued by the revolutionary committees, *al-Zahf al-Akhdar* [The Green March] and *al-Jamahiriyya.*[78] Television and broadcasting are also supervised by the Information, Culture and Jamahiriyya mobilisation secretary.

In practice, the mass media are used for socialisation and to spread the revolutionary regime's ideology in Libya, and abroad. Al-Qadhafi has also used the media to discuss urgent events and to issue major policy statements.

3.4.2 Problems and crises in the political socialisation process in Libya: a critical analysis

The political socialisation process in Libya, as in many other Arab countries, has faced a number of challenges and problems. The first challenge has been that the informal or primary agents of political socialisation, such as family and tribe, were not reliable agents as far as the regime was concerned. In many instances these agents served as counter-revolutionary sources of socialisation, because they inculcated Libya's younger generation with traditional, rather than revolutionary values.[79] For the younger generation it was confusing to receive different values from different channels. In other words, the younger generation received revolutionary values at school, through the education curricula, and in the ideological preparation camps (IPC), and traditional values from family, tribe and kinship relations. The latter came to represent almost an alternative to the state and its institutions. As John Davis argues in the case of Libya,

> kinship, and the natural loyalty which comes from historic domesticity, provides the automatic comradeship, the supportiveness which men yearn after in an unsettling world...and with this support, men do not need the state, and can manage affairs without government. [80]

The second challenge has been the *thaqafa al-istihlak* [consumer culture], which is a result of the development of world communications and the increasing exposure Libyans to global culture through the popular satellite dishes. Libyans became accustomed to listening to and watching foreign programmes, such as the CNN and some other satellite channels, and they lost their interest in the internal media, which the regime uses as a channel to transfer its ideology to its citizens. The main reasons which Libyans give to explain interest in other media and channels of information are, first, their mistrust of the local official media,

especially in broadcasting the news; second, the bad quality of the programmes of Libyan television and radio; and third, the media having "too much revolution." What Lisa Anderson says about the attitudes of some Libyans towards the educational process is similar to what can be said about the media:

> As early as the 1970s, Libyan mothers who were themselves illiterate openly expressed doubts about the quality of the education their children were receiving—"too much revolution," they worried, "and not enough reading" and they constituted the core of the sceptical response to Qadhafi's subsequent educational innovations.[81]

The third challenge has been the increasing role of the Islamic movement, reflecting the difference between formal Islam and popular Islam within Libyan society. Most members of Islamist groups are from the generation of the revolution, who have received the values of the regime's ideology through the formal agents of political socialisation. The Islamist movement became an alternative and the mosque became an important institution to instil different values from those which the regime tried to inculcate. Although the regime has tried to control this phenomenon in different ways, it seems that the experience of Libya has not been different from that of other Arab Northern African countries.

Notes to Chapter 3

[1] Maja Naur, *Political Mobilization and Industry in Libya,* (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1986), p. 57.

[2] Ummayads: First major dynasty in mediaeval Islamic history, which established itself in Damascus. The Umayyads ruled a growing empire from 661 AD until 750 AD. Their dynastic name comes from the grandfather of Abu Sufyan whose name was Umayya.

[3] Fatimids: Major dynasty in mediaeval Islamic history which flourished in North Africa (from 909 AD) and later in Egypt (from 969 AD to 1171 AD). It derived its name from Fatima the daughter of Muhammad.

[4] Hilalians: Arab tribe, originally from Najd, some of whose members later migrated to Egypt. They settled in the middle of the 11th century.

[5] Ibid., p. 57.

[6] Jamal Hamdan, *Al-Jamahiriyya al-Arabiyya al-Libiyya: Dirasa fi al-Jughrafiya al-Siyasiya,* [The Libyan Arab Republic: A Study in Political Geography], (Al-Qahira: ᶜAlam al-Kitab, 1973), p. 57.

[7] Maja Naur, op.cit., pp. 57-58.

[8] Salem Ali Hajjaji, *Libya al-Jadida* [The New Libya], (Tripoli: Government Printing Press, 1967), p. 106.

[9] Quoted in Omar I. El Fathaly, and Monte Palmer, *Political Development and Social Change in Libya,* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1980), p. 1.

[10] Omar I. El-Fathaly *et al, Political Development and Bureaucracy in Libya,* [Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1977], p. 1.

[11] Ibid., p. 1.

[12] Unlike Quranic schools, located in towns, *al-zawayya* [lodges] were located in the desert and unpopulated areas, and some parts of the big mosques. Some of these *zawayya* were well known before the main Sanusiyya *zawayya* were established. Among the former were those of Shaikh ᶜAbd al-Salam al-Asmar in Zlitin, Shaikh Ibrahim El-mahjub and Ahmad al-zaruwq in Misrata, Shaikh al-Dwkali in Msallata and Shaikh ᶜAbd al-Nabi al-Asfar in al-Jabal al-Gharbi. The Sanusiyya *zawayya* appeared later as cultural, social, economic political and military centres of the regions in which they were situated. The most famous Sanusia *zawayya* were those of al-zawia al-Bayda'a near the tomb of Sidi Rafiᶜ al-Ansari, one of the Arab conquerors of Libya, and zawiat al-Jaghbub.

[13] Ibrahim Muhamad Al-Shafᶜi, *Al-Marjiᶜa fi ᶜUlum al-Tarbiya,* [The Reference of Education Science], (Benghazi: Jamiᶜat Garyunis, 1978), pp. 526-527.

[14] Rifᶜat Ghunaymi Al-Shaikh, *Tatawur al-Taᶜlim fi Libiyya fi al-ᶜUsuwr al-Haditha,* [The Development of Education in Libya in the Modern Ages], (Tripoli: Dar al-Tanmiyya Li-lnahsir wa al-Tawziᶜ, 1972), p. 162.

[15] Ibid., p. 115.

[16] For further analysis of this process of Italianization project see Marco Rolandi, *Taliyanat al-Afariqa: al-Taᶜlim al-Mahali al-Hukuwmi fi al-Mustaᶜmarat al-Italiyya 1890-1937* [The Italianization of Africans: Governmental Regional Education in Italian Settlements 1890-1937] translated into Arabic by ᶜAbd al-Qadir al-Mhayishi, (Tarabulus: Markaz Dirasat Jihad al-Libiyyin Didda al-Ghazw al-Italiy, 1988).

[17] Salem Hajjaji, op.cit., p. 82.

[18] Rolandi Marco, op.cit., p. 26.

[19] Quoted in Maja Naur, op.cit., p. 65. Marius K. Deeb and Mary Jane Deeb, *Libya Since the Revolution: Aspects of Social and Political Development,* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), pp. 22-25.

[20] For an elaboration of these policy changes see Ministry of Education, *Dirasa Tariykhiyya ᶜan Tatawur al-Taᶜlim fi al-Jamhuriyya al-Arabiyya al-Libiyya* [A Historical Study of the Development of Education in Libyan Arab Republic], (Tripoli: Government Press, 1972), and Ahmad Muhamad Al-Qmmati, *Tatwiyr al-Idara al-Taᶜliymiyya fi al-Jamahiriyya al-Arabiyya al-Libiyya al-Shaᶜabiyya al-Ishtirakiyya fi al-Fatra Min 1951-1975* [The Development of Education Administration in the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya During the Period 1951-1975: A Historical Analytical Study], (Tarabulus: al-Dar al-ᶜArabiyya li-Lkitab, 1978).

[21] Omar I El-Fathaly and M Palmer, *Political Development and Social Change in Libya,* op.cit., p. 27.

[22] Ibrahim Muhamad al-Shafᶜi, op.cit., p. 540.

[23] Salem Hajjaji, op.cit., p. 84.

[24] Deeb and Deeb, op.cit., p. 32.

[25] Salem Hajjaji, op.cit., p. 84.

[26] Mohamed Zahi El-Mogherbi, *The Socialisation of School Children in the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya*, (University of Missouri, PhD thesis, 1978), pp. 33-34.

[27] Ibid., p. 34.

[28] Ibid., p. 34.

[29] Ibid., p. 34.

[30] Omar I. El-Fathaly *et al*, op.cit., p. 11.

[31] Mohamad Zahi El-Mogherbi, "Tribalism, Religion and the Challenge of Political Participation: The Case of Libya", paper presented at *Democratic Challenges in the Arab World*, Cairo, 24-27 September, 1992, p. 1.

[32] See Distribution of Sanusiya Lodges in North Africa and Arabia in E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica*, (Oxford: University Press, 1949), pp. 24-25.

[33] Rachael Simon, *Libya between Ottomanism and Nationalism: The Ottoman Involvement in Libya during the War with Italy 1911-1919*, (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 1987), p. 50.

[34] Nicola A. Ziadeh, *Sanusiyah: a Study of a Revivalist Movement in Islam*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1958), p. 83. For more details about the Sanusi philosophy see Chapter 3 in Nicola A. Ziadeh, pp. 73-98.

[35] Rachael Simon, op.cit., p. 11.

[36] J. Roumani, "Libya and the Military Revolution" in Zatrman, I. W. (ed), *Man, State and Society in Contemporary Maghrib* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), p. 346.

[37] For more details about the relationship between the Sanusi order and the tribal system see Emrys L. Peters, *The Bedouin of Cyrenaica: Studies in Personal and Corporate Power*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 10-28.

[38] Hisham Sharabi, *Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 72.

[39] Omar I. El-Fathaly *et al*, op.cit., pp. 11-12.

[40] The main characteristics of the Arab family given in this section are taken from the analysis of Halim Baakat of the Arab family in Halim Barakat, *The Arab World: Society, Culture and State*, (California: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 97-118.

[41] Ibid., p. 97.

[42] Ibid., p. 101.

[43] See Ibid., p. 101.

[44] Ibid., p. 106.

[45] Anwar Pasha, *Mudhkkarat Anwar Pasha fi Tarablus al-Gharb* quoted in A. S. El-Horair, *Social and Economic Transformations in the Libyan Hinterland during the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century: The Role of Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif al-Sanusi*, (University of California, PhD thesis, 1981), p. 237.

[46] Mohamed Zahi El-Mogherbi, "Tribalism, Religion and the Challenge of Political Participation", op.cit., p. 8.

[47] A. S. El-Horair, op.cit., pp. 16-17.

[48] Ibid., p. 21.

[49] Mohamed Zahi El-Mogherbi, "Tribalism, Religion and the Challenge of Political Participation: The Case of Libya", op.cit., p. 9.

[50] Ibid., p. 9.

[51] Ibid., p. 9.

[52] Al-Qadhafi announced several times in his speeches that: The Berber in North Africa are originally Arabs. They were the old Arab immigrants from Arab peninsula 10,000 years ago.

[53] For more details about Berbers in North Africa, see Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud, *Arabs and Berbers: from Tribe to Nation in North Africa*, (London: D. C. Heath, 1973)

[54] According to a Minority Rights Group report, Berbers in Libya number 200,000 (3% of the population). For more details see David McDowall, "Minorities in the Middle East" in *Minority Rights Group International*, (London, No Date), p. 2.

[55] See *Area Handbook for Libya: Foreign Area Studies*, (Washington: The American University, 1969), pp. 59-61.

[56] Quoted in Henri Habib, *Politics and Government of Revolutionary Libya*, (Ottawa: Le Cercle du Livre de France Ltée, 1975), pp. 121-122.

[57] Salih Mohamad ᶜAtaa and Fawzi Ahmad Tayyim, *Al-Nuddum al-Siyasiya al-Arabiyya al-Muᶜasira*, [Contemporary Arab Political Systems], vol. 2, (Benghazi: Manshurat Jamiᶜat Garyunis, 1988), p. 380.

[58] The Revolutionary Command Council, *Mawsuᶜat al-Tashriyᶜaat al-Libiyya al-Haditha*, [Encyclopaedia of Libya's Modern Legal Regulations] (Tripoli: Dar Maktabat al-Fikr, 1972), p. 5.

[59] For more details see Ruth First, *Libya: the Elusive Revolution*, (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1974), pp. 124-132.

[60] Message from Al-Qadhafi, quoted in Sadat's memories, *October*, Cairo, 5 June 1977 quoted in Mary-Jane Deeb, *Libya's Foreign Policy in North Africa*, (Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), p. 53.

[61] Ministry of Information and Culture, *The Revolution of September 1, 1969: the Fourth Anniversary*, (Tripoli: Ministry of Information and Culture Publications, No Date), p. 227.

[62] Muammar Al-Qadhafi, *The Green Book*, vol. 1, (Tripoli: Global Centre for Study and Research on the Green Book, 1979), p. 5.

[63] Ibid., p. 28.

[64] Muammar Al-Qadhafi, from al-Sijil al-Qawmi (1975-1976), quoted in Hanspeter Mattes, "The Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Committees" in Dirk Vandewalle (ed), *Qadhafi's Libya, 1969-1994*, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1995), p. 90.

[65] Monte Palmer and Omar El-Fathaly, "The Transformation of Mass Political Institution in Revolutionary Libya: Structural Solutions to a Behavioural Problem" in E.G.H. Joffé and K.S. Mclachlan (eds), *Social and Economic Development of Libya*, (Wisbech: MENAS Press, 1982), p. 247.

[66] Abdul Salam Ali Al-Mzoughi, *Mafhum al-Idara al-Shaᶜabiyya wa Ilaqatiha Bi al-Sulta al-Shaᶜbiya: Dirasa Moqarana* [The Concept of Popular Administration and its Relationship with Popular Authority: A Comparative Study], (Tarabulus: Manshuwrat al-Markaz al-ᶜalami li-Dirasat wa Abhath al-Kitab al-Akhdar, 1987), p. 51.

[67] Al-iᶜlan ᶜAn Qiyaam Sultat al-Shaᶜab [Declaration of People's Authority] in *Mauswᶜat Qararat al-Mu'atamarat al-Shaᶜbiya al-Asasiyya* [Encyclopaedia of Basic Popular Congresses Resolutions], (Tripoli: General People's Congress, No Date), p. 106.

[68] Muammar Al-Qadhafi, *Commentary on the Green Book*, vol. 1, (Tripoli: Global Centre for Study and Research on the Green Book, 1984).

[69] Muammar Al-Qadhafi, *Al-Sijil al-Qawmi: Majmᶜuat Khutab wa Bayyanat*, (National Register: Group of Speeches), v. 13, p. 719.

[70] Omar I. El-Fathaly and Monte Palmer, *Political Development and Social Change in Libya*, op.cit., p. 103.

[71] Ibid., p. 103.

[72] The role of the Revolutionary Committees, another important agent of socialisation, has been covered earlier in this section.

[73] For more details about the development of the education system in Libya under the revolutionary regime, see Marius K. Deeb and Mary Jane Deeb, op.cit., pp. 18-48. See also Taoufik Monastiri, "Teaching the Revolution: Libyan Education since 1969" in Dirk Vandewalle (ed), *Qadhafi's Libya, 1969-1994*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1995), pp. 67-88.

[74] Taoufik Monastiri, Ibid., p. 63.

[75] Omar I. El-Fathaly and Monte Palmer, *Political Development and Social Change in Libya*, op.cit., p. 104.

[76] Ibid., p. 104.

[77] Muammar Al-Qathafi; *The Green Book*, vol. 1, op.cit., pp. 37-38.

[78] Newspapers and periodicals are published either by the Jamahiriyya News Agency (JANA), by government secretariats, by the Press Service or by trade unions.

[79] Omar I. El Fathaly and M. Palmer, *Political Development and Social Change in Libya*, op.cit., p. 104.

[80] John Davis, *Libyan Politics: Tribe and Revolution*, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1987), p. 42.

[81] Lisa Anderson, "Qadhafi's Legacy: an Evaluation of a Political Experiment" in Dirk Vandewalle (ed), *Qadhafi's Libya, 1969-1994*, op.cit., p. 230.

4. The Survey Process and the Sample

4.1 Introduction

Survey research constitutes the principal method on which this study is based. The object is to understand the nature of the political system in Libya through studying the political attitudes of university students, who are an important stratum in Libyan society, as seen by the amount of attention paid to them by the regime. It has sought to socialise students by inculcating them with certain ideals or beliefs and patterns of political values. Both the education system and media have been used to this end.

An understanding of the influence of state ideology on this significant stratum of the population is, moreover, necessary because of the crucial role of ideology as a factor in the Libyan political system. This research should help to illustrate the belief and value system and pattern of behaviour of a section of Libyan citizens.

The first section of this chapter is devoted to describing the process of the survey which was carried out in spring and summer 1994 among Libyan students at Garyunis University in Benghazi. The aims and objectives of the survey, data collection, selection of samples and the questionnaire design are covered.

The second section deals with data treatment and the statistical procedures. The main statistical procedures which have been used in the analysis of the data of this study are: Frequencies; Cross-Tabulations; Spearman Rank Order Correlation Coefficients; Kruskal Wallace Rank Order Analysis of Variance, and Cluster Analysis.

The third section concentrates on the features and characteristics of the students who made up the sample of the study. These 'background factors' include place of family residence

according to the area of origin and residence (urban or rural), education of parents, occupations of parents, and the social background of the family. An important aspect of this chapter is to compare the sample of this survey (students at Garyunis) with the whole population of Libya, particularly with other students in the same age groups. This comparison was made by using information about the Libyan population in general, drawn from United Nations sources as well as some Libyan sources such as the population census and data from individual municipalities like Benghazi (1984). The chapter ends with a conclusion.

4.1.1 Aims and objectives of the survey

The main aim in carrying out this study is to examine and explore the attitudes of university students towards certain issues which relate to the political values of the state ideology in Libya.

As has been indicated in previous chapters, the state ideology has played a crucial role in Libya since 1969. The regime in Libya has tried to inculcate particular values in its citizens through the use of socialisation agents such as the mass media and the education system (through schools and their curricula). Some elements of regime ideology which this study examines come from an analysis of textbooks for the ninth grade (6 years of primary, and three years of preparatory level) in the school curricula in Libya, which the researcher conducted previously (a content analysis of school children text books)[1]. These elements can be summarised as follows:

a) The identity question is one of the most crucial elements for the individual and society. This study explores this by looking at how the students identify themselves and what the most important element in their identification is: family, tribe, city, the state, Arabism and Islam represent the possible principal sources of identity.

b) Tribe and tribalism also has been targeted by the regime. On the practical side the regime tried to abolish the tribal system especially in the early years of the revolution, thereby seeking to neutralise its political role within Libyan society. This study looks at the tribe as a possible source of identification and loyalty, the attachment of the students towards the tribe and tribalism, and finally the possibility of dropping and/or changing tribal identification.

c) The involvement of the population in the political process through political participation is one of the methods used by the regime to create "the participant

individual" in the decision making process through the political institutions of the regime such as the popular congress. This study explores the attitudes towards the political process in Libya by using university students as a sample. The relationship between the regime and its citizens through the participation process will be explored at many different levels. This might show to what extent the regime has succeeded or failed in creating participant citizens in the political process in Libya.

d) The ideas of Arab Nationalism, Arab unity and the Palestinian issue have been key common denominators of the political literature of the regime since 1969. Dealing with these ideas is one of the main aims of this study, through an exploration of the attitudes of the university students towards these elements of state ideology in Libya.

e) The attitudes towards the role of women in society is another theme. Several questions related to the role of women within society and factors that might influence their role, probe the attitudes of university students towards this issue. These factors include religion, traditions and social values.

4.1.2 The process of data collection

The process of data collection for the present study was based on survey research undertaken in the period from the end of January to May 1994. The main part of the survey is based on a questionnaire. Before starting the process of field work, the draft questionnaire was prepared in English and then translated into Arabic.

The questionnaire was first tested on a pilot group with 'pilot testing questionnaires'. The researcher carried out the pilot test among 50 students of different years of study in the Geography Department in the Faculty of Arts and Education at the University of Garyunis. This helped the researcher to evaluate and develop the questions. After deleting some of the questions and adding others, the questionnaire was distributed to a representative sample of 500 Libyan students of both sexes at the University of Garyunis. The students came from five faculties of the University, covering 16 of the 34 departments.

The researcher also personally interviewed 15 students at the end of the data collection process. The purpose of these interviews was to explore in more depth some of the answers and to provide further insight into the material which came from the respondents. This was done by asking the students to respond orally to selected questions from the main

questionnaire (approximately 21 questions) and one supplementary question which was not in the questionnaire. The interview questions can be found in Appendix B.

Another source of material was spontaneous comments from some of the students who completed the questionnaire. After collecting the questionnaires, a number of students carried out informal discussions with the researcher about some of the issues in the questionnaire. This provided further understanding of the material and allowed more exploration of the analyses of the data in the later stages.

With regard to difficulties and problems facing the researcher, it should be noted that one difficulty encountered by many researchers who carry out such a study, was not a problem for her. The researcher in this study did not face any security problems in undertaking the survey. It was not necessary to obtain permission from any officials or institutions, the only requirement was a letter from the Political Science department at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science, which is the researcher's department. The researcher paved the way by visiting the selected departments of the university and handing over the letter from the Political Science department which gave the researcher's name and the aims of the study, and persuaded the relevant departments to cooperate.

In general, although the survey period was very interesting to the researcher, it might be useful to mention a numbers of difficulties and problems which faced the researcher in collecting the data at that time. These can be summarised as follows:

a) The survey had to be undertaken in a limited period of time, despite the large size of the sample. This was due to difficulties with British visas, which put pressure on the researcher to work hard to obtain reasonable data in a limited period of time.

b) Basic information and full statistical information, such as numbers of students in the university, did not exist. None of the statistics were available on computer, they were held on files which could not be easily accessed. This required the researcher to do additional work to collect information and figures about the students through the registry of the faculties. Care was taken not to include students who had graduated or were not Libyan.

c) There were no volunteers who could help during the period of the survey of this study. This placed a heavier responsibility on the researcher to deal with the survey as a whole, without any help except in the last stages of the field work, when two members of the

Economics Research Centre at Garyunis University helped to distribute the questionnaire forms among some of the departments.

d) It was very difficult to collect information from different faculties when they did not follow a common academic year. Some faculties follow a semester system, some follow a full academic year. This meant some students were not present because of the mid-academic year holiday which took place during the month of Ramadan. To cope with this problem the researcher had to carry out the research process when the students of a faculty were present.

4.1.3 The significance of Libyan students as a sample

The reasons for using students as a sample rather than other groups within Libyan society are manifold.[2] Firstly, they are an important stratum within society, leading the regime to pay particular attention to them especially in terms of inculcating them with the values and orientations related to the ideology of the political system. Secondly, the student movement has played a crucial role within Libyan society at different stages of its development (as have students in many Arab countries). Said and Mughisuddin have described the Arab students' role since the end of the nineteenth century as follows:

> Arab students have played an important role in the political dynamics of the region. Prior to independence, they were leaders of freedom movements as well as channels of communication for new ideas inspired by Western education. Since independence, they have become the avant-garde of revolutionism, reformism, socialism, nationalism, and Arabism in North Africa and the Middle East. Individual politicians, as well as political parties, have often competed for the allegiance of student groups as a powerful weapon against political adversaries.[3]

El-Mogherbi's general comments on the role of students in Arab countries apply clearly to the Libyan case. According to El-Mogherbi,

> in the Arab countries, students have often been encouraged by both government and opposition leaders to carry out demonstrations and devote more of their time to politics than to study, each group trying to marshal students, as support for its own position.[4]

As indicated earlier, the regime pays particular attention to the students, seeking to inculcate them with the values of the political system. The importance of students within the Libyan society has been given some emphasis in Chapter Three. El-Fathaly and Palmer have also stressed this point:

> University students are of particular concern to Libya's revolutionary leaders, for in Libya, as in most developing areas, they represent a substantial portion of the nation's intellectual elite. As recently as 1952, there were virtually no university students in

> Libya, and they now enjoy a position of enormous respect in Libyan society. This position of respect, if not of awe, makes students potential opinion leaders of considerable importance. Their position of respect also provides them with at least some immunity against direct repression. To treat youths of such great promise with excessive force would be considered poor taste and perhaps a sign of weakness. At least some immunity, too, emerges from the fact that university students tended to come, at least until recently, from the more influential families. To injure a student indiscriminately would run the risk of alienating important segments of the political community. Finally, university students are clearly the most intensely politicised segment of Libyan society. Starting in the era of the monarchy, no group in Libyan society has been more vocal in expressing its opinions than the university students.[5]

In Libya, as in many other countries, students are always seen as the future decision-makers. Also in the long-range perspective, "the current generation of students must bear ultimate responsibility for the government's mobilization and government programs".[6] The failure or success of these mobilisation processes depends to a greater degree on them due to their position as a significant stratum within the society. According to El-Fathaly and Palmer,

> The success or failure of the revolution's modernisation programs, not to mention government efforts to reform the bureaucracy in general, will depend largely upon the training and political socialisation of the current generation of students.[7]

For these reasons the revolutionary regime in Libya has realised the nature of their role and has tried to make use of their powerful influence over the masses. These attempts started with a training and socialisation process intended to draw the university students into the revolutionary movement.

To understand the importance of Libyan students, it is necessary to provide some information about Libyan youth as part of Libyan society in general. Youths represent a large proportion of the population in Libya. According to the African Statistical Yearbook 1991, Libya's population was 4,712,000. The Libyan Central Bank estimated the population growth rate for Libyan nationals at 3.9 percent annually, while the World Bank predicted an overall growth of 3.5 percent annually between 1987 and 2000, one of the highest growth rates in the world. At that rate, the population would number 6 million by 2000.[8] The increasing number of young people among the population makes Libya a "youthful country". About 65 percent of the population was under twenty-five years of age in 1990, and 867,000 of the total of population were between 15 and 24, of which almost 442,000 were males and 425,000 were females.[9] The northern regions of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica accounted for 80 percent of the population in 1989. Population density is over 50 persons per square kilometre in the two regions, while in the rest of the country, it falls below 1 person per square kilometre.[10]

The findings of the sample population as far as age structure is concerned reflect the typical pattern of a country with a rapidly growing population, in that the majority are under 25

years. Figure 4.1 shows the age category of the sample. The main age groups which have been covered in this study are those between 17 and 24 years, which encompassed 429 students out of the whole sample of 500. The second age group was between 25 to 29 which covered 65 students. Finally, a very small number were in the third age group (30 years and over), this group included only six students.

Figure 4.1: Age category of the sample



Age group

According to Libyan official statistics, the total number of students in 1987/88 was 1,474,525 distributed between different levels of the education system. Table 4.1 shows the distribution of Libyan students at the different levels and stages of education between 1969/70 and 1987/88.

According to the United Nations Yearbook 1991, by 1990 there were 44,500 male and 11,100 female university-level students in Libya. The researcher believes that the number of students increased rapidly after 1988, especially at the university level, due to the increasing of number of universities in Libya and additional faculties at the existing educational establishments.

Table 4.1: Number of Libyan students in 1969/70 and 1987/88

Level	1969/70 Male	1969/70 Female	Total	1987/88 Male	1987/88 Female	Total
E. Education	214,100	110,500	324,600	512,595	461,700	974,295
P. Education	31,700	6,500	38,200	178,740	130,275	309,015
S. Education	7,700	1,400	9,100	54,000	26,515	80,515
T. S. Education	1,500	-	1,500	22,275	6,615	28,890
T. T. Institutions	3,000	1,700	4,700	14,580	26,865	41,445
H&U Education	3,700	400	4,100	30,645	9,720	40,365
Total	261,700	120,500	382,200	812,835	661,690	1,474,525

E. Education - Elementary education
P. Education - Preparatory education
S. Education - Secondary education
T.S. Education- Technical secondary education
T.T. Institutions - Teacher training institutions education
H&U Education - Higher & university

Source: Al Jamahiriyya in 20 years, EIU Country Profile 1990-91

Between 1973 and 1993 the population of Libya increased from 2.249 million to 4.7 million.[11] The country underwent a very high level of population growth which increased the number and proportion of young people, and simultaneously led to far higher participation rates in higher education.

There are now a number of universities in addition to the two main universities of al-Fatih in Tripoli and Garyunis in Benghazi. According to the new educational structure, the idea behind the increasing numbers of universities, is to create specialised universities and also to distribute universities throughout the whole country in small towns as well as the big cities. The additional universities may give all individuals the opportunity to gain from such education.[12] Table 4.2 shows the main universities in Libya, and the total number of students in each university. Education in Libya until recent times has generally been free at all levels and all university students until the mid-eighties received substantial maintenance support. Moreover, the universities also used to provide text books and scientific instruments to all students at a discount of 40 percent of the cost price. Also, students did not have to pay more than five Dinars for a book, whatever the cost of the book would be. The objective was to encourage the students to possess books and establish their own libraries. However, since the mid-eighties the students do not receive the substantial maintenance support which they used to receive. Students especially in the primary, preparatory and secondary schools now have to pay for the school books which they need for their studies.

Table 4.2: The main universities and their student numbers 1994/95

University	Total Number of Students	Location
University of Al-Fatih	51,361	Tripoli
University of Garyunis	24,453	Benghazi
University of the Arabs for Medical Science	1,718	Benghazi
University of 'Umar al-Mukhtar for Agricultural Science	4,072	Al-Bayda
University of Al-Fatih for Medical Science	5,538	Tripoli
University of Seventh of April	11,138	Al-Zawiya
University of Western Mountain	6,297	Gharyan
University of Bright Star for Technological Studies	1,101	Burayga
The Open University	15,908	Tripoli
University of Darna	4,427	Darna
University of Sabha	5,890	Sabha
University of Nasir	6,870	Tripoli
University of Gulf Challenge	6,275	Sirte
Total	144,988	—

Source: General Secretary of Higher Education (Sirte)

This information about the educational position of the students and the increase of their number within the education system in Libya, especially in higher education, shows the significance of students as a stratum within Libyan society. It provides an important reason for dealing with them as a basis for the sample of this study.

4.1.4 Selections of samples

The sample covered in this study consists of students of both sexes at the University of Garyunis in Benghazi, which is a free public institution of higher education. The university was founded in Benghazi on December 15, 1955 under the name of the Libyan University. It was the first university established in Libya. The nucleus of the University was the Faculty of Arts and Education. The University comprises a number of faculties which were established at different times.

Some other subject areas were formerly part of the University of Garyunis, but were later split to become separate universities such as the University of the Arabs for Medical Science, and the 'Umar al-Mukhtar University for Agricultural Science. At the present time the University comprises five faculties with an enrolment of more than twenty-three thousand

students. The proportion of students in each faculty at the time of the survey was as follows (see Figure 4.2):

a) Faculty of Arts and Education (FAE): The faculty follows the system of the full academic year. It contains more than twelve departments. The faculty represents 25 percent of the whole population of the university.

b) Faculty of Economics and Political Science (FEPS): The faculty follows the semester system. It contains five departments and has 48 percent of the students.

c) Faculty of Law (FL): The faculty follows the system of the full academic year. It has four departments and its students make up just 7 percent of the total.

d) Faculty of Science (FS): The faculty follows the semester system and grants B.Sc. degrees in nine different specialisations. Its students make up 11 percent of the whole population of the university.

e) Faculty of Engineering (FE): The faculty follows the semester system. It consists of six departments and with 9 percent of the total. It has the second smallest number of students.

Figure 4.2: Libyan students distributed through the university



With regard to what kind of approach to take on sampling, the researcher tried to avoid sampling errors by using stratified samples with simple random sampling. The stratified

sampling is a modification of simple random sampling and is designed to produce more representative and thus more accurate samples. The stratified sampling may be defined as a

> sample which is selected from every subgroup of the population in at least one stage of the procedure. The basis for constructing the subgroups or strata may be one or several properties. We may have two simple strata such as 'male' or 'female' or a large number such as 'age at last birthday', ... the stratified sampling enables the researcher to make comparison of the properties of the strata as well as to estimate population characteristics.[13]

There are two major reasons which lay behind this decision to use stratified sampling. These reasons are:

a) The university is by nature stratified and divided into different years, departments and subjects of studies, and between males and females.

b) It simplifies the execution, which enables the researcher to avoid some of the problems mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.

The sample of the study represented 23,434 Libyan students at Garyunis University, and consisted of 500 Libyan students of both sexes: 238 were female and 262 male. The sample numbers were proportionate by gender and faculty. Table 4.3 gives details of the distribution of the sample among the faculties of the university and includes only Libyan students.

The researcher chose 500 students as a representative sample after she realised that there was no need to take a larger sample, since Libyan students are fairly homogenous in age, and in social and cultural levels.

The first step to obtain a representative sample from all the faculties was to select the departments in each faculty from which to take the sample. The decision was based on the size of the departments and the number of students in the department.

Table 4.3: The population of the study—University of Garyunis students (Libyan students only)

Faculty	Number of males	Number of sample males	Number of females	Number of sample females	Total	Total of sample
Faculty of Arts & Education	1,735	35	4,215	89	5,950	124
Faculty of Economics & Political Science	7,941	169	3,331	72	11,272	241
Faculty of Law	586	13	1,019	22	1,609	35
Faculty of Science	844	19	1,651	36	2,495	55
Faculty of Engineering	1,232	26	880	19	2,112	45
Total	12,338	262	11,096	238	23,433	500

Source: Field survey carried out by researcher, 1994

The numbers in the sample (per faculty) reflect the numbers of students in the faculty. The largest faculties in the university are the faculties of social science, in comparison to science faculties. This is due to the increasing number of specialist universities covering particular scientific subjects for instance medical studies. The number of social science students represented in the sample of this study accordingly came to 400, while 100 students came from the faculties of Engineering and Science.

Table 4.4 gives more detail about the sample size by faculty, department, subject of study and gender. Five departments were represented in the sample out of a total of fifteen departments in the faculty of Arts and Education. These departments were Arabic Language and Literature, English Language and Literature, History, Sociology and Mass Media. The total number of students taken from the whole faculty was 124, 35 male and 89 female, representing 24.8 percent of the whole sample. Four departments were chosen from the Faculty of Economics and Political Science. These departments were Economics, Business Administration, Accounting and Political Science. The total number of the sample taken from the Faculty of Economics and Political Science was 241 students, 169 male and 72 female.

Table 4.4: Sample size by faculty and departments and gender (Libyan students only)

Faculty	Male	Female	Total	Total of Samples [%]
Faculty of Arts & Education	35	89	124	24.8
• Arabic Language-Literature	8	19	26	5.4
• English Language-Literature	6	17	23	4.6
• History	7	18	25	5.0
• Sociology	7	18	25	5.0
• Mass Media	7	17	24	4.8
Faculty of Economics & Political Science	169	72	241	48.2
• Economics	42	18	60	12.0
• Business Administration	42	18	60	12.0
• Accounting	42	18	60	12.0
• Political Science	43	18	61	12.2
Faculty of Law	13	22	35	7.0
Faculty of Science	19	36	55	11.0
• Zoology	7	14	21	4.2
• Mathematics	6	11	17	3.4
• Chemistry	6	11	17	3.4
Faculty of Engineering	26	19	45	9.0
• Electrical Engineering	9	7	16	3.2
• Industrial Engineering	8	5	13	2.6
• Civil Engineering	9	7	16	3.2
Total Samples	262	238	500	100.0

Source: Field survey, 1994

As shown in the Table 4.4, the total number of students from the Faculty of Law selected for the sample was 35, 13 male and 22 female. This faculty represents almost 7 percent of the total number from the whole sample. The selected departments from the Faculty of Science were Zoology, Mathematics and Chemistry. The total number from this faculty was 55 students, 19 male and 36 female, representing 11 percent of the whole sample. Finally, three departments in the Faculty of Engineering were selected, namely Electrical Engineering, Industrial Engineering and Civil Engineering. The selection number for these departments was 45 students, 26 male and 19 female. This represented 9 percent of the whole sample of the study. (Figure 4.1 the male and female ratio of Libyan students within the faculties of Garyunis university).

Figure 4.3: Male/ Female ratio of Libyan students within the five faculties at the university of Garyunis



4.1.5 Structure of the questionnaire

The questionnaire of this study was designed to cover a number of subjects through which the political attitudes of the representative sample of this study, 'the university students', could be investigated.[14] All questionnaires were completed in Arabic.

In this part of the chapter, it is useful to introduce the contents of the questionnaire. The sections of the questionnaire can be summarised as follows:

Section one (Questions 1 to 15). This section was the face sheet of the questionnaire (personal data is usually found at the start of any questionnaire). The face sheet questions were concerned with the basic information on each respondent, including place of family residence, place of birth, age, sex, marital status, year of university study, the faculty and the subject of the study, parents' occupation, level of parents' education, family income and social status of the family.

Section two (Questions 16 to 18). Questions in this section were designed to explore the identity issue among the students. One of these questions dealt with the most important

aspects of student identification related to Arabism and Islam, by asking them to select one of the possible answers being an Arab, being a Muslim, or identifying with both equally. The reasons for the identification as an Arab are then assessed by another question in which the respondents were asked to choose one of the possible answers (religion, language, both equally). A final question dealt with how the students identify themselves and what they consider the most important element of their identity: family, tribe, city, state, Muslim, and Arab.

Section three (Questions 19 to 21). This section was designed for the collection of data to help explore the attitudes to tribe and tribalism. The questions covered issues like tribal loyalty and attachment.

Section four (Questions 22 to 39). This section was designed to investigate the attitudes to political participation among the students, through questions which explored their participation in the political system and the awareness of their roles in the political process in Libya.

Section five (Questions 40 to 53). This section dealt with attitudes of the students towards Arab issues, such as Arab unity and the Palestinian issue (Arab-Israeli conflict).

Section six (Questions 54 to 62). This section was designed to investigate the attitude of students towards the role of women in society.

4.2 Data Treatment and Selecting Statistical Procedures

After the field data had been collected, the next step was the analysis of the data. This process started by coding the data in order to allow them to be processed and analysed statistically. Each variable of the data was given a code number. The choice of statistical tests and analytical methods varied according to the nature of the research questions. The researcher tried to adopt the most common straightforward methods which have been used in social science research. As the focus of research was based on a study of the political attitudes of university students, the analysis was centred on six groups of variables. The first group related to the background variables or the "face sheet variables." These variables are gender, age, place of family residence, parents educational level, family income, social status. The second group dealt with identity and the sources of identity such as Arabism, Islam, tribe, family, state and city. The third dealt with tribe and tribalism. The fourth dealt with political participation. The fifth group dealt with some Arab issues such as Arab unity and the

Palestine (Arab/Israeli) conflict. Finally, the sixth group dealt with the role of women in society.

The data was analysed using the SPSS statistical package. The main statistical procedures are:[15]

a) **Frequencies**: Simple counts of each value for a variable, e.g. numbers respectively male and female for the variables set.

b) **Cross-tabulation**: One of the simplest and most frequently used ways of identifying the presence or absence of a relationship between two variables. In cross tabulation, at the simplest two-variable level, one variable forms the rows of a table and another the columns. Each cell contains the cases which have the appropriate row and column values. For example, in a cross-tabulation of sex against the variable rural/urban with the rows as rural/urban and the columns as sex, then there are four cells, namely male urban, male rural, female urban and female rural. Sample data chi-squared can be used to test for the statistical significance of observed associations of variables.

c) **Spearman rank order correlation coefficients**: A statistic measuring the extent to which two sets of discrete data place the distinct items in the same order. Values vary from one, in which there is a complete correspondence of ranks, to zero in which case there is no correspondence. An example would be the relationship between ranking the importance of family as a source of identity and religion as a source of identity.

d) **Kruskal-Wallace rank order analysis of variance**: This is a useful alternative to the analysis of variance. Like analysis of variance, this tests whether sorting cases from a sample into categories produces groups which have differences that are statistically significant. Here the data is ordinal and the test is of mean ranks. An example would be differences in mean ranking of the importance of Islam as a source of identity by father's occupation.

e) **Cluster analysis**: In statistics, the search for relatively homogeneous groups of objects is called cluster analysis. Cluster analysis is used to classify objects or cases into categories. The goal of cluster analysis is to identify homogeneous groups or clusters. Also, in cluster analysis the initial choice of variables determines the characteristics that can be used to identify subgroups. In this study the main cluster analysis has been

carried out using the variables dealing with sources of identity. Here the different composition of ranks indicate different 'identity types'.

As this study is an exploratory study, the abovementioned methods, were used in an exploratory way, not to test hypotheses, but to obtain reasonable information from the data in terms of patterns.[16]

In this thesis the researcher has combined a quantitative examination with material drawn from a review of official and historical sources and with the content analysis of school texts. However, given the lack of social attitudes studies of Libyan society the greatest attention has necessarily been devoted to the survey findings.

4.3 The Characteristics of the Sample

It is useful to give more details about the characteristics of the sample, in terms of gender, place of family residence (i.e. urban versus rural origin), educational specialisation of the respondents (i.e. faculty and subject of study), parental occupational levels, parental educational levels, family income and social status. As these factors may influence the respondents' answers and attitudes towards the issues which this study is based on, they need to be brought into the analysis.

4.3.1 Place of family residence

One of the main background variables relates to the place of family residence (or specifically urban-rural origins). It seems a natural assumption that people might have different attitudes according to their family residence, whether urban or rural.

It should be noted that it was difficult for the researcher to find a practical definition for the division between urban and rural as regards to the place of family residence is of the representative sample of this study. The problem was solved through using the general norms used for the census in the municipality of Benghazi city and some other cities in 1984.

Administratively at that time Libya was divided into 24 provinces (*baladyat*), each of them comprising one main urban centre. The census considered as urban not only the main town of each province, but also the area which was administered as part of that town. In addition to that, any other settlement within the province which had more than 5000 inhabitants was also considered as urban.[17] By UK standards a settlement with a population of only 5000 would

not necessarily count as urban in the twentieth century, but this level was regularly used in the nineteenth century and it is the level used officially in Libya. It may be that this administrative definition overstates the urban element, bringing some people into the urban category who are not truly urban, but it seems to be the only practicable one to employ.

In order to understand the nature of the division between urban and rural in the sample of this study, it is important to give brief details about the background of the urbanisation process in Libya. According to the African Statistical Yearbook, Libya's total population in 1991 was 4,712,000 in comparison to 1,986,000 in 1970. One of the significant features of population growth in Libya has been the increasing proportion of the population concentrated in metropolitan areas such as Benghazi and Tripoli. This process accelerated following the oil discovery in the 1960. Three main factors might explain the movements from rural to urban areas in Libya:

a) The return of many Libyan expatriates who left the country during the Italian era.

b) Discovery and exploitation of oil resources, which has attracted thousands of workers into the cities looking for employment.

c) Attraction to the better facilities found in cities (health, education, entertainment) and an entirely different way of life.

The major cities which experienced rural-urban migration in Libya before the 1970s were Tripoli, Benghazi, Darna, Ijdabia, Tobruk, Bayda and Barce. Since the late 1970s these cities increased their share of the country's population from 22.9 percent in 1954 to 27.4 percent in 1964. During the same period, the two cities Benghazi and Tripoli had a population of more than 80,000 and increased their share of the population, from 18.8 percent to 22.4 percent.[18] Another type of migration has appeared during the late seventies, which is urban-to-urban migration. This process was enhanced by the return of some former migrants to their towns of origin. In 1979, over 66 percent of urban-bound migrants have come either from a city or a town.[19]

As far as the sample is concerned, the vast majority of the respondents came from an urban background. Only few students came from rural areas. In the survey the students came from 55 different areas, cities, villages, small towns, etc.

Figure 4.4 shows the place of family residence (urban-rural) of the representative sample.

Figure 4.4: Type of place of family residence



It was not unexpected for the researcher to find that 428 (86.0 percent) of respondents came from urban areas and 72 (14.0 percent) came from a rural background. The reasons for the high urban percentages can be summarised as follows:

a) The urban population in Libya in general is high in number, as in most of the Arab Middle Eastern countries.

b) Students from rural areas prefer to go to universities which are close to their family residence, especially female students.

c) The university in which the survey was carried out is Garyunis University in Benghazi. It is one of 13 universities around the country (see table 4.2). The researcher has noted that most of the respondents came from Benghazi (64 percent), with about another 10 percent coming from Benghazi's suburbs and surrounding areas, and 4 percent each from Tobruk and Tripoli.

One interesting fact about this figure is that urban females represent 92.0 percent and rural females represent 8.0 percent of the female sample. In contrast, urban males represent 80.0 percent of the sample and rural male students represent 20.0 percent of the male sample.

The larger proportion of urban female students is related to the fact that women tend to choose their faculty or university in the area where their families live for social and cultural reasons. Some families do not allow their daughters to stay away from home or in another city, despite the facilities which every university provides for their students, such as free accommodation.

4.3.2 Parents' education

Parental educational level is one of the main background factor variables in the questionnaire of this study. This variable might have a significant influence on the political attitudes of the sample.

As mentioned in Chapter Three, Libyan society had a lack of education in the period before independence. Afterwards, the education system in Libya, in common with most Arab countries, suffered from a limited curriculum and few qualified teachers. Furthermore, during the monarchy, education was shaped by religious elements more than in any other period. Even with the expansion in secular and Islamic schools, vocational education, the establishment of the first Libyan University, the inclusion of rural and Bedouin children for the first time into the educational system and the creation of an adult education programme, the educational system still did not meet the country's need of trained technical, managerial, and skilled personnel.[20]

The overall literacy rate among the Libyan population over 10 years of age at the time of independence in 1951 did not exceed 20 percent. By 1977 the rate had increased to 51 percent overall, 73 percent for males and 31 percent for females, in consequence of expanding school opportunities.[21] In 1988 it was estimated that only 5 percent of men and 10 percent of women were still illiterate.[22] These official figures for the overall population have to be contrasted with the survey finding that 17 percent of the students' fathers and 50 percent of their mothers were illiterate. This shows that most of the students were the first generation within their families to have been educated. The probable explanation for this discrepancy was the absence of a formal educational provision for their parents. Even the system that did exist was not taken seriously by many people as children especially girls were not sent to school for financial or social reasons. This gap in educational experience between parents and children illustrates the enormous changes in Libya and is an important illustration of the degree of social change which has occurred.

Table 4.5: Parental education

Educational level	Males' fathers [%]	Males' mothers [%]	Females' fathers [%]	Females' mothers [%]	Total fathers [%]	Total mothers [%]
Illiterate	24.0	58.0	11.0	42.0	17.0	50.0
Can only read	7.0	6.0	2.0	6.0	5.0	6.0
Can read and write	17.0	8.0	10.0	7.0	14.0	7.0
Primary	13.0	11.0	14.0	12.0	14.0	12.0
Preparatory	11.0	7.0	16.0	14.0	13.0	10.0
Secondary	5.0	3.3	20.0	8.0	12.0	5.0
Intermediate college	7.0	5.5	6.0	6.0	7.0	5.0
University and over	15.0	2.0	21.0	6.0	18.0	4.0
Total Number of Respondents	262	262	238	238	500	500

Source: Field survey 1994

Table 4.5, demonstrates that the females' fathers are better educated than the males'. As far as the mothers' educational level is concerned, Table 4.5 shows that mothers of females and males had less education than the fathers of males and females. Also, the percentages of illiteracy among the mothers of the respondents are quite high. It seems that the educational level of females' mothers as shown in Table 4.5 was slightly higher than the educational level of males' mothers. It is worth comparing the literacy levels of the respondents' parents with that of the Benghazi population (aged 15 or more) in 1984.[23] There, more than 30 percent of males and more than 40 percent of females were illiterate. The respondents' fathers were substantially more literate than the general population had been ten years earlier, and the mothers were slightly less literate. The difference for women reflects the timing of the introduction of compulsory education. The educational level of the fathers indicates that their social status was higher than that of the general population.

4.3.3 Parents' occupation

Parents' occupation is another of the 'face sheet' variables on which this study is based. This variable may have a significant reflection on the students' attitudes towards the issues investigated.

It is important to justify the method which has been used to classify parents' occupation. In the first stage of classification, the parents' occupation was identified by two open questions (questions 8, 11a and 11b, see Appendix A). The first was asked about the father's occupation. The second was about the mother's occupation, and had two parts. The first half was: "Does your mother work?", and the second part was: "If yes, what is your mother's occupation?".

The second stage was based on classifying the parents' occupation by using the census of the municipality of Benghazi in 1984 as a preliminary guide. However, the categories employed there mixed occupation and field of activity (e.g. working in the public service, working in production etc.) and could not form the basis for a ranking of occupation. It was necessary to modify this so substantially that direct comparisons of the general population in 1984 and the students' parents are not possible. All parents who were self-employed were classified under the category "businessman." Any parents who were working as doctors, engineers, university lecturers, teachers or in any skilled job with higher education were considered as professionals. Figure 4.5 shows the respondents' fathers' occupations. As can be seen, there are some differences between males' and females' fathers' occupations.

Figure 4.5 shows that females' fathers had higher percentages than males' fathers in certain categories such as 'businessman', and 'professional'. Almost 24.0 percent of females' fathers were businessmen, compared with 16 percent of males' fathers. Also, 33.0 percent of females' fathers were government officials, compared with 26 percent of males' fathers. 19.0 percent of females fathers were professionals compared to 16 percent of males' fathers. There were only small percentages of the fathers of both sexes who were working as settled farmers or labourers. The low percentages in these categories are due to the small number of rural students in the sample.

Figure 4.5: Father's occupation



As far as the mothers of the respondents are concerned, it seems that most of the mothers were not economically active. There were only three categories of mother's occupation: not economically active, professional or administrative official, and labourer.

The findings show that 91.0 percent of the males' mothers were not economically active, and almost 89.0 percent of the females' mothers were not economically active. In contrast, 5.0 percent of the males' mothers were professionals or administrative officers and 8.0 percent of the females' mothers were professionals or administrative officers. Furthermore, almost 2.0 percent of the males' mothers were labourers as were 3.0 percent of the females' mothers. Most of the women who were economically active were professional or government officials. According to the respondents' answers, most women who were in the labourer category were working as cleaners at schools, hospitals and offices, or as labourers in factories.

It seems that the explanation for the low numbers of economically active mothers is related to the low percentages of mothers' education in general. It is also affected by the early marriage of women and their role in the family.

It is useful to mention that women in Libya have obtained many opportunities to work and participate in most of the economic activities of the society during the last three decades.

Attir, in his study about development and modernisation in the Libyan society, describes the role of women in Libyan society since the late thirties as follows:

> It was common in the family to find just one member who was working to obtain income, usually the father played such a role. The work to obtain economic benefits such as money was monopolised by men....It seems that women had entered the labour market on a simple level in the late thirties and forties as cleaners in hospitals, schools and houses. Then the situation developed for the women to became teachers, and nurses. The extension of education among women, gave them the opportunity to enter several fields such as engineering, medicine, and teaching at universities.[24]

There are no official reports that show the role of women as part of the labour force in Libya. A large number of women are working in the education system. This reflects one of the main policies of the country, namely to use female teachers for the whole of the early years of the education system (primary and preparatory schools).

4.3.4 Social status of the family

Social status is one of the main background factors or face sheet variables, which the researcher expected to effect the attitudes of the respondents towards the main issues of this study.

Social status in this study was measured in practice by two main questions (numbers 13a and 13b, see Appendix A). The first asked the respondents a direct question about their family income. The second question asked them to categorise the social status of their family. Each question had a number of alternative answers to assist the respondents to choose the most relevant answer. There were some other control questions which were intended to help the researcher to find out more information about the social status of the respondents. These questions (12, 14a, 14b, 15, see Appendix A) were about the number of family members, type of family residence (including the rooms in the family house) and whether the family owned certain goods such as cars, air-conditioning, video, etc. In practice, the degree of variation in ownership of items etc. was not high and these were not used in the specification of social status.

It was very difficult to choose the most suitable method to measure family income and social status. Since 1969, especially after 1977 (the issuing of *The Green Book*), economic structures have changed due to the regime's attempt to create the "State of the Masses". These include the following changes:

a) The "partners, not wage workers" policy in light industry, the services sector, etc. This is a notion al-Qadhafi introduced in order to replace the traditional employer-employee relationship with the concept of profit-sharing. However, in practice the effects of this policy have not been very great.

b) The adoption of the Equal Wages Law Number (15) in 1981 by the General People's Congresses. This was designed to organise the wages and salaries system of the native workers in Libya. The first article of this law guarantees equal wages for equal jobs and responsibilities with the amount sufficient to satisfy basic needs.[25]

c) The emergence of a policy of economic liberalisation from 1988. The regime's economic policy has moved towards liberalisation, by allowing private enterprises in the retail trade, small scale industries and agricultural businesses and by the abolition of state export and import companies.[26]

There was, moreover, the problem of updated information such as official reports and material, relating to the economic activities in Libya. Unfortunately, these are scarce and often out of date. Thus they couldn't be relied upon when measuring and classifying family income and social status.

The researcher therefore tried to resolve the problem of classification of social status practically, by talking to a range of employees of Garyunis University and asking for their views on the relationship between income levels and general social status. There was a rough consensus on the scale, as shown in Figure 4.6. Thus, income level has been used as a proxy variable for social status.

Figure 4.6: Family income per month



In Table 4.6 the researcher has replaced the income categories, which were actually measured, with the labels that the Garyunis University Staff thought could be generally applied to those income levels. This was necessarily an approximate procedure, but it gives some idea of social status by income. The values in the table are of course the same as in the figure.

By looking at Figure 4.6 and Table 4.6, we can see that 5 percent of the male respondents were from families in the labour category with a monthly income of less than 120 Libyan dinars, and 3 percent of the females' families were in this category. The second category (lower-middle class, with a monthly income between 121-199 L.d.) accounted for 16 percent of the male and 11 percent of female.

The middle category with a monthly income of 200-300 L.d. covered 39 percent of the male respondents, and 50 percent of the female respondents. The middle is the largest category of the whole sample for both sexes. In contrast, the upper middle category, with a monthly income of 301-500 L.d, contained 25 percent of the males and 28 percent of the females. The last category, with a monthly income 501 and over L.d. covered 16 percent of the male respondents and 10 percent of the females.

Table 4.6: Social status of the family

Categories	Male [%]	Female [%]	Total
Lower	5	3	4
Lower-Middle	16	11	13
Middle	39	50	44
Upper Middle	25	28	26
Upper	16	10	13
Total Number of Respondents	262	238	500

Source: Field survey 1994 - note that in this and other tables percentages may not sum to 100 because numbers have been rounded to the nearest whole number.

To conclude, according to the tables and figures shown above, the most common categories of social status of the respondents' families, were these of the middle and the upper middle income strata. It is also worth noting that female respondents were more likely to come from middle and upper middle backgrounds than were male respondents.

It is not possible to make an exact comparison of the social status of the students' parents with that of the general population, because there is no general income distribution data published for Libya or Benghazi. However, it is evident from the social status labels which the Garyunis staff gave to the income levels that the students do come from more affluent and higher status backgrounds.

4.4 Conclusion and Summary

This chapter was intended both to describe the process of survey design and execution and to give some general background information about the students in the sample obtained. The students are primarily urban and the majority come from the Greater Benghazi area and surrounding districts. They come from a variety of social backgrounds, but again it is important to emphasise the regime's commitment to a relatively egalitarian social system, and the relatively even standard of living (by comparison with other Arab societies) which prevails in Libya. It is very important to remember that education at all levels is free in Libya, although at the time of the study there were no maintenance grants. This latter reason may well be important in reducing the participation by those from poorer backgrounds in higher education, but those whose families could not afford to support them into higher education were not, by definition, in my sample.

The study will now explore the influence of background on identity, attitudes to tribalism, extent of political participation, attitudes to gender issues, and attitudes to general Arab issues. It must be emphasised, however, that the most important characteristics of the students may well be what they have in common rather than what differences of background could indicate. In many senses they are a homogeneous group and the most important distinctions are not those among them, but between them and previous generations in Libya. Indeed, subsequent analyses will show that social background has little influence on attitudes, although there are important differences among the students with regard to both attitudes and conceptions of identity. The major exception is the influence of gender on attitudes towards the women's role.

Notes to Chapter 4

[1] Amal S. M. Obeidi, *Political Socialisation of School Children in Libya: A Content Analysis of School Readers 1979-1988* (Garyunis University, Benghazi, MA Dissertation, 1990)

[2] For more details about students in underdeveloped countries see Seymour Martin Lipset, "University Students and Politics in Underdeveloped Countries", *Comparative Education Review* vol. 10, no. 2, June 1966, pp. 132-162. For more details about the students as a subculture in the Arab countries see Abdul A. Said and Mohammed Mughisuddin, "Subcultures in the Arab World" in William E. Hazen and Mohammed Mughisudden (eds), *Middle Eastern Subcultures*, (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1975), pp. 127-139.

[3] Abdul A. Said and Mohammed Mughisuddin, ibid., p. 127.

[4] Mohamed Z. El-Mogherbi, *The Socialisation of School Children in the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya*, (University of Missouri, Columbia, PhD thesis, 1978), pp. 33-34.

[5] Omar I. El-Fathaly and Monte Palmer, *Political Development and Social Change in Libya*, (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1980), p. 144.

[6] Ibid., p. 144.

[7] Ibid., p. 144.

[8] The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Libya Country Profile 1990-91*, (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1990), p. 9.

[9] See Table 1.1 total population, p.1 and Table 2 population by age group and sex, p. 13, in United Nations, *African Statistical Yearbook, 1990/1991*, vol. 1, part 1, North Africa. See also *World Population Prospects the 1992 Revision*, (New York: United Nations Publications, 1993), p. 532.

[10] The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Libya Country Profile 1990-91*, op.cit., p. 9.

[11] 'Statistical Survey of Libya' in *The Middle East and North Africa*, (London: Europa Publications, 1996), p.737

[12] Subhi Ganwus, *et al*, *Libiya al-Thawra fi I'shriyn ʿAmman: al-Tahawulat al-Siyasiya wa al-Iqtiṣadiya wa al-Ijtimaʿiya 1969-1989*, [Revolution Libya in Twenty Years: Political-Economic-Social Transformational 1969-1989], (Al-Dar al-Jamahiriyya lil-Nashir wa al-Tawuziʿ wa al-Iʿlan, 1989), p. 420.

[13] R. L. Ackoff, *The Design of Social Research*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1967), pp. 104-105.

[14] The full questionnaire can be found in Appendix A.

[15] For more details about the SPSS and the statistical procedures used in this study see Marija J. Norusis, *SPSS: Statistical Data Analysis, SPSS Base System User's Guide*, (Chicago: SPSS, 1990); see also Leonard Champney, *Introduction to Quantitative Political Science*, (Harper Collins College Publishers, 1995). See R. Mark Sirkin, *Statistics for the Social Sciences*, (London: Sage Publications, 1995), and Alan Bryman and Duncan Cramer, *Quantitative Data Analysis for Social Scientists*, (London: Routledge, 1992).

[16] For more details on exploratory data see J.W. Tukey, *Exploratory Data Analysis*, (Reading MA: Addison-Wesley, 1977), p. vii.

[17] *Benghazi Census of 1984*, Department of Statistics and Planning, Benghazi, Libya, p. 23.

[18] See F. Zagallai, *Recent Urban Trends in the Libyan Arab Republic*, (Colorado State University, MA dissertation, 1973).

[19] See R. A. Khalaf Allah, *Migration, Labour Supply and Regional Development in Libya*, (University of Oklahoma, PhD Thesis, 1979).

[20] Richard F. Nyrop, *et al*, *Libya a Country Study*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office for Foreign Areas Studies, 1973), p. 5.

[21] Harold D. Nelson, (ed), *Libya a Country Study*, (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office for Foreign Areas Studies, 1979), p. 112.

[22] Libya *Country Profile 1990-91*, op.cit., p. 9.

[23] *Benghazi Census 1984*, op.cit., p. 40.

[24] Mustafa Attir, *Al-Tanmiya wa al-Tahdith: Nta'ij Dirasa Maydaniya fi al-Mujtamaᶜ al-Libiyi*, [Modernisation and Development: Results of an Empirical Study in Libyan Society], (Tripoli: The Arab Development Institute, 1980), pp. 103-104.

[25] "Qanwn Raqam 15 Li-Sanat 1981 Bi-Sh'an Nizaam al-Muratabat Lil-ᶜamiliyn fi al-Jamahiriyya" [Law No 15 of 1981 of wages system in Libya], *al-Mawsuᶜa al-Qanwniya: al-Mar'aa fi al-Tashriyᶜat al-Libiyya* [The Encyclopaedia of Law: Woman in Libyan Legislation], (Tarablus: Sh'wwn al-Mar'aa bi-A'mana Mu'atamar al-Shaᶜb al-ᶜAam, 1994), p. 216.

[26] The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Libya Country Profile 1990-91*, op.cit., p. 11.

5. The Issue of Identity

5.1 Introduction

Identity is one of the most significant factors related to the building of a nation, and the formation of a political community. In empirical studies it is one of the major concepts in understanding how people in different ethnic groups, religions and nations perceive themselves.

The identity issue is a confusing one, especially in Arab societies. Saad Eddin Ibrahim mentions identity, authority and equality as the main issues which underlie the building of a modern nation.[1] But the problem is that although most Arab societies accept the existence of one common identity, which is "the Arab identity", there are other competitive political identities: "regional identity" (operating at various levels e.g. national or subnational), "Islamic identity", and "ethnic identity." It is unclear what the hierarchy of these identities is. But most people have more than one identity.

The identity question is particularly important to the Libyan system because of its attempts to create a national identity based on Arab nationalism. Arab identity is intended to serve as an alternative to regional and local identities (such as those linked to tribe, city or region). The revolutionary regime has sought to abolish the political role of some of these units such as the tribe, giving more emphasis to their social role, that is, to provide their members with social values, morals, and security. Also, through its attempts to build a nation, the regime has used nationalism in the wider context. This concept was linked with Arabism and Islamism as other important sources of identification.

This part of the study will explore identity through a number of questions which are intended to clarify how students in Libya identify themselves. What are the most important elements

for their identification? What is the role of Islamism and Arabism in terms of identification? And what is the role of identification as *walad ᶜayla* [the son of a family], and *walad qabila* [the son of a tribe]. The traditional identification with tribe is still powerful among Libyans, as in most of the other Arab countries.

These are the key questions raised when exploring the attitudes of the 262 male and 238 female university students concerning their identity. I will cover factors which might influence their identification, such as gender, social status, place of family residence, parents' education and the subject of study. A number of analytical procedures are used to explore the attitudes of the representative sample. These procedures are cross tabulation and cluster analysis.

There is some homogeneity in Libya, in so far as almost all of the population are Arabs and Muslims. However a Berber minority is present, which shares the religion, history, and culture of the Arab majority and even uses Arabic as a second language. Furthermore, they have adopted the Arabic alphabet to express their various dialects in written form. In general, these groups are integrated into the system, with fewer problems than similar groups in some other North African Arab countries, such as Algeria. Furthermore, the political literature of the regime considers Berbers as Arabs who immigrated to the region before Islam. Yet the Berbers are still aware of their identity as a distinctive group in Libyan society. They have their own language, which has Hamitic roots.

In this study sample, the researcher only came across three cases of individuals who did not identify themselves as Arab. Two of the cases in the survey identified themselves as Muslim Berbers. They distinguished themselves as Berbers because of the language. The third case identified himself as an African Muslim. He justified his identification because of his distinctive language, skin colour and the geographical location of his home—near the Southern Libyan border.

While there are no big differences between "Arabs and non-Arabs" in Libyan society, there are still important differences in the identification of individuals. Libyan society, like many other Arab societies, is based on traditional identifications such as family, tribe, religion, and city. For instance, when meeting for the first time, there are certain questions people usually ask: *lia'i qabila ant* [Which tribe do you belong to?], and *lia'i ᶜai'la* [Which family do you belong to?]. There are also phrases like *walad-bint ᶜai'la* [I am a son-daughter of a specific family], or *ana min qabila* [I belong to a specific tribe]. There are also ties with particular localities.

In such a society the deeds of individuals bring collective fame or shame to the family and tribe. Hence the good or bad reputation of a family or tribe crucially influences the lives of individuals socially, politically and economically. The clan or tribe can interfere even at a personal level, such as in the decision of marriage, especially for females.

This chapter explores the identity issue through three main questions as shown in the questionnaire (questions 16, 17, 18, see Appendix A). The first question involved asking the respondents about the most important aspect of their identity by giving them three choices: being an Arab, being a Muslim, or being an Arab and Muslim. The second question involved asking the respondent how they identified themselves, ranking in descending order the following potential answers: son or daughter of a specific family, belonging to a specific tribe, coming from a particular city within Libya, being a citizen of the Libyan state, being a Muslim, and being an Arab. The third question was based on selecting one of the following statements: I am an Arab because of my religion, I am an Arab because of my language, I am an Arab because I belong to an Arab state.

5.2 The Notion of Identity: A Review

Identity can have many different levels. People can have a sense of belonging to a religious grouping, a culture, a state and a region, all at the same time. Identities are not exclusive of others. Moreover, the weight which individuals give to particular elements of their identity can change over time. The task is to assess what weight individuals give to the different elements of their identity, and how those elements relate to one another.

One recent study which highlights this point is Da Costa's (1994) study of Cape Town Muslims (South Africa). His study was based on research on the geography of religion, conducted in Greater Cape Town between 1985 and 1989. He tried to find out whether the group identified itself as South African, or whether the national-origin sub-groups still identified themselves in terms of their countries of origins. Did the group accept the different racial classifications which had been imposed upon it by colonialism and later by apartheid legislation, or had the group become welded into a socially distinguishable religious community? Or were there combinations of these identities which had given rise to a system of multiple identities?[2]

Da Costa found that, despite the heightened religious identity within a minority religious group, other forms of identity are not excluded. Half the Muslim population of Great Cape

Town saw themselves as part of other population categories, such as 'Coloured', 'Indian' and so on. Moreover, at least one fifth of the Muslim population considered their religious identity as Muslims less important than their identity in terms of other categories.[3] Despite these findings it was the case that religious identity within a group could override all other forms of identity. This appears through the behaviour and experience of most members of the Muslim community, where most of them preferred to use Islamic forms of greeting and gave their children Arabic names. The researcher added that under very special socio-political circumstances minority groups may not see themselves as part of the country of residence, and may not express any significant national identity. In this study only one respondent considered himself as South African.

A study by Al-Salem is one of the few on this topic undertaken in Arab countries. Al-Salem studied the issue of identity in selected Arab Gulf States during the period 1979-1982, using a representative sample of 500 high school students from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. He found that the students in the Arab Gulf states appeared to have no general Pan-Arab identity.[4] The only formulated identity that had developed among the students was a sense of belonging to the existing state. Pan-Arab nationalism had lost its meaning by the 1970s and, according to the sample of students asked, Pan-Arabism considered was a myth.

There is, moreover, often a gap between what people say about their identity and how they act. As al-Salem states,

> What is true of Arab nationalism is also true of the pan-Islamic movement: there is a vast difference between theory and practice. The wealthy Muslims of the Gulf states who talk about the distribution of wealth according to Islamic theory do not necessarily practice what they preach.[5]

This study is seeking to contribute something to the few studies in the Arab countries, and the Middle East in general, through an exploration of the attitudes of 500 Libyan university students towards self-identity.

5.3 Analysis of the Data

The purpose of this section is to analyse and explore the attitudes of the university students in Libya towards the identity question through a numbers of dimensions of potential identification such as Arabism and Islamism on the one hand, and the traditional sources of identity such as region, tribe, family, city and the state, on the other hand.

In political sociology, attitudes are usually considered to be influenced by background factors, often referred to as 'face-sheet' variables (see chapter 4). Such possible background factors are gender, urban versus rural origin, parental occupational levels, household income, household size and the social status of the family from which the respondents come. It is important to emphasise that some of these factors do not vary very much among the sample. Libya is a relatively homogeneous society with regard to household incomes (in comparison with other Arab societies), and the respondents are all students entering into a common status. However, as the discussion in Chapter 4 shows, there is some significant variation in many of these background variables and it is worth considering the potential impact of this on attitudes towards identity.

5.3.1 Arabism and Islamism: possible sources of identity

To find out the relative strength between Islam and Arabism as source of identities, the respondents were asked which of the following was most important to them: being an Arab, being a Muslim, or both equally. The result can be seen in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1: Importance of identity by gender and place of family residence

Categories	Number of respondents	Being an Arab [%]	Muslim [%]	Both equally [%]
Urban male	209	2	21	77
Rural male	53	2	11	87
Urban female	219	1	9	89
Rural female	19	0	21	79
Urban	428	2	15	83
Rural	72	1	14	85
Male	262	2	19	79
Female	238	1	10	89
All	500	2	15	84

Source: Field survey 1994

Table 5.1 is based on gender and the place of family residence (urban/rural). Even when considered together in a three variable model (that is, by looking at urban/rural distinctions for males and females separately), these background factors do not have much impact on the way the Libyan students see themselves. As shown in the table, the results show that the combination of Islam and Arabness is the key to identity for most of the respondents, although

this is somewhat less so for rural women and for urban men, both of which categories have relatively large proportions citing Islam alone.

Arabness by itself counts very little in identity. For instance, those who identified themselves as Arab alone by the two background factors (gender and place of family residence) covered only 1 percent and 2 percent of each category. Muslimness by itself is considerably more important. Between 9 percent and 21 percent identified themselves as Muslim. But between 77 percent and 89 percent identified 'both equally' as being of the greatest significance. It seems clear that the overwhelming majority of respondents were not prepared to distinguish between Arabism and Islam as sources of personal identity.

5.3.2 Reasons for identification as an Arab

This section explores the reasons why respondents identify themselves as Arabs. The question (number 18 see appendix A) puts three different alternatives as possible reasons for identification as an Arab. These alternatives are religion, language, and belonging to an Arab state.

The significance of the question with respect to Arab nationalist thought is very important. In most Arab nationalist thought there are a number of different elements of Arab identity such as language, history, religion. But the relationship of Arab nationalism to Islam remains at the centre of discussion. One of those who discussed this feature was Sati^{c} al-Husri. According to Bezirgan

> Al-Husri argued that Islam as a religion, is not among the basic component elements of Arab nationalism but yet cannot be entirely overlooked in the process of the development of national consciousness. His argument is based on his concept of religion. To al-Husri, there are two types of religions in the world. One is the universal, like Islam and Christianity, which are not the religion of a particular nation or race but which tend to link several nations in a bond that is stronger than language and history. The second type is what he calls 'national religions' such as Judaism, which is the religion of specific people. National religions, he maintains, constitute an integral part of nationalism and cannot be divorced from the political life of the nation.[6]

For al-Husri, whose writings are historically oriented, Islam played a crucial role in the evolution and spreading of Arab nationalism for two main reasons. Firstly, Islam was the driving force behind the Arab conquests which spread the Arabic language, and secondly, it became the 'protective force of division and disintegration'. But this does not mean that Arab nationalism remained tied to Islam.[7] Al-Husri gave special emphasis to history as one of the main elements of nationalism.

Often a nation defines itself by having a distinctive language. For al-Husri, for instance, language is a pillar of nationalism, while history is the feeling and memories of the nation.[8] Michel ᶜAflaq was another thinker who paid a great deal of attention to the relationship between Islam and Nationalism (Arabism).[9] Islam is the beginning of Arabism and Islam for the Arabs is the

> clearest expression of their cosmic consciousness and their general outlook. Above all *Islam* is the most splendid form of their language and literature and the largest slice of their national history.[10]

ᶜAflaq was aware of the role of religion and he completely rejected Marxist ideas about religion. He maintained that any attack on religion would create a barrier between the political leadership at the top and the masses of people at the bottom.[11]

ᶜAbdul Rahman al-Bazzaz was another advocate of the linguistic-historical approach. He argued that there was no contradiction between Arabism and Islam. In his view, Islam can not be included as a 'necessary' element in the formation of Arab nationalism.[12] In his book, *Hadhi Qawmiyyatuna* [This is our Nationalism], Al-Bazzaz stated that:

> If we equate religion and nationalism, we would exclude one-tenth of the Egyptian population, and one-fifth of the Syrian population and about one-half of the population of Lebanon from Arab nationalism. We would also exclude a sizeable proportion of the Iraqis, Palestinians, Jordanians, and Sudanese, as well as a great number of Arabs who have immigrated to America, Africa and the other continents. But on the other hand, when we lose these millions (of Arabs), the theory (that Islam is an essential element) would have us consider every Muslim in Asia, Africa and Europe as brother to the Arab Muslim brothers in the national sense, which means that the sons of the same nationality will have the same political destiny and one ultimate national interest, and requires the establishment of a social and political solidarity and association among them.[13]

The relationship between religion and nationalism as a general concept was one of the key questions to which the state ideology in Libya paid a great deal of attention, especially in the *Green Book*. According to al-Qadhafi

> The social, i.e. the national factor is the driving force of human history there is no real rival to the social factor in influencing the unity of one group except the religious factor, which may divide the national group or unite groups with different nationalism.[14]

As far as the relationship between Islam and Arab nationalism is concerned, for al-Qadhafi, Islam is the fundamental basis of Arab identity, of unity within the Arab nation and between it and all Muslims. Islam, for al-Qadhafi, is also the most significant political and cultural weapon against imperialism and intellectual domination.[15]

The relationship between Islam and the Arab nation as an ethnic identity is a close organic one. In the Arab nation, Islam as a message has been spread by its sons to all peoples. Al-Qadhafi maintained in 1973 that Islam was neither an Arab nor an Eastern religion, but an international and universal mission.[16] According to Deeb and Deeb,

> Al-Qadhafi regarded Islam as national in character in the sense that the Arab lands had been the land of the prophets, the Arabic language the language of the Qur'an, and the Arabs had been chosen to carry this message. It is al-Qadhafi's attempt to reconcile the nationalist and the universal conceptions of Islam without abandoning either that have led him to oscillate from one conception to the other, depending on the situation encountered.[17]

Al-Qadhafi's conception of Arab nationalism or Arabism was simply tied to his Islamic identity. He was brought up in a society which did not encompass religious divisions among its indigenous population. He was criticised for this by Arabs from the Eastern part of the Arab countries who saw his beliefs as a divisive influence that could alienate non-Sunni Muslims as well as Christians.[18] According to Deeb and Deeb al-Qadhafi's reaction to this criticism was that:

> Islam includes the 'people of the book' all those who believe in God and his prophets are Muslims, and consequently, Christians and Jews were Muslims even before the coming of Prophet Muhammad. He believes that the adoption of an all-inclusive view of Islam would make it possible to transcend divisions based on religious and sectarian grounds.[19]

Al-Qadhafi thus oscillates between Islam as a universal religion and Islam as the national religion of the Arabs. Al-Qadhafi believed the "Arab and Islamic identity were inextricably linked, therefore, he felt the Arab revolution must also be an Islamic one."[20]

The sample survey gives the reasons why Libyan students identify themselves as Arab. Their answers reflect their attitudes to state ideology in Libya. The analysis is based on the face sheet variables (such as place of family residence, gender, subject of the study, social status, and parents' education). Table 5.2 shows the results of the survey, by gender and the urban-rural divide, in a three-variable model. The reasons for identifying oneself as an Arab among Libyan students were: religion, language and being part of an Arab state.

Table 5.2: Reasons for identification as an Arab by gender and place of family residence

Categories	Number of respondents	Religion [%]	Language [%]	Arab State [%]
Urban male	209	58	23	18
Rural male	53	55	21	23
Urban female	219	56	20	23
Rural female	19	53	21	26
Urban	428	57	22	21
Rural	72	54	21	24
Male	262	58	23	19
Female	238	56	20	23
All	500	57	21	21

Source: Field survey 1994

Table 5.2 shows, first, that the Islamic element is strongest among the respondents. There are no great differences between the categories of the respondents. The researcher suggests that this is due to the regime's socialisation process which gave the same norms and values to the students as a whole. Furthermore, it seems that the regime has succeeded in creating a collective attitude towards certain issues among the students. For instance, comparing the result of the general attitudes of the respondents in Table 5.2 with the regime's ideology, we can see that the majority of respondents reflect the regime's values through their attitudes towards religion (Islam) as an important element of their identification as Arabs. However, a significant minority was oriented towards other factors, such as language and Arab state, as shown in the table.

Table 5.3 is a similar cross tabulation for the question which deals with reasons for being an Arab by father's educational level. Here the parental educational level as an ordinal variable has no statistical significance, although there is a tendency for religion to become less important, the higher the father's education level.

Table 5.3: Reasons for being an Arab by father's education

Father's education	Number of respondents	Religion [%]	Language [%]	Arab State [%]
Illiterate	87	70	18	20
Read Only	23	65	13	17
Read and Write	68	53	27	19
Primary	69	59	19	23
Preparatory	65	65	14	22
Secondary	62	52	24	23
Intermediate	33	52	30	18
University and above	91	50	25	23
All	500	57	21	21

Source: Field survey 1994

A similar analysis for the same question, analysed according to the educational level of the respondents' mothers, can be seen in Table 5.4. Again there is a tendency, although not a significant one, for religion to be less important, the higher the level of mother's education.

Table 5.4: Reasons for being an Arab by mother's education

Mother's education	Number of respondents	Religion [%]	Language [%]	Arab State [%]
Illiterate	252	59	19	21
Read only	29	86	7	7
Read and write	37	43	38	19
Primary	58	60	21	19
Preparatory	52	46	25	23
Secondary	27	63	15	22
Intermediate	27	41	37	22
University and above	18	39	22	39

Source: Field survey 1994

Table 5.5 shows the reasons for Arab identification by subject of study and faculties of the respondents.

The study background (humanities or sciences) of the respondents did not have much impact on the way the students rank the reasons for being an Arab. However, there was an exception in the Faculty of Science among Zoology students who were oriented towards language as the main reason for identification as an Arab (52 percent).

Table 5.5: Reasons for being an Arab by subject of study

Faculties and departments	Number of respondents	Religion [%]	Language [%]	Arab state [%]
Faculty of Economic & Political Science	241			
• Economics	60	65	13	22
• Business Administration	60	55	28	18
• Accounting	60	65	13	18
• Political Science	61	59	25	16
Faculty of Arts & Education	124			
• Arabic Language	27	74	7	15
• English Language	23	57	22	22
• History	25	48	16	36
• Sociology	25	60	24	16
• Mass Media	24	42	21	38
Faculty of Law	35	49	23	26
Faculty of Science	55			
• Zoology	21	33	52	14
• Mathematics	17	53	35	12
• Chemistry	17	41	29	24
Faculty of Engineering	45			
• Electrical Engineering	16	56	25	13
• Industrial Engineering	13	46	23	31
• Civil Engineering	16	69	0	31
All	500	57	21	21

Source: Field survey 1994

It is appears that the subject of study did not make any significant difference to the respondents' reasons for being an Arab.

Figure 5.1 explores the reason for being an Arab by social status. It seems that there was no significant difference between the categories of social status. The percentages of the respondents for the main three alternatives (religion, language, and Arab state) were quite close, with no big differences.

Figure 5.1: Reasons for identification as an Arab by social status



Sources of identity

The findings of this study show that Libyan students mainly identify themselves as Arabs through the Islamic religion. They do not distinguish between Arabism and Islamism. The two concepts for them are the same, or at least have a strong relationship. Religion is thus a very important element in Arabism or Arab nationalism for students. Language and awareness of being a member of an Arab state are less important factors in identifying oneself as Arab.

These findings in general reflect Libyan state ideology. Students seem to fit in within the political value system of the regime. Generally speaking, the background of the students does not make much difference.

5.3.3 Exploration of different dimensions of identity sources

This section explores other possible dimensions of the identity question. When the respondents were asked about identifying themselves, they were also asked to rank the following possible sources of identity in order of importance from one to six: Family, Tribe, City, State, Islam and Arabism.

Some subsequent analyses will use procedures which are based on rank order correlations, in which the full potential of the rank ordering of data is employed. However, Figure 5.2 lays out what the respondents thought to be most important.

Figure 5.2: Most important source of identity



Figure 5.2 shows that there is considerable variation in the most important source of identity. Although Islam was the major factor, only a third of respondents ranked it as most important to them. Arabism (23 percent) and Family (17 percent) were also of considerable significance.

It is interesting to look at the overall pattern of the ranking of response to the questions dealing with components of identity. Here the ranking is simplified by creating three categories, taking 1 and 2 as 'High', 3 and 4 as 'Middle', and 5 and 6 as 'Low'. Table 5.6 shows the pattern for the first question.

Table 5.6: Simplified ranks of sources of identity

Rank	Family [%]	Tribe [%]	City [%]	State [%]	Islam [%]	Arabism [%]
High	19	16	18	24	52	55
Middle	16	19	50	52	25	21
Low	58	59	24	16	8	15

Source: Field survey 1994

Table 5.6 shows that Family and Tribe are ranked low by more than half of the respondents. In contrast, Islam and Arabism are ranked highly by more than half of all respondents. City and State get a middle rank by about half of all the respondents.

It is worth exploring the pattern of inter-relationships amongst these variables which deal with possible sources or dimensions of identity. Since all these variables were measured on ordinal scales, the simplest way of doing this was to compute rank order correlation coefficients (see chapter 4) amongst the variables. The resulting matrix for the six sources of identity variables is given in Table 5.7.

Table 5.7: Spearman rank order correlation coefficients - identity variables

Source of identity	Family	Tribe	City	State	Islam
Family					
Tribe	0.33				
City	-0.27	-0.15			
State	-0.42	-0.48	0.31		
Islam	-0.33	-0.20	-0.48	0.12	
Arabism	-0.43	-0.41	-0.31	-0.12	0.34

Source: Field survey 1994

A pattern of relationships can be discerned. There is a positive Family/Tribe relationship, but ranking of these two variables is negatively associated with other rankings. City and State are positively related, but identification with City is negatively related to identification with Islam and Arabism. State identification is positively, albeit weakly, related to Islam and negatively and weakly, related to Arabism. Islam and Arabism are strongly positively related. All these coefficients are statistically significant at the 5 percent level.

There were no significant correlations between rankings on the source of identity variable set, and the rankings of components of Arab identity. These last components were strongly and negatively inter-correlated, but this is to be expected with a three rank order set.

The above findings, although simplified, are interesting. It does seem that there may exist two fairly strongly distinguishable sorts of respondents, with a less clearly marked intermediate category. At an exploratory level we can identify a Family/Tribe identity set as against an Islam/Arabism identity set, with an intermediate group relating more to both City and State – in summary indicating some sort of territorial basis for identity.

Figure 5.3 shows the results of the gender-urban/rural two-way tabulation in relation to the highest rankings given for the possible components of identity. Again there was little real variation. The apparent difference between rural males and females was not statistically significant, since the numbers of rural females in the sample was so small. However, the stronger commitment of urban females to Arabism as a source of identity was statistically significant.

Figure 5.3: Identification by gender and place of family residence



Similar cross tabulations of sources of identity by subject of study showed no real systematic pattern of variation.

Figure 5.4 shows the pattern of variation by social status of family. Again what is interesting about this chart is the absence of significant differences in either the substantive or statistical sense. The social status of the family makes little difference in these matters.

Figure 5.4: Identification by social status



Table 5.8 and Table 5.9 show the limited impact of the father's and the mother's educational background, leading to the same conclusion on these variables as was given for social status.

Table 5.8: Identification by father's education

Father's education	Number of respondents	Family [%]	Tribe [%]	City [%]	State [%]	Muslim [%]	Arab [%]
Illiterate	87	20	10	6	9	35	23
Read only	23	26	9	4	4	48	9
Read and write	68	15	3	18	4	40	18
Primary	69	10	7	6	4	36	35
Preparatory	65	6	6	19	8	34	25
Secondary	62	21	3	8	10	32	26
Intermediate	33	27	0	0	3	39	30
University and over	91	19	6	11	8	36	18
All	498	17	6	10	7	36	23

Source: Field survey 1994

Table 5.9: Identification by mother's education

Mother's education	Number of respondents	Family [%]	Tribe [%]	City [%]	State [%]	Muslim [%]	Arab [%]
Illiterate	252	19	6	9	7	33	24
Read only	29	0	7	7	3	55	28
Read and write	37	5	5	14	8	41	24
Primary	58	22	9	9	5	38	17
Preparatory	52	15	2	10	15	37	19
Secondary	27	15	7	15	7	26	30
Intermediate college	27	7	4	15	4	44	26
University and over	18	28	0	6	0	50	17
All	500	17	6	10	7	36	23

Source: Field survey 1994

Another analytical procedure which can be applied here is the Rank Order Analysis of Variance using the Kruskal-Wallace procedure (see Chapter 4), in which ordinal variables are sorted by category. The categorical variables employed here are gender and the urban/rural distinction. Some significant variation was identified by this approach. Females gave a slightly higher mean ranking to family and tribe than did males, whereas males gave a slightly higher ranking to Islam and Arabism. For the urban/rural division the main difference was

that urban respondents gave a slightly higher mean ranking to family, and rural respondents a slightly higher ranking to Arabism.

5.3.4 Cluster analysis: a typology of respondents

In Chapter Four we introduced cluster analysis which is a "technique used to identify groups of of objects or people that can be shown to be relatively distinct within a data set. The characteristics of these people within each cluster can then be explored."[21] Here we will use cluster analyses to classify the representative sample of university students into subgroups according to their attitudes towards the issue of identity.

Figure 5.5: Cluster analysis and sub-clusters



There are two main stages at which the cluster analysis procedures have been used. The first stage is based on three clusters. The second stage is based on two clusters. The procedure indicated that these were the levels at which differentiated clusters emerged through large changes in the fusion coefficient.[22] Figure 5.5 describes the three cluster levels according to the sources of identity variables tribe, family, city, state, Muslim and Arab.

The clustering procedure was based on the ranks given to the different sources of identity. These ranged from 1 to 6, in that the students were asked to rank the sources of identity in order from highest to lowest and there are six sources of identity. Table 5.10 shows the numbers of students in each cluster giving the highest rank, 1, to each of the different sources of identity. Table 5.11 shows the mean rank given to each source of identity by the students in that cluster.

There are three clusters. Cluster 1 comprises the students who are very much tribal/family oriented. Cluster 2 comprises those whose primary identification seems to be Islam alone. Cluster 3 includes those who are both Islam and Arab oriented. When two clusters are formed, Clusters two and three (primarily Islamic and Islamic/Arabist) fuse and remain differentiated from Cluster one, the Tribal / Family cluster.

Table 5.10 shows the actual cluster analysis. The three clusters show how the students rank their identity by rank order. Cluster 1 indicates identification with the traditional institutions of society such as family, tribe, city. As can be seen from the table, in cluster 1 family as a source of identification was given the highest rank with 60 percent. 24 percent was given to tribe and city. The state was given a lower rank of 5 percent. Islam as another source of identification was given about 8 percent and zero for Arabism.

Table 5.10: Cluster analysis for the most important source of identity - highest ranks only

Source of identity	Cluster 1 [%]	Cluster 2 [%]	Cluster 3 [%]
Family	60	19	0
Tribe	24	2	0
City	24	2	16
State	5	0	9
Islam	8	62	38
Arab	0	16	36
All	89	98	257

Source: Field survey 1994

Cluster 2 covers the Islamists; that is, respondents who are oriented towards Islam as most important source of identification. Islam was given the highest rank of 62 percent. Only about 19 percent of respondents were family oriented and 16 percent identified themselves with Arabism. Finally, a small percentage of respondents (2 percent each) identified themselves with tribe and city. No one gave the state as an identification source.

Cluster 3 respondents are both Islam and Arab oriented: Islam was given 38 percent and Arabism 36 percent. For this group the relationship between Islam and Arabism is a very strong one. About 16 percent of the respondents identified themselves with the city and 9 percent identified themselves with the state. Finally, no-one of this cluster identified themselves with family and tribe.

In summary, the first group was very traditionally oriented and identified itself by family, and with a slightly smaller number identifying by tribe and city. The second group named Islam or being a Muslim as the most important source of their identification. The third group identified Islam and Arabism together as the most important element for their identity.

Table 5.11 shows the mean rank (see Chapter 4) for the most important source of identity of three clusters. The first cluster is very much family and tribal oriented. Mean ranks are 2.1 for the family and 2.3 for the tribe. In contrast, the lowest mean ranks were for the identification as Muslim or Arab (4.0 and 5.3). The city and state were given a middle ranking (3.3 and 3.9).

Table 5.11: Mean rank for the most important sources of identity by three cluster analysis

Source of identity	Cluster 1 Family/Tribal	Cluster 2 Islamist and Arabist	Cluster 3 State/Islam/Arab
Family	2.1	3.0	5.4
Tribe	2.3	4.4	5.4
City	3.3	5.3	3.4
State	3.9	4.6	2.6
Muslim	4.0	1.2	1.9
Arab	5.3	2.1	2.1
All	89	98	257

Source: Field survey 1994

The second cluster were Islamist and Arabist. Identification with Islam ranked highest (1.2), followed by Arabism (2.1). The lowest rank in this group was given to the city and state, 5.3 and 4.6. Family in this group was given a middle rank, 3.0.

The third cluster is also very Islam and Arab oriented. The highest rank was given to identification with Islam (1.9) and Arabism (2.1). However, the state was given a middle rank of 2.6, with the city at 3.4. The lowest ranks were given to family and tribe, both at 5.4.

Table 5.12 shows the mean rank of the most important source of identity by two groups of clusters. These clusters were created by fusion, out of the three shown in Table 5.11. The two new clusters which came out of this were: a tribal and family oriented group versus Islam and Arab oriented group.

Table 5.12: Mean rank of the most important source of identity by two cluster analysis

Source of identity	Cluster 1 Family/Tribal	Cluster 2 Islamist/Arabist
Family	2.2	4.8
Tribe	2.5	5.2
City	3.5	3.9
State	3.9	3.1
Muslim	3.9	1.8
Arab	5.0	2.1
All	103	341

Source: Field survey 1994

For Cluster 1, the highest rank was family (2.2), and tribe (2.5). The lowest mean rank was given to Arab at 5.0. City, state and being a Muslim were given middle ranking (3.5, 3.9 and 3.9). For Cluster 2 the highest rank was given to Muslim and Arab (1.8 and 2.1). In contrast, state and city were given the middle rank (3.1 and 3.9). The lowest ranks were given to family and tribe (4.8 and 5.2).

Further analyses were carried out in which the cluster membership of respondents was related to their answers to the two main identity questions. In the first question the respondents were asked to choose whether they regarded themselves as primarily Arab, Muslim, or both equally. Cluster membership made no significant difference to the pattern of responses, with 80 or more percent in each cluster opting for 'both equally' and about 15 percent in each cluster opting for 'primarily Muslim'. Only for Cluster 1, which is family/tribal oriented were there any respondents who asserted that their primary identity was Arab (7 percent).

In Table 5.13 the ordinal or "face sheet variables" which represent background factors are combined with cluster groups. Background variables here are gender, urban/rural place of respondents, family income, fathers' occupation, fathers' education, and mothers' education. It is clear that there are some differences among the clusters. One of these differences is gender. Female respondents formed a slight majority of the third group cluster, which is Islam/Arab oriented. They represented about 55 percent of this cluster.

A plurality of respondents whose fathers were businessmen was found in the second cluster which is primarily Islamic in orientation. The highest percentages of respondents whose fathers were government officials (37 percent) concentrated in the third cluster.

Table 5.13: Characteristics of cluster groups

Categories	Cluster 1 Family/Tribal	Cluster 2 Islamist/Arabist	Cluster 3 State/Islam/Arab
• Male	61	58	45
• Female	39	42	55
• Urban	81	85	88
• Rural	19	15	12
• Family income			
<120 Ld	6	4	2
121-199 Ld	11	15	14
200-300 Ld	40	38	46
301-500 Ld	29	29	27
501> Ld	14	14	12
• Fathers' occupation			
Businessman	19	28	25
Government official	27	29	37
Professional	25	16	20
Settled farmer	4	3	4
Labourer	15	9	4
Retired	9	15	10
• Fathers' education			
Illiterate	25	18	16
Can read only	6	6	4
Read and write	8	16	12
Primary	11	14	16
Preparatory	8	8	18
Secondary	15	12	12
Intermediate	8	5	7
University	20	19	17
• Mothers' education			
Illiterate	56	55	46
Can read only	1	3	8
Read and write	5	8	9
Primary	18	9	11
Preparatory	7	10	12
Secondary	7	4	5
Intermediate	3	5	6
University	3	5	4
All	89	98	257

5.4 Conclusion and Summary

In this chapter we have reviewed the attitudes of the university students towards the identity question, and Arabism and Islamism as possible sources of identity. The general findings show that students were not prepared to distinguish Islam from Arabism as a source of personal identity, as the majority identified 'both equally' as having the greatest significance. This result reflects to some extent the regime's approach to Arabism and Islam shown in the analysis of the regime's ideology earlier in this chapter which makes no distinction between Arabism and Islam.

When we explore the reasons for being an Arab given by the respondents through potential answers (religion, language and being a member of Arab state), the findings show that the majority of respondents indicated religion as the main reason for Arabism. Language comes second, while "belonging to an Arab state" is the lowest. It seems that attachment to the existing state is quite low among the respondents and the awareness of being a member of the state is weak. This low level of belonging to the state could be interpreted as being a consequence of the strong identification with Islam and Arabism. Additionally, identification with tribal/family units undermines the identification with the state, in so far as tribal/family units function as important social networks. In Libya, these social organisations represent an alternative to the institutions which might exist in a 'modern' civil society. The lack of a history of Libyan statehood is clearly one further factor explaning the weak identification with the state.

Other dimensions of identity were explored through the question "how do you identify yourself." The respondents were asked to rank the possible sources of identity (family, tribe, city, state, Islam, and Arabism) in order from one to six according to their importance. Different analytical procedures proved quite useful here. In a simple ranking most respondents gave family and tribe 'low' status, city and state 'middle' status and Islam and Arabism were given 'high' status. Thus, Islam and Arabism were ranked highly by more than half of all respondents; city and state were ranked less highly; and family and tribe were given the lowest ranking. Moreover, the findings show that there might be two sorts of identity patterns, one focusing on Islam and Arabism, the other one focusing on localist values associated with family and tribe. Such a result proved that people could have more than one identity.

The result of the cluster analysis show the emergence of three groups emerged among the students: first, a tribal and family oriented group second, a primarily Islam oriented group

and, an Islam and Arab oriented group. By fusing these three clusters together, we found one tribal and family oriented group, and another, Islam and Arab oriented group.

Although some Libyan students were very much locally oriented, as reflected by their choice of tribe and family as most important for their personal identity, most students asserted a kind of mixture of Islam and Arab way of identification.

Further noteworthy points are the following. First, there were no significant differences among the students based on their backgrounds. This would seem to be attributable to the fact that they all went through a common educational system. Thus, most of the students ended up with the same values and attitudes towards the identity question.

It is also noting that the main identity forms expressed by the respondents correspond quite closely with the regime's view of the appropriate identity for Libyans. Given the absence of differences by 'background' among the respondents, it seems as if the formal educational and ideological preparation processes have produced the kind of identity set which they were intended to.

The existence of significant numbers of students who identified strongly with Islam is extremely interesting. In the light of developments in Libya subsequently to the study, especially in the Benghazi region, it may indicate that this sort of identity which has become translated into support for 'fundamentalist' groups. However, this can be no more than informed speculation here. Nevertheless in conditions of tension such an identity might well turn towards fundamentalist solutions. The only real distinguishing factor of this group is that it was differentially female. Other background factors were not significant. The necessity for further research is evident.

Notes to Chapter 5

[1] Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Masadir al-Shar^{c}iya fi Anzimat al-Hukm al-^{c}Arabiya" [Legitimacy Sources in Arab Governmantal Systems], *al-Mustaqbal al-Arabi*, no. 62, April 1984, p. 103.

[2] Yusuf Da Costa, "Muslims in Greater Cape Town: a Problem of Identity", *The British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 45, no. 2, June 1994, p. 236.

[3] Ibid., pp. 242-243.

[4] Faisal al-Salem, "The Issue of Identity in Selected Arab Gulf States", in Tawfic Farah and Yasumasa Kuroda (eds), *Political Socialisation in the Arab States*, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987), pp. 47-63.

[5] Ibid., p. 63.

[6] Najim A Bezirgan, "Islam and Arab Nationalism", in Michael Curtis (ed), *Religion and Politics in the Middle East*, (Colorado: Westview Press, 1981), p. 47.

[7] Ibid., p. 48.

[8] Al-Sayid Yasin. *Tahlil Maddmun al-Fikr al-Qawmi al-^{c}Arabi: Dirasa 'Istiṭla^{c}iya* [Content Analysis of the Arab Nationalism Thought], (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Waḥda al-^{c}Arabiya, 1980), pp. 86-87.

[9] Michel ^{c}Aflaq, *Fi Sabil al-Ba^{c}th* [Toward the Ba'th], (Beirut: 1975), p. 131.

[10] Ibid., p. 131.

[11] Najim A Bezirgan, op.cit., p. 52.

[12] Ibid., p. 48.

[13] Abdul Rahman Al-Bazzaz, *Hadhihi Qawmiyatuna* [This is our Nationalism], (Al-Qahira: 1963), p. 188.

[14] Muammar Al-Qadhafi, *The Green Book;* vol. 3, (Tripoli: Global Centre for Study and Research on the Green Book, 1979), pp. 73-78.

[15] Mahmoud Ayoub, *Islam and the Third Universal Theory: The Religious Thought of Mu'ammar al Qadhdhafi*, (London: Kegan Paul International, 1991), p. 108.

[16] Muammar al-Qathafi, *Al-Sijil al-Qawmi: Majmu^{c}at Khutab wa Bayyanat*, [National Register: Group of speeches], vol. 2, pp. 117-118.

[17] Marius K. Deeb and Mary Jane Deeb, *Libya Since the Revolution: Aspects of Social and Political Development*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 103.

[18] Ibid., p. 104.

[19] Ibid., P. 104.

[20] Ronald Bruce St John, *Qaddafi's World Design: Libyan Foreign Policy, 1969-1987*, (London: Saqi Books, 1987), p. 33.

[21] David Jary and Julia Jary, *Collins Dictionary of Sociology*, (Glasgow: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), p. 88.

[22] See Brian Everitt, *Cluster Analysis*, (London: Heinemann, 1974). See also Maurice Lorr, *Cluster Analysis for Social Scientists: Techniques for Analyzing and Simplifying Complex Blocks of Data*, (San Francisco & London: Jossey-Bass, 1983).

6. Attitudes Towards Tribe and Tribalism

6.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to focus on tribe and tribalism in Libya. The aim is to explore the attitudes of the generation of the revolutionary regime towards tribe and tribalism. It seeks to find out if tribalism is still part of Libyan life, even though the tribal system was formally abolished by the regime.

The issue of tribe was already mentioned in Chapter 5 in questions which dealt with the source of identity, together with other possible sources (family, city, state, Arabism and Islam). For the respondents tribe along with the family, localist and traditionalist values, is an important source of identification.

This chapter is based on three main questions dealing with tribe and tribalism (19a, 19b, 20 and 21, see Appendix A). It includes four main sections. The first part seeks to deal with the tribe as a concept. In other words, it is a review of the definition of tribe by looking at relevant material, such as previous studies and specialist encyclopaedias. The second section looks at the relation of tribes to the rest of society and to regime ideology. The third section is an exploration of the sample's attitudes towards tribe and it is based on data analyses of the relevant questions of the questionnaire. The final part evaluates the findings and tries to assess the degree of attachment of the Libyan society to their tribe.

6.2 The Concept of Tribe: A Theoretical Framework

This section of the chapter deals with the concept of tribe. According to *The Social Science Encyclopaedia,* tribe and its associated abstract, tribalism, may be defined as follows:

> A social organisation of peoples living (usually) in the tropics and (usually) employing little technology ..., the tribe also is bigger than a family, but somehow not the same as a nation. It is tied together by complex bonds of kin and duty.[1]

According to *A Dictionary of the Social Science,* 'tribe' is defined as a

> system of social organisation which includes several local groups – villages, bands, districts, or lineages – and normally includes a common territory, a common language, and a common culture. The elements constituting the tribe may or may not be co-ordinated by formal or centralised political power. Ideally the term *tribe* implies a large element of solidarity based on strongly shared primary sentiments. Such solidarity becomes contractual in nature as the tribal organisation becomes more formally organised.[2]

As indicated by the two definitions, tribe is a social organisation based on solidarity. The concept of solidarity was introduced by ᶜAbd-al-Rahmân Ibn Khaldûn, the renowned Arab sociologist-historian (1332-1406). He calls this factor *ᶜasabiya* [solidarity, group feeling, or group consciousness], a word which he borrowed from classical usage and to which he gave a new, positive meaning. The group to which an individual feels most closely attached is his/her clan or tribe, the people with whom he/she shares a common descent. But, politically, *ᶜasabiya* can also be shared by people not related to each other by blood ties, but by long and close contact as members of a group.[3] However, the term tribalism can be used to refer to the placing of family ties before other political allegiances.[4]

Analysing the tribe, especially in Arab society, has produced a number of characteristics which give meaning to the concept. First, solidarity among its members is the main element of a tribe as a social organisation. Common descent is an important, but not exclusive element in this. Second, age determines the social role within the tribe and its hierarchy. Third, males dominate over females within the tribe. This results in higher respect and social value for men. Najwa Adar in her study *The Concept of Tribe in Yemen* states that

> the tribal concept includes an emphasis on maleness. The tribe as it is presented to the society as a whole is male. At formal functions segregation by gender is the rule, and women are represented by male kin. Women do not vote in tribal elections and do not share tribal obligations of protection equally with men. Significantly, a tribeswoman is referred to as Bint al-Qabila (tribesman's daughter),... despite the male presentation of qabyala, women are not considered any less tribal than men. In the plural Qaba'il refers to tribal men and women. Tribal women are expected to adhere to tribal standards of honour, generosity, and industry. Women are known to bear arms in some areas of

Yemen, and women who succeed in "male" activities are admired by men and women alike.[5]

In anthropology three kinds of tribal units have been identified: simple acephalous tribes, acephalous segmentary tribes, and centralised tribes. Gould and Kolp write:

> First, simple acephalous tribes are constituted of autonomous bands or villages. In these component units membership is based largely on kinship which is often bilaterally recognised. As an examples of such tribes include the Mende, Ibo, Great Whale Eskimo etc. These tribes are acephalous because they lack a clearly designated head or council. Secondly, Acephalous segmentary tribes also lack a clearly defined head. They are comprised of localised unilinear kin groups—lineages and clans, each of which claims a territory and itself may possess formal political organisation. Politically each kinship segment is independent of the other, although a few provisions—mainly ceremonial—exist which allow two or more to act in concert on certain occasions. Thirdly, centralised tribes possess a single power source—king, council, or other form of administration. Such tribes generally are larger than either of foregoing types. In Africa some centralised tribes emerged when one kinship segment in segmentary system won political ascendancy over other unilinear groups.[6]

Ibn Khaldûn interpreted Arab history in terms of conflicts and struggle for power between *badw* [bedouin] versus *hadar* [sedentary].[7] For Ibn Khaldûn, the differences of condition among people are the result of the different ways in which they make their living.[8] He characterised *badw-hadar* relationships as confrontational because of their intrinsic conflict of interests.[9] This traditional division in Arab society, based on the two concepts *badw* and *hadar*, still remains part of Arab culture and has not disappeared.

Although adapting the division between *badw* and *hadar* might help us understand some of the characteristics of Arab society and the tribal structure in particular, the tendency among the scholars to link tribe and *badawa* [the nomadic style of life] is not acceptable. Tribalism can exist equally as a social organisation in cities as in rural areas or in the desert among the nomadic tribes. Some tribes are a combination of *badawa* [the nomadic style of life], *filaha* [cultivation] and *sukkan al-mudun* [city habitation]. The al-Fawai'r in Syria, the Bani Rabi^{c}in Kuwait and Iraq, and the ^{c}anza in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait are examples of such a combination.[10]

Instead of the division *badw – hadar,* Barakat suggests a tripartite division that includes village life:

> by identifying village or peasant life as a third, distinct pattern of living. That is, rather than relying on the cliché of badu–hadar conflict to understand contemporary Arab society, we should utilise recent social science research on the village to characterise a triad of distinctive social patterns rooted in tribal, village, and urban life.[11]

Adopting such an analysis is significant for understanding the tribe as one of the main social organisations in contemporary Arab society. The tribe as a social organisation can be found both in villages and cities, despite the remarkable changes that occurred in the economic and political sphere. It is quite normal to find individuals referring to themselves as tribesmen, even if they live in urban areas. Therefore, loyalty and attachment to the tribes still play an important role in personal identification. In Libya many tribes exhibit all three patterns of living (tribal, village, urban), but there are also quasi-tribal families which originated in the Ottoman period and are *hadar* [urban] but not *badw*. This division between tribes and quasi-tribes seems to have no contemporary political significance, and inter-marriage among the groups is normal now, but this has only developed during the period of the present regime.

In order to understand the nature of the three patterns of living which shape contemporary Arab society, we can refer to Barakat's study *The Arab World: Society, Culture and State,* which focuses on these three patterns: tribe, village, and city. The significance of this can be seen both with regard to social organisation and with regard to value orientations.

6.2.1 Social organisation

Tribal solidarity based on blood, symbiotic ties and premises of equality are the most distinctive features of Bedouin social organisation. The basic units of the Bedouin social organisation are *qabila* [tribe], *ᶜashira* [clan], *hamula, fakhda, batn* [sub-tribes], and family, which includes both the *ahl, ᶜayla* [extended family] and *usra* (nuclear family). Barakat also indicates that the main activities of tribes are political, consisting of management of relations with other tribes and the government. One of the most important features of Bedouin society is classlessness, unlike other sectors of Arab society.[12]

The village social organisation, is an intricate net of interrelationships of extended families. One of the main differences between bedouin and peasants is based on the relationship to the land rather than kinship ties i.e "to be landless or detached from family is to be uprooted until death. To die is to return to the land like seeds, whose planting—that is, burial—beings the process of renewal and rebirth...death in the collective memory of the peasants is defined by continuity in land cultivation."[13]

The basic kinship unit among peasants in villages is the extended family rather than the tribe. Family structure is based on a web of relations centred on land cultivation. Moreover, village class structure is based on land ownership. In some Arab countries many villages are referred to as *kafr* or *beni* [village], which indicates some historical relationship between the social

organisation in agricultural communities and that in Bedouin tribes. Such relationships can be seen in north and north-eastern Yemen.[14]

The main feature of the city is based on functions rather than size of population. City functions include serving as the centre of economic, political, religious, and cultural activities. Barakat mentions that *al-madina*, which is the Arabic word for city, is the centre of political and economic power. The neighbourhoods and institutions are the base of social organisation in the city.

In Libya there is no real peasant population along the lines of Egypt or Yemen. But the *badw* system of social organisation exists throughout society, including non-*badw* groups. Thus, the social order of the nomadic system is at least formally present in the whole society.

6.2.2 Value orientations

The main values orientations of Bedouin culture are *ʿasabiya* [tribal solidarity], *furusiya* [chivalry], *karam* [hospitality], *basaṭṭa* [simplicity] and *al-fardiya* [individuality].[15] These values are sometimes used to distinguish between tribal and non tribal populations. Najwa Adar in her study *The Concept of Tribe in Rural Yemen* indicates that

> When a person asks a modern-day tribesman "On what basis does the tribal population consider itself tribal and distinct from the non-tribal population?" the answer is likely to be expressed in terms of adherence to a given values system. One is told that the tribesman is courageous, hospitable, discerning, knowledgeable of custom, and independent.[16]

As indicated, the emphasis here is on the value system where tribesmen identify themselves as tribal on the basis of shared values. The tribal concept combines a moral compulsion to cooperate with members of one's group with an emphasis on personal autonomy.[17]

The value orientations of the village (peasants) in Arab culture are directed towards land, family, the local community, religion, social class, and time. Some of the values which are associated with the land are fertility, continuity, patience, and spontaneity.

The value orientations of city-dwellers are embedded in an intricately balanced social structure based on the interrelationship of class, family, and religious establishment. Barakat has distinguished three types of urban bourgeoisie in the Arab countries. First, the traditional urban bourgeoisie can be found in Morocco, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. These are the class of notable families, that control the religious establishment and political system. Moreover, the main values of this group are based on "strife and struggle; not daydreaming" especially in

searching for material profits and power. Such strife emphasises realistic evaluations, moderation, cunning, cleverness, opportunism, and innovativeness.[18]

The second type of Arab urban bourgeoisie is the new national bourgeoisie who took over the political system in a number of Arab countries after independence in for example, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. The values of this new bourgeois elite are based on nationalist and socialist values on the one hand (Iraq, Syria, Egypt are good examples) and national liberation movements (in Algeria and among the Palestinians) on the other hand.

The third type is a composite between old and the new bourgeoisie, with Lebanon and Tunisia providing examples of this type. Their values are based on Western liberalism, emphasising the values of success, pragmatism, free economy, consumption, Western education, and individuality.[19]

Exploring the three patterns of Arab society i.e. tribe, village and city, leads to the question of what relationships exist between them. Barakat explored the following interrelationships:[20]

a) Conflict and cooperation between these three groups. Cooperation is based on economic exchange, i.e. trade and exchange of basic commodities and services which the city provides for both village and the Bedouin, such as health, religious, and educational services. However, the conflicts between these three groups result partly from the need to control the land and its products. For instance, "city dwellers have always attempted to dominate villages, in some instances, they used Bedouin tribes to do the job. This alliance ensured urban dominance of the peasants in the Fertile Crescent, Yemen and the Nile and the greater Maghrib. Urban domination resulted in the imposition of a feudalistic system, taxation, and absentee landlords residing in urban centres, and led to the emergence of landless peasants."[21]

b) Stereotypes and images. Clear stereotypes exist for each group. As an example, the Bedouins have traditionally shown great pride in their subculture and looked down on peasants as weak and submissive to their masters. They also refused city life, which for them is a source of corruption, deviance and softness. Peasants have shown pride in village life and the land, which they see as a source of dignity. They, regard Bedouins as lazy parasites, people who survive by raiding to steal the products created by others. City people consider both Bedouins and peasants as primitive. However, there are also some positive images among these subcultures. For instance, the Bedouins are known for their courage, hospitality and noble character. The peasants and village life are represent

simplicity, quiet and natural beauty. The Bedouins and peasants in turn are fascinated by the city and its distinct affluence and pleasures.[22]

c) Sources of common values and norms. One of the main source of values in the cities and villages is tribalism and Bedouin orientations. This was a consequence of the Bedouin migration to the agricultural communities and urban areas. It can be said that most of Arab countries nowadays are dominated by Bedouin values. Iraq provides one such example where Bedouin values are running high especially among the rural tribes, which account for 60 percent of the Iraqi population, and whose way of life is close to the Bedouin. They share certain values such as solidarity, patriarchal hierarchy, hospitality, revenge, honour crimes.[23] Libyan society is still influenced by Bedouin values through the customs and traditions, even in the urban community. Another source of common values is the city. From the city came modernisation, changes in the economic norms and the emergence of new classes. Finally, the family as a basic unit of social organisation still remains a source of common value orientation.

Tribal identity exists in many Arab societies among both peasants and city dwellers, as well as in nomadic groups. In Yemen, where peasant agriculture dominates,[24] tribes are extremely important. In Libya, most people have recent clear Bedouin connections, even if they themselves are now urban. It may well be that distinctions based on tribe and city (villages are not an important social form) could emerge eventually, however as large - scale urbanisation is relatively recent phenomenon, these distinctions have not (yet) fully developed.

The significance of tribes can also be seen in how much energy has been invested in ideological attempts to replace traditional tribal loyalties and attitudes in many Arab countries, especially in Libya. Therefore, to help to understand the nature and role of the tribes in Libya in the present time, it might be useful to focus on tribe as a concept in the ideology and practice of the revolutionary regime. This is done in the following section.

6.3 The Tribe in the Ideology and Practice of the Regime

In order to understand the role of tribe in Libyan society as a social and perhaps as an invisible political organisation, it is important to focus on the ideology of the regime and the practical side of its policies towards tribe and tribalism. However, analysing the ideological and practical sides is not an easy matter. In some Middle Eastern countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, as well as Libya, as Khoury and Kostiner argue, new social and

economic formations and ideological commitments have replaced traditional parochial loyalties and sentiments. However, the values of the tribal society have continued to affect the state. Indeed, from the perspective of the state, modernisation and rapid social change were often regarded as counterproductive in that tribes were given a renewed role, through their participation in the conflicts these changes inevitably produced.[25]

In the case of Libya, it might be useful to raise the following questions in order to help to understand the ideological and the practical framework of the Libyan regime towards the tribe. First, to what extent has the regime sought to alienate the tribe from having a role in Libyan society, especially in politics? Secondly, has the tribe as a social organisation become a source of political legitimacy for the regime, especially since the beginning of the 1990s? Finally, has the regime succeeded in replacing the traditional loyalties to tribes and families among its citizens through the process of state - building and the creation an Arab identity? Answers to these questions must make a distinction between, first, the ideological perspectives of the regime towards the tribe, and second, the actual implementation of policies towards tribal groupings especially in the past few years.

6.3.1 The tribe in the ideological perspective

Tribes in Libya had a clear and significant role in the former regime before 1969. Historically, the Sanusiyya movement, which was the basis for the political legitimacy of the regime, emerged from a tribally-based society, and the symbiosis between the S^{c}adi tribes of Cyrenaica and the Sanusiyya movement was almost complete.

The revolutionary regime has regarded the tribe an important social organisation which is essential to the individual as a source of social values, as well as a tool for education and socialisation. Al-Qadhafi in his theory (*The Green Book*) argues that a society has a number of social structures central to its vitality; they are the family, the tribe and the nation, all of which are non-political in nature.

Al-Qadhafi believes that the tribe is a natural 'umbrella' for social security. Like the family, the tribe provides individuals with benefits, advantages and ideas. Although many countries have attempted to weaken, if not destroy, tribes in the name of progress and modernisation, al-Qadhafi believes that the tribe has a certain role to play in the socialisation process. From childhood to adulthood, people gradually and systematically absorb tribal customs and traditions which influence their values, mores, ideals and behaviour. Al-Qadhafi suggests that this practical life experience in tribal acculturation can benefit society if it is transformed into

a social education. To him, such education is not only practical and valuable but also much "better and more human than any [formal] school education."[26] Moreover, the tribe is not considered to be a political organisation. Any political dimension will change its role of social security and in the socialisation process.

The regime originally saw tribalism as harmful because of its divisive effects, undermining collective nationalism (Arabism). Ideologically, al-Qadhafi rejects any political role for tribes, just as he rejects any role for a party system. He maintains that the party is the modern form of the tribal and sectarian system. Society governed by one party is exactly like that which is governed by one tribe or one sect.[27] Clearly the regime seeks to down-play any political role for tribes and to concentrate on the social role of tribes as a tool of education and source of security for the individual.

6.3.2 The tribe in the practical perspective

The practical perspective of the regime towards the tribe started in the early years of the revolution. In order to consolidate the revolution, the revolutionary regime tried to dismantle the old elite and tribal structure. As El-Fathaly and Palmer state,

> It was easier for the new regime to deal with those in opposition who had roots deeply engrained in the fabric of Libyan society. Particularly sensitive in this regard were the tribal chiefs. The tribal chiefs had prospered under the monarchy. Indeed, the local administrative boundaries of the dominant tribes were the de facto boundaries of local government, and tribal leaders dominated the local administrative positions.[28]

For the purpose of the study, it was useful to classify the practical policies of the regime towards tribe into two phases. The first phase started with the beginning of the revolution in 1969, during which open hostility was shown to tribalism, and great efforts were made to reduce, indeed eliminate, tribal loyalties and attachments.[29] Administrative boundaries based on de facto tribal lines were restructured and this was followed by the dismissal of all local officials, including governors and mayors, most of them had been tribal leaders or their relatives; and their replacement by new local administrators whose values and social origins were compatible with those of the RCC. These were usually educated members of less prestigious tribes with no ties to the old elite structure.[30] Throughout this phase, the revolutionary regime under the leadership of al-Qadhafi had done its best to undermine the traditional structure. In order to minimise tribal and regional identification El-Fathaly *et al* indicate that

> the tribal system was legally dismantled and a single political organisation, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), was created in June 1971 to fill the void. The legal status of

> tribes was destroyed by dividing tribal areas into zones crossing old tribal boundaries, combining parts of different tribes within one zone. Leadership also was radically changed because sheikhs, whose positions were inherited or selected on ascriptive basis, were replaced by zone administrators selected on the basis of skills and education.[31]

In the second phase, the regime has surprisingly employed the tribal structure to promote its activities. Tribal influence permeates the popular congresses and popular committees. In the selection for the popular committees in 1990, tribalism was evident in the process of choosing the members of the popular committees even in the city of Benghazi.[32] This illustrates a complete policy reversal of the regime. Since the early 1990s the regime has paid great attention to the tribal system. One of the most visible activities of al-Qadhafi in the last two years, has been his visits to the tribes.

The tribe was also used as a tool of pressure to get rid of some opposition to the regime inside the country and outside. In an interview in *al-Hayat,* one of the Arab newspapers based in London, the *Amin al-wahda* [Secretary of Unity] indicated that the tribe could be utilised as a tool for 'encircling the betrayal phenomenon' in Libyan society (i.e. to counter the opposition to the regime). Most tribes were encouraged through their tribal leaders to write a *Wathiqat ᶜahd wa Mubayᶜa* [a certificate of allegiance] to prove their loyalty and attachment to the revolution and its leadership.

Al-Qadhafi had expressed the same idea when he mentioned the necessity of 'tribes encompassing the social betrayal'.[33] The latter strategy involved encouraging tribes and their leaders to issue statements denouncing those in the tribes who had betrayed the country and the regime. Pressure on the tribes could lead them to expel those of their members who were against the regime. This strategy is similar to that used by Saddam Husain in Iraq after the Gulf war.

The regime is now faced with a contradiction over its relationship with the tribal system. On the one hand it has sought to utilise good relations with tribes as a source of legitimacy with important social functions. On the other hand by so doing it has let a tribal element, which it wished to be confined to the social sphere, back into the political process even if merely in an informal way.

As a matter of fact, the importance of tribe and tribalism for the students is evident through their political activities inside the university especially during the selection of the secretaries of students' congresses of the faculties (*Umana' al-Mu'tamarat al-Tulabyya).*

In general, then, it is clear that there are some differences between the practical and the ideological sides of the regime's policies towards the tribe. The ideological side seeks to limit the political role of tribe, whilst encouraging its role as a social organisation and a tool of education. The practical side was also at one stage an echo of this ideology. However, in recent years the regime has realised the important role of the tribe within Libyan society. This approach has attempted to win tribal support, and hence legitimacy, through conceding at the social level. The attempts of the regime to alienate tribes from playing a role in politics have in fact been unsuccessful. In the early 1990s, it seems that the tribe became one of the main sources of political legitimacy of the regime and one of the key factors in stabilising the internal situation, especially after the increase of external pressures through the imposition of United Nations sanctions.

6.4 Exploration of the Attitudes towards Tribe: Data Analyses

The purpose of this section is to explore the attitude of the respondents toward tribe and tribalism in Libya through the questions raised in the questionnaire. These dimensions of the exploration relate to loyalty and attachment to the tribe and the possibility of changing or dropping the tribe as one of the sources of identity. These dimensions were based mainly on three questions in the questionnaire (19a, 19b, 20 and 21, see Appendix A).

The data analysis was carried out by using cross-tabulation, cluster analysis and Spearman correlation coefficients. The first data exploration covers tendencies of attitudes towards loyalty and attachment to tribe among the respondents.

6.4.1 Exploring the tendencies of loyalty and attachment towards tribe

The first exploration of attitudes to tribe and tribalism among the university students is based on two questions. The first question involved asking the respondents whether they belong to a tribe. The second question deals with the strength of feeling of loyalty and attachment towards the tribe.

The responses to the first question illustrates that almost all respondents hold a tribal attachment. The result shows that about 96.0 percent of the respondents see themselves as belonging to a tribe.

Figure 6.1 shows the strength of loyalty and attachment of respondents toward tribe by sex (i.e. male/female) and place of family residence (i.e. urban/rural). From 492 respondents

about 45 percent are very attached, about 45 percent are attached and just 10 percent of the respondents are not attached.

Figure 6.1: Loyalty and attachment towards tribe by sex and place of family residence



We can compare the above–mentioned results with the results of another survey conducted by El-Fathaly and Palmer in 1973 which dealt with political development and social change in Libya. The questionnaire of that survey contained several items relating to tribalism. One of these questions was the same question: "Do you feel loyal and attached to your tribe?" The results of El-Fathaly and Palmer's research showed that tribalism was very much a part of Libyan life. Almost 33.2 percent of respondents were very attached, 38.2 percent were attached, about 9.4 percent were somewhat attached, and 19.1 percent were not attached. The authors concluded that because the tribal system had been abolished by the government prior to the survey, a non-response rate of almost 40 percent for the tribalism items made the data difficult to interpret. However, the high rate of non-respondents allowed to the researchers to reach the conclusion that tribalism still remained a part of Libyan life.[34]

To some extent these results are similar to the results of the present study. The two studies conducted in the 1973 and 1994 both find attachment and loyalty towards tribe to be very clear and quite strong despite the differences between the samples of the two surveys. It is evident that the regime's efforts at weakening the tribal system and identification with it have not succeeded.

In Figure 6.1 the difference between males and females is interesting. 51 percent of females were clearly very attached to their tribe, 39 percent were attached and 9 percent were not attached. In contrast, about 40 percent of male respondents were very attached, 50 percent were attached and 10 percent of male respondents are not attached. Thus, it seems that female students were more attached and loyal to their tribes than male respondents.

The difference between urban and rural respondents is also clear. The strength of attachment to the tribe is greater among rural respondents. 62 percent of rural respondents are very attached to their tribe, 32 percent are attached, and 6 percent are not attached to their tribes. Only 43 percent of urban respondents are very attached, while 47 percent urban respondents are attached and 10 percent are not attached.

The indication that urban people are less likely to be very attached to the tribe reflects a generally accepted view of the attitudinal differences between rural and urban people. A possible explanation for the differences in their loyalty and attachment to their tribe between male and female respondents is that the males in general are more involved in activities within society. These activities, such as being a member of non-governmental organisations like clubs or other professional organisations such as unions, are generally confined to urban areas.

Table 6.1 indicates loyalty and attachment towards the tribe by family income. There was no clear pattern, but there appeared to be no significant differences between the respondents by their families income. Thus the overall pattern does not suggest that tribal attachment is related to wealth.

Table 6.1: Loyalty and attachment by family income

Family income	Number of respondents	Very attached [%]	Attached [%]	Not attached [%]
< 120 L.d.*	18	39	33	28
121- 199	65	46	45	9
200- 300	215	50	43	7
301- 500	131	36	53	9
501 + L.d.	63	51	35	14

* L.d - Libyan Dinars
Source: Field survey 1994

Table 6.2 shows the loyalty and attachment by the father's occupation of the respondents. In general, there are no significant differences in terms of the father's occupation.

Table 6.2: Loyalty and attachment by father's occupation

Father's Occupation	Number of respondents	Very attached [%]	Attached [%]	Not attached [%]
Business Man	98	56	40	4
Government Officials	146	46	44	10
Professional	85	41	46	11
Settled Farmer	16	56	31	13
Labourer	30	40	47	13
Retired	56	43	43	14

Source: Field survey 1994

Table 6.3 gives the percentage of loyalty and attachment to the tribe by father's education. The researcher expected that the higher the education of the father's respondents the lesser the attachment to their tribes would be. However, the findings show that there is no statistical significance of differences.

Table 6.3: Loyalty and attachment by father's education

Father's education	Number of respondents	Very attached [%]	Attached [%]	Not attached [%]
Illiterate	85	45	47	8
Read Only	23	44	35	22
Read & Write	64	41	47	11
Primary	69	58	36	6
Preparatory	65	49	43	8
Secondary	61	44	43	13
Intermediate	33	46	52	3
University and over	90	38	50	11

Source: Field survey 1994

Table 6.4 gives the percentages of the tribal loyalty and attachment of respondents by mother's education. As a general pattern it seems that the higher the mother's education level, lesser importance is attached to tribe. Among the first three categories of respondents, it seems that the attachment is quite high to the tribe, especially in the first category "very attached". This shows that those whose mothers are not educated or hardly educated are more attached to the tribe, but there is no consistent trend at other levels.

Table 6.4: Loyalty and attachment by mother's education

Mothers' education	Number of respondents	Very attached [%]	Attached [%]	Not attached [%]
Illiterate	245	49	41	10
Read only	29	59	35	7
Read and write	37	46	51	0
Primary	58	41	53	5
Preparatory	52	44	46	10
Secondary	27	26	48	26
Intermediate	26	31	50	19
University and over	18	39	50	6

Source: Field survey 1994

Table 6.5 shows the percentage of respondents' loyalty and attachment to the tribe by subject of study. Overall, the table indicates that there is no significant difference between those who study humanities or sciences in terms of loyalty and attachment to the tribe. Nor is there is

any relation between the attitudes towards the loyalty-attachment and the respondents' faculties. But there are some small differences by subject of the study.

Table 6.5: Loyalty and attachment by subject of study

Faculty & Subject of Study	Number of respondents	Very attached [%]	Attached [%]	Not attached [%]
Faculty of Economics & Political Science	**241**			
• Economics	60	45	45	10
• Business	60	38	48	13
• Accounting	60	53	41	7
• Political Science	61	41	44	15
Faculty of Arts & Education	**124**			
• Arabic Language	27	48	52	0
• English Language	23	46	50	5
• History	25	72	28	0
• Sociology	25	28	64	4
• Mass Media	24	22	65	9
Faculty of Law	**35**	53	29	18
Faculty of Science	**55**			
• Zoology	21	71	19	10
• Mathematics	17	53	41	6
• Chemistry	17	35	53	12
Faculty of Engineering	**45**			
• Electrical Engineering	16	13	81	6
• Industrial Engineering	13	39	46	15
• Civil Engineering	16	69	19	13

Source: Field survey 1994

Figure 6.2 shows the tribal loyalty and attachment by the sources of identification variables (as shown in Chapter 5, Family, Tribe, City, State, Islam and Arab). This Figure reflects some statistically significant differences. Among the respondents who are family oriented and identify themselves by family, 46 percent are very attached, 44 percent are attached and just 9 percent are not attached to the tribe. Among those who identify themselves with Tribe, 63 percent are very attached, which is the highest percentage among the respondents in general, 37 percent are attached, and none of them is not attached to the tribe. This result is not surprising because the more people identify themselves with their tribe the more attached and

loyal they will be to this unit. Among the respondents who identify themselves by City, 49 percent are very attached to their tribes, 41 percent are attached and just 10 percent are not attached.

Figure 6.2: Loyalty and attachment by the sources of identification



38 percent of those who identify themselves with the State are very attached, 47 percent are attached and 12 percent are not attached. 39 percent of those who claim Islamic identification are very attached, 49 percent are attached and only 11 are not attached. It seems that the percentages of those who identify themselves by State and Islam are the lowest in term of "very attached" to the tribe. Among those who identify themselves by Arab as a source of identification 50 percent are very attached, 43 percent of them are attached, and only 7 percent are not attached.

Table 6.6 gives the attitudes toward loyalty and attachment to the tribe by three cluster identity variables. Using cluster variables might help to understand to what extent the loyalty and attachment towards tribe has any relation to the attitudes of the three cluster groups (tribe/family oriented, Islam oriented and Islam/Arabism oriented). The same three clusters are used as in Chapter 5 (Cluster 1, Cluster 2, Cluster 3).

One can notice from the table that among the group, Cluster 1, 50 percent of the respondents are very attached to their tribes, 43 percent are attached and only 7 percent of this group are not attached to their tribe. This result was expected because the more people are tribally oriented, the more they will be attached and loyal to their tribes. Among those who belong to the Islamist group, Cluster 2, about 40 percent are very attached, 47 percent are attached and only 12 percent are not attached to their tribes. In the third group cluster 3 (Islamist/Arabism oriented), about 45 percent of the respondents are very attached, 48 percent are attached and only 7 percent are not attached to their tribes.

Table 6.6: Loyalty and attachment by cluster identity, 3 variables

Clusters of identity	Number of respondents	Very attached [%]	Attached [%]	Not attached [%]
Cluster 1	88	50	43	7
Cluster 2	95	40	47	12
Cluster 3	256	45	48	7

Cluster 1: Traditional oriented identification, tribe/family Cluster 2: Islamist oriented
Cluster 3: Islamist/Arabism oriented
Source: Field survey 1994

It seems that the identification with Islam and Arabism in Cluster 2 and Cluster 3 does not reflect any crucial significance. This is contrary to what the researcher expected, namely that the more Islamist and Arabism oriented respondents are, the less attached they would be to their tribes. In general, it can be said that there is no great difference between the three clusters.

6.4.2 Exploration of possible attitudes towards tribe

The second exploration of the terms tribe and tribalism is based on two main questions. These questions are 20 and 21 (see Appendix A). The first question involved asking the respondents the following:

- If it were possible, would you like Libyans to drop tribal identification and think of themselves only as Libyan?

The second question deals with the possibility of an individual changing tribes. The respondents were asked the following:

- If you have the chance would you like to change to another tribe?

The purpose of this part is to explore the possible attitude toward the tribe as one of the sources of identification. In this part an analysis similar to the one in earlier section will take place by using cross-tabulation and cluster procedures. As in the previous section the background factors or the 'face sheet' variables will form part of the analysis of the data.

Responses to the first question are particularly revealing. When respondents were asked about the possibility of dropping tribal identification within Libya and identifying themselves only as Libyans, about 47 percent the respondents accepted the idea and 52 percent did not. Given the level of identification with tribes, this willingness of nearly half the respondents to drop tribal identity is surprising. However, we should remember that people identify with the tribal system in a society in certain circumstances. Many who do identify with it in such circumstances might prefer to live in a society where tribe did not matter, and would therefore be willing in principle to drop that identity. The results of this question may be compared with El-Fathaly and Palmer's study which has been mentioned earlier. Their survey contained a similar question which was: 'If you had the chance, would you like to drop all tribal identification?'. El-Fathaly and Palmer found that 41.0 percent of respondents answered 'yes' for dropping the tribal identification and 59 percent were against it.[35]

There are some small differences between the two studies in this question of dropping tribal identification. More respondents in this study (47 percent) are ready to drop the tribal identification than in El-Fathaly and Palmer's study (41 percent). However, the differences were not substantively significant.

As far as the second question is concerned, the response was to be expected, given that most Libyans belong to a tribe and seem attached to it. The result was that about 3 percent would agree to changing their tribe and 95 percent of respondents rejected changing their tribe.

Figure 6.3 gives the percentage of respondents willing to drop their tribal identification, by sex and place of family residence (urban and rural). Looking at the result by gender, it seems that there are some differences between male and female respondents in their attitude towards dropping tribal identification. As shown in the table, female respondents are more likely to reject dropping the tribal identification than males. 53 percent of male respondents accepted the idea of dropping the tribal identification, whilst among the female respondents just 41 percent accepted dropping tribal identification.

Figure 6.3: Readiness to drop the tribal identification by sex and place of family residence



As shown in Figure 6.3 rural respondents were more willing to drop tribal identification, which is a surprising result because usually rural dwellers are more attached to their tribes, with 53 percent of rural respondents accepting the idea as compared with 46 percent of urban respondents.

Table 6.7 shows the attitude of respondents towards 'dropping tribal identification', by family income. The table indicates that among the five categories of family income, those with lower incomes were more willing to drop tribal identification than those with higher income. 61 percent of respondents whose family income was less than 120 Libyan Dinar said 'yes' to dropping the tribal identification and just 39 percent answered 'no'. A similar distribution existed among respondents whose families' income was between 121 and 199 Libyan Dinar. Among those whose family income was between 200 and 300 Dinars, 40 percent said 'yes' and 59 percent said 'no'. Among the respondents whose families income between 301 and 500 dinars, 49 percent said 'yes' and 51 answered 'no'. In the last category of family income, among those whose family income was over 501 dinars 51 percent answered 'yes' and 49 percent answered 'no' towards dropping tribal identification.

Table 6.7: Readiness to drop the tribal identification by family income

Family income	Number of respondents	Yes [%]	No [%]
< 120 L.d.*	18	61	39
121-199 L.d.	66	61	39
200-300 L.d.	220	40	59
301-500 L.d.	131	49	51
501+ L.d.	65	51	49

* L.d - Libyan Dinars
Source: Field survey 1994

The table shows that the poorest (by family income) are not those attached to tribe—which is opposite to the assumption which is often made that tribal identification is more likely among the poor. But here the lower income group is not as attached to their tribes and they represent the highest percentage of respondents who accepted the idea of dropping the tribal identification. It is, also, surprising that it is the middle stratum which appears most attached. Moreover, it seems that the differences between the strata are not all that great. These differences were statistically significant at the 0.05 level. This can be explained by assuming that the poor sometimes do not benefit from their tribes as a social and economic network, unlike the middle strata.

Figure 6.4 shows the attitude of respondents towards dropping tribal identification by father's occupation. It appears that respondents whose father's occupation is either businessman or settled farmer are more likely to be attached to their tribe. These two categories have the lowest percentage, they cover 37 and 35 percent of respondents who said 'yes' to dropping the tribal identification. However, those whose father's occupation is labourer and those whose fathers were retired cover the highest percent among the respondents who agreed to drop the tribal identification.

Figure 6.4: Readiness to drop the tribal identification by father's occupation



Table 6.8 gives the percentage of respondents' attitudes toward dropping tribal identification by father's education. The interesting thing about this table is that the respondents whose fathers were illiterate are the highest percentage (55 percent) among those who accepted dropping tribal identification.

Table 6.8: Readiness to drop tribal identification by father's education

Father's education	Number of respondents	Yes [%]	No [%]
Illiterate	87	55	45
Can read Only	23	39	61
Read and Write	68	52	47
Primary	69	46	54
Preparatory	65	43	57
Secondary	62	50	50
Intermediate	33	42	52
University and over	91	41	59

Source: Field survey 1994

Respondents who came from a poor educational background seem generally to have less tribal identification. It may be that those who come from that background do not benefit from the association of tribe. Tribalism may have become a network of privilege, therefore those who did not benefit from it were willing to drop their tribal identifications.

A similar cross-tabulation has been used to explore the respondents' attitude toward dropping tribal identification by mothers education. The result shows that among those whose mothers are illiterate, 53 percent accepted the idea of dropping the tribal identification which is the highest percentage of those who said 'yes' and just 46 percent refused. Among those whose mother's education was at university level. 50 percent said 'yes' and the same percentage said 'no'. Those whose mother's education was primary and intermediate formed the lowest percentage among respondents who accepted the idea of dropping tribal identification, which was only 35 and 37 percent respectively.

The highest percentage among respondents who refused dropping tribal identification were those whose mother's education was primary, followed by 63 percent where the mother's education was intermediate, then 60 percent where their mother's education was preparatory, 51 percent where their mothers' education was secondary and 50 percent where their mothers education was university.

In general, it seems that there are some differences of respondents' attitudes toward dropping tribal identification by both father's and mother's education but no consistent progression can be traced. The interesting aspect of this data is that those coming from illiterate-backgrounds

are the most willing to drop tribal identification, while the university educated are the least willing, but in between there is no clear progression by education.

Table 6.9 shows the percentage of respondents' attitude toward dropping tribal identification by the subject of study. In general, the table indicates that the area of study between those who did humanities and those who did science does not make any significant difference. There are some small differences by faculty but the larger differences are between subject groupings.

Table 6.9: Readiness to drop the tribal identification by subject of study

Faculty & Subject of Study	Numbers of respondents	Yes [%]	No [%]
Faculty of Economics Political Science	**241**		
• Economics	60	50	50
• Business Administration	60	48	50
• Accounting	60	40	60
• Political Science	61	57	43
Faculty of Arts & Education	**124**		
• Arabic Language	27	33	67
• English Language	23	30	70
• History	25	36	64
• Sociology	25	52	44
• Mass Media	24	42	54
Faculty of Law	**35**	54	46
Faculty of Science	**55**		
• Zoology	21	38	62
• Mathematics	17	29	71
• Chemistry	17	65	35
Faculty of Engineering	**45**		
• Electrical Engineering	16	38	63
• Industrial Engineering	13	69	31
• Civil Engineering	16	69	31

Source: Field survey 1994

Figure 6.5 shows the attitude of respondents toward dropping the tribal identification by sources of identification. As indicated in the table these sources are family, tribe, city, state,

Islam and Arab. This table shows that the respondents identifying themselves by Islam and by the state are more ready to drop the tribal identification, with 51 percent in each category.

Figure 6.5: Readiness to drop tribal identification by the sources of identification



Among those who identify themselves by tribe, 48 percent were willing to drop the tribal identification and 52 percent did not accept the idea of dropping tribal identification. Also, among respondents who identify themselves by family, 47 percent accepted the idea of dropping the tribal identification and 51 percent were not willing to drop the tribal identification. Among those who identify themselves as Arab, 60 percent of the respondents were against dropping the tribal identification, and 40 percent said 'yes' to it.

In general, it is surprising that those who identify themselves by tribe are more willing to give up their tribal identification than those who identify themselves with family, city and 'Arab'. It was those who identified themselves as Arab who were least likely to give up the tribal identification. This is surprising, as Arabism ought to suggest less attachment to tribe.

6.5 Conclusion and Summary

The main aim of this chapter was to explore the attitude of the respondents towards the tribe and tribalism. This was based originally on three questions. The analyses showed that there was no significant variation for the question which dealt with changing tribes. The vast majority refused this option. This is interesting in itself because it illustrates the continuing emotive content of tribal identity for the respondents.

The result of this study seems quite similar to the result of an earlier study by El-Fathaly and Palmer in 1973 which included certain items about tribe and tribalism. Their study showed that tribalism was still part of Libyan society. In El-Fathaly and Palmer's work, non-respondents to the question posed were assumed to support the hypothesis that people were still in favour of the tribe and tribalism, on the grounds that they were too scared to express such an answer. The findings of the recent study are quite similar, indicating that almost all respondents asserted a tribal identity and a small majority were not ready to drop the tribal identification.

This study shows that tribe is still a major source of personal identification in Libyan society. The vast majority of the respondents in the study were not willing to change their tribes. However a substantial minority were willing to drop the tribal identification altogether. Statistical analyses have shown some small differences between respondents according to background variables, such as differences between gender, and between rural and urban respondents in their attitudes towards tribe. Moreover, those who came from a poorly educated background, were less in favour of the tribal identification thus it is possible to suggest that they regard tribalism as a network of privilege. They seem to perceive that they do not derive any benefit from the tribe, unlike those who came from a higher educational and social background.

In general, the findings of this study demonstrate that Libyan society is still a tribal society. The tribe is one of the strongest social organisations, and tribalism still plays a significant social role. It may be an invisible political unit, but it has emerged as one of the main sources of legitimacy of the Libyan regime in the last few years.

The findings of this part of the study are complex and interesting. A large majority of the students were very attached or attached to their tribe, and almost no one wanted to change tribe. At the same time nearly half of the students were in favour of dropping tribal identities in Libyan society. One surprising result of the survey is that when the relationship between

strength of attachment to tribe and willingness to drop tribal identity was investigated, this relation was strong and negative. 72 percent of those who were not attached to their tribe wished to drop tribal identity compared with 31 percent of those who were strongly attached to their tribe. An unexpected fact here is that a substantial minority of those who were strongly attached to the tribal system were willing to drop tribes as a form of identity. This divided position is actually rather similar to the divided position expressed over time by the regime. It seems clear that there is a substantial minority of students who would prefer that there was no tribal system but who accommodate to it because it is there and is important. This also quite closely corresponds to the regime's position. It was initially against tribalism but has had to accept tribes into a sort of partnership which in some ways substitutes for a civil society, although rejecting any formal political role for tribes. The views expressed by the students might be considered to belong to three sets. The first is represented by those who are strongly attached or attached to their tribe and who do not wish to drop tribal identities. They seem likely to have a non-instrumental as well as an instrumental view of the role of tribes. For those who want to drop tribal identities and are not attached to their tribes, both the instrumental and non-instrumental bases are rejected. Those who are willing to drop identities but remain attached are probably somewhat instrumental in their view of the tribe - i.e. it has a role so they remain part of it. The regime's position has tended to either extreme of this continuum. At first it tried to reject tribes but it has subsequently asserted their non-instrumental role in ideological terms. At the same time it has accepted their instrumental role outside the formal political sphere.

It is important to remember here, as throughout this thesis, that the respondents are close in generational terms to the Libya of their grandparents which was an essentially tribally ordered society. Despite the enormous demographic and educational changes since that time, family socialisation has certainly continued to reinforce tribal identities in ways which reflect both the traditions of common descent and of Bedouin value systems, even when the actual Bedouin form of life is no longer the experience of the great majority of Libyans, especially the urbanised population. It would be necessary to engage in detailed qualitative (ethnographic) research to explore the exact character of tribal identity in the new social context. However, it would have been very remarkable if an identity form with such a long history and with such a central role in the social order, had indeed disappeared within two generations.

This general account is supported by the review of the regime's policies towards the tribe and tribalism. On the one hand its initial efforts to eliminate tribes from society have been

replaced by an acceptance of their existence and on the other hand an effort to confine their role to the social sphere.

Notes to Chapter 6

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[4] Nidal Al-Hawamdeh, *Political Development in Jordan from 1988 until the Present,* (Temple University, PhD thesis, 1994), p. 238.

[5] Najwa Adar, 'The Concept of Tribe in Rural Yemen', in Saad Eddin Ibrahim and Nicholas S. Hopkins (eds), *Arab Society: Social Science Perspectives,* (Cairo: The American University Press, 1985), p. 280.

[6] Julius Gould and William L. Kolb (eds); op.cit., pp. 729-730.

[7] Halim Barakat, *The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State,* (California: University of California Press, 1993), p. 48.

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[10] Fuad I. Khouri; *Al-Ddihniya al-Arabiya: al-ᶜUnf Saiyd al-'Ahkam* [The Arab Mind: Violence is Master of Judgements], (London: Dar al-Saqi, 1993), p. 119.

[11] Halim Barakat, op.cit., p. 48.

[12] Ibid., pp. 50-52.

[13] Ibid., p. 54.

[14] Ibid., pp. 54–57.

[15] Ibid., pp. 52-53.

[16] Najwa Adar, op.cit., p. 279.

[17] Ibid., p. 283.

[18] Halim Barakat, op.cit., p. 64.

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[20] Ibid., pp. 65-69.

[21] Ibid., p. 66.

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[26] Mohamed A. El-Khawas, *Qaddafi: His Ideology in Theory and Practice,* (Vermont: Amana Books, 1986), p. 32.

[27] Muammar Al-Qadhafi, *The Green Book,* vol. 1, (Tripoli: Global Centre for Study and Research on the Green Book, 1979), p. 15.

[28] Omar I. El-Fathaly and Monte Palmer, *Political Development and Social Change in Libya,* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1980), p. 57.

[29] Mohamed Z. El-Mogherbi, "Tribalism, Religion and the Challenge of Political Participation : The Case of Libya", Paper presented at *Democratic Challenge in the Arab World*, Cairo 24-27 September, 1992, p. 15.

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[31] Omar I. El-Fathaly *et al*, *Political Development and Bureaucracy in Libya*, (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1977), p. 92.

[32] Mohamed Z. El-Mogherbi, op.cit., p. 15.

[33] Al-Hayat newspaper, 28. 9. 1995, p. 1.

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[35] Ibid., p. 35.

7. Attitudes towards Political Participation

7.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the attitudes towards and the engagement with political participation of the Libyan university students will be examined. The term 'political participation' is used in this study to refer to "the act of taking part in the formulation, passage or implementation of public policies. This applies to the activities of any person, whether an elected politician, a government official or an ordinary citizen, who is active in any way in the production of policy within any type of political system."[1] Most of the literature on political participation deals with systems where there is competition between parties, and is therefore not very relevant for our purposes here.[2]

Political participation in Libya will be examined by focusing upon the institutions for participation which the regime has created. One of the main such institutions is the Basic People's Congress (details will be given in the section which follows). This chapter looks at the relation of the respondents to these institutions of political participation because they play a crucial role in Libya's political system.

The chapter has two main sections. The first focuses on the political system in Libya. This covers the development of Libya's current political system, how it functions, and its progress through two main periods, firstly from 1969 until 1977, and secondly from 1977 until the present day. The transformation within the Libyan political system reflect the changing strategies employed by the revolutionary regime towards the mobilisation of its citizens. Focusing on the changes will provide an insight into the character of the channels of mass political participation which the revolutionary regime constructed. The second section

explores the attitudes of the respondents towards political participation in terms both of their active engagement and their views as to its effectiveness. This section deals initially with the experience of participation which the respondents have had, firstly within their families and then at school and university. The final section is the conclusion.

7.2 The Political System in Libya: An Outline of the Framework

To understand the mechanisms of political participation in Libya, it is important to focus on the nature of the political system, especially since March 2, 1977, when the Declaration of the Establishment of the People's Authority was issued. This period is significant in understanding the political structure of the system, because, despite all the practical changes within the system, in principle it still bases its structure on the Popular Congresses and the Popular Committee.

The periods, first from 1969 until 1977, and second from 1977 until the present, are distinctive due to different mobilisation and modernisation processes initiated by the revolutionary regime. The "mobilisation process" involved changing the political system in order to provide different channels for mass political participation.

7.2.1 The first period from 1969 until 1977

The 1 September 1969 *coup d'état* was completed without any civilian involvement. As a result, the RCC consisted of military officers who carried through the coup and exercised both executive and legislative functions in the early days of the revolution. According to Article 18 of the Constitutional Proclamation of December 11, 1969, the RCC is,

> The highest authority in the Libyan Arab Republic. It exercises the function of supreme sovereignty and legislation and draws up the general policy of the state on behalf of the people.[3]

On September 8, 1969, the RCC appointed civilians to the Council of Ministers to help operate the government, but even then it reserved for itself complete authority in all fields. It sat at the top of the pyramid, issuing proclamations, laws, and resolutions; ensuring the support of the armed forces; overseeing the activities of the government; and creating new institutions to promote the objectives of the revolution.[4]

In order to create a primary link between the people and the government, the RCC established the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) on June 11, 1971. This was a Nasirite-style mass organisation. In a speech on June 12, 1971, al-Qadhafi stated that

> the new political institution would create a sacred popular alliance of the sons of Libyan cities, villages, country and desert. Giving them all the opportunity to participate politically in planning and supervising future policies.[5]

The Arab Socialist Union was one of a series of experiments made by the RCC in order to build structures of elite-linkage, channels for participation and instruments for the regime's legitimacy. According to Hinnebusch, this organisation had multiple purposes:

> On the one hand it was meant to fill the "vacuum" left by the banning of parties and an effort to dismantle tribal structures, to prevent political activity by both traditional chiefs and party leaders by cutting them off from their traditional bases of support, and to bring the voluntary organisations, trade and professional unions under government control. On the other hand, it was to mobilise mass support and bring the various social and political forces into a cadre promoting common co-operative activity directed from above.[6]

The regime hoped that creating such organisations would motivate, encourage, politicise and mobilise the population towards development goals of the revolutionary regime. But this experiment failed, especially with regards to mobilisation and participation, for a number of reasons. These were given by El-Fathaly *et al* as:

> First, negative preconceptions based on the Egyptian counterpart. Secondly, a complex organisational structure which confused the public. Thirdly, a failure to understand the traditionalism of the public and the central role of traditional leaders in the development of public perceptions. Finally, a failure to co-ordinate with the new modernising local officials.[7]

As a consequence of these failures of mobilisation, al-Qadhafi declared a 'Popular Revolution' on April 15, 1973. In a major speech he announced a five-point program to revolutionise the administrative structures of the government by turning the masses against the inefficient, corrupt bureaucracy, and abolishing outdated laws.[8] The main objectives of this revolution were listed in an official government text as follows:

> (1) The Annulment of all laws in effect, and the continuation of the revolutionary work with the establishment of new procedures and penalties; (2) purging of the country of deviationists was to be tolerated. They conspired against the revolution. This applied to people who "preach communism and capitalism as well as Muslim Brethren if they engage in clandestine activities"; (3) freedom belongs to the people and not to its enemies: arms would be distributed to the people for whom the revolution was started as an experiment; (4) to launch an administrative revolution; and (5) to launch the cultural revolution.[9]

The first step in the Popular Revolution was the formation of Popular Committees, elected directly by the people. Al-Qadhafi declared that people everywhere should establish Popular Committees in each village, city, university, institute, school, port, airport and organisation, and should move towards the five points enunciated on April 15, 1973.[10] The Popular Committees were to become the official authority in the governorates and municipalities, and also in the management of institutions, public corporations, companies, faculties and universities.

El-Fathaly *et al* argue that the Popular Committees involved for the first time popular participation in the selection of local leaders and gave the opportunity of popular participation in policy-making processes.[11] But the Popular Revolution did not bring about mobilisation, participation and development. The new political leaders, as Hinnebusch states,

> were often poorly prepared to exercise their tasks, were guilty of negligence, incompetence or indiscipline, or took the Popular Revolution as merely an opportunity to leap to positions of power, without showing much concern for popular service.[12]

Accordingly al-Qadhafi expressed dissatisfaction not with political participation or the expertise of the bureaucracy, but with popular mobilisation. El-Fathaly *et al* indicate that one of the difficulties in developing a capacity for mass mobilisation was rooted in the conflict between the ASU and the Popular Committees which were the central institution for popular mobilisation.[13] As a consequence of this failure of the Popular Committees in the mass mobilisation process, al-Qadhafi embarked on another method of mobilisation and institution-building, in an attempt to encourage the masses towards participation, especially after the break-up of the RCC in 1975. This new structure was based on the "Basic Popular Congresses " (BPC).[14]

In the first part of his book, *The Green Book*, al-Qadhafi introduced the new format of popular democracy as a unique form of direct democracy, based on *sultat al-shaᶜb* [the authority of the people]. The Basic Popular Congresses represented a tool to help the people to be involved in the political process at the grass-roots level. Thus the BPC was formed locally, according to place of residence all people (males and females) would be members of a congress. These congresses would select their People's Committees. They would also choose their secretariats, which, in turn, would constitute the Municipality People's Congresses.[15]

At the national level, the General People's Congress (GPC) was made the highest political instrument of government in Libya. The General People's Congress was described by al-Qahadafi as "not a gathering of members or ordinary persons as is the case with parliaments.

It is a gathering of the Basic Popular Congresses , the people's committees, the unions, the syndicates and the professional associations."[16]

According to *The Green Book*, the topics discussed by Basic Popular Congresses or the Popular Committees, syndicates and unions, would take their final shape in the General People's Congress. What was drafted by the GPC, which would meet at least once a year (more if emergency meetings are called), would, subsequently, be submitted to Popular Congresses, People's Committees, syndicates and unions.[17]

Practically, the GPC's duty is to study, discuss and approve the policies of the country, its general planning, budget, peace and war treaties, to check and to guide the executive and popular authorities. (Further details will be given in the following section).

7.2.2 The second period from 1977 to date

Al-Qadhafi's ideology is based on a criticism of existing political theories and economic models in the world today. He argues that neither communism nor traditional democracy has dealt effectively with the many problems facing contemporary societies.[18]

The state ideology in Libya criticises the party system, although Libya as a country has had no experience with political parties even before the revolution. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) after the revolution in 1969 continued the monarchy's ban on the organisation and operation of political parties. The December 1969 Decision on the Protection of the Revolution, the Penal code and Law No. 71 of 1972 render strict legal injunctions against unauthorised political activity.

In *The Green Book*, al-Qadhafi describes the political party as the modern dictatorial instrument of governing and the party system as an overt form of dictatorship. Al-Qadhafi's criticism of the political party system comprises the following:[19]

a) Political parties are not a democratic instrument because they are composed of people who have common interests, have a common outlook, belong to the same locality or have the same belief. The party thus represents and promotes the interests of only a segment of society. Such segments form parties to attain their ends and impose their doctrines on society as a whole.

b) In such a system, competition between parties frequently escalates, often resulting in a dominant party or parties ignoring the rights and interests of minority-party members.

c) Political parties, in their struggle to gain power, often destroy the achievements of their predecessors, even if those achievements were for the general good.

As a solution to these dilemmas al-Qadhafi proposed the system of People's direct democracy, based on Popular Congresses and Popular Committees. According to al-Qadhafi, the sovereignty of the people is indivisible. Parties govern on behalf of the people, but his principle is that there should be no representation in lieu of the people.

The development of Libya's current political system has been an evolutionary process which, very likely, is still incomplete. Despite some changes in the main structure, based on the Basic Popular Congresses and Popular Committees which are still the core of the political system.

The Declaration of the Establishment of the Authority of the People was issued on March 2, 1977. This declaration defined new central principles relating to the people's authority; nevertheless it was not a constitution. Together with some other resolutions, the Declaration revised the governmental organisation laid down in the 1969 Constitutional Proclamation. The March 1977 declaration also changed the name of the country to the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya. The word 'Jamahiriyya' was an invented one, which was introduced into the political dictionary. The word may be translated as "people's power" or the "state of the masses."[20]

Article 3 in the Declaration on the Establishment of the Authority of the People stated that

> the people's direct democracy is the basis of the political system in the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya, where the authority is in the hands of the people alone. The people exercise their authority through the people's congresses, the people's committees and the professional unions. The authority of the people is comprised of People's Congresses, People's Committees, Professional Unions and General People's Congress.[21]

The structure of the 'authority of the people's system' or 'direct democracy', according to the ideology of the state which is based on the *Green Book,* is comprised of four elements. These are covered below (see Appendix C).

7.2.2.1 The Basic People's Congresses

In accordance with Article 3 in the Declaration on the Establishment of the Authority of the People, people are allocated to Basic People's Congresses on the basis of their place of

residence. All citizens register as members of the Basic People's Congress in their areas. Also, every Basic People's Congress shall choose from its members a committee to lead the Congress.[22] A number of comments can be made about the practical experience of the Basic People's Congresses as a base for the new institutions of political participation:

a) In practice, those who participate in the meeting of the BPCs become more aware of politics at the local, national and international levels. The BPCs do therefore function as a mechanism for political education.

b) Membership of the BPC is not limited to men or political activists but is open to all people. This therefore includes women, who constitute half of the Libyan population. In the early years of the BPCs, social traditions in practice obstructed women's participation. To find a solution to this problem al-Qadhafi implemented a suggestion that they could meet in separate chambers to express their views on issues arising in the BPC, if traditions did not allow women and men to assemble in a single hall.[23]

c) The passivity and the lack of motivation of the people to practice their responsibilities through the BPC was a very clear phenomena. This passivity was due to a number of reasons. First, some people stayed away because they were not familiar with such an experiment. Others attended the BPC sessions but did not take an active role in the discussions. Second, some of the Revolutionary Committees[24] misused their duties and functions and became dominant in the BPCs. The Revolutionary Committees are regarded by the Libyan system as an instrument of the People's Revolution, as a means to guide the masses.[25] One of the duties of the revolutionary committees is,

> to encourage the Popular Congresses to intensify their ideological work, to help the masses make progressive decisions and to get such decisions implemented by the People's Committees.[26]

But among the population there was a feeling that decision-making in the BPCs was dominated by particular groups. Theory proved to be very different from practice. In theory the BPCs were the main decision-making institution through which people were involved in the political process at the grass-roots level. The people and the people alone were supposed to have the prerogative and indeed the authority to make-decisions,[27] with no veto over the people's power.[28] There were certainly some instances where the BPC's decisions could affect national policy. In 1983 for instance, al-Qadhafi introduced the idea of *al-taʿlim al-manzili* [home education]. He asked those parents who were able to do so to keep their school-age children at home. There they should be given, under parental tutelage, the basic elements of

primary school knowledge.[29] Al-Qadhafi's proposal was rejected by the BPCs and caused an enormous amount of discussion and criticism in Libya. However, in other cases the opinions of the BPCs went unheeded. Al-Qadhafi acknowledged that sometimes direct democracy did not work: "Theoretically, this is the genuine democracy. But realistically, the strong always rule, that is, the stronger part in the society is the one that rules".[30]

7.2.2.2 People's Committees (PC)

Article 3 in the Declaration of the Establishment of the Authority of People stated that the masses of the People's Congresses shall choose People's Committees which are responsible to the People's Congresses.[31] The membership term on the People's Committee is limited to three years, and a Committee member can be removed at any time by a two-third vote. Resignation must be accepted and approved by the Committee.[32]

The PCs are administrative tools chosen by the BPCs. The latter dictate the policy to be followed by the People's Committees and supervise its execution. According to *The Green Book*, both administration and supervision become popular, and the outdated definition of democracy—democracy is the supervision of the government by the people—comes to an end. It will be replaced by the right definition: democracy is the supervision of the people by the people.[33]

7.2.2.3 The Unions and Professional Associations

According to *The Green Book*, all citizens who are members of the Popular Congresses belong, professionally and functionally, to 'categories'. On this basis they can establish and organise themselves into unions and professional associations.[34] The purpose of these professional unions is to defend the professional rights of their members.

7.2.2.4 General People's Congress (GPC)

This is the highest political authority and instrument of government in the country. The GPC possesses both legislative and executive powers. It is the national conference of the People's Congresses, People's Committees and Professional Unions. The delegates to the GPC come from the latter bodies, who choose them by direct choice involving raising hands in open meetings.

According to Article 3 in the Declaration of the Establishment of the Authority of the People, the GPC has a General Secretariat to execute the general policy of the state as defined by the Congress, drawing up the agenda of the GPC and executing its resolutions and recommendations.[35]

The president of the GPC is openly selected to preside over sessions, to sign its laws, and accept the credentials of ambassadors. The GPC also elects the General Secretariat, which has taken over the function of the council of ministers in the previous system. The secretariat includes a Secretary-General and a number of Secretaries, each of whom supervises one section of activities in the state. They cannot, however, make decisions to determine the general policy of the country. The main duty of the Secretary General and the Secretaries is to implement decisions made by the GPC.

The People's Congresses, People's Committees, Professional Unions and the General People's Congress are the main structures of the political system in Libya and represent channels for mass political participation.

Further reference should now be made to the Revolutionary Committees — a movement which is not officially part of the political system in Libya. The rise of this movement started when al-Qadhafi in the late 1970s gave up his post as a Secretary General of the General People's Congress (GPC) and all other official positions and titles except that of the Leader of the Revolution. He introduced the idea of a separation between the Revolution and the people's authority and civil administration. As Leader of the Revolution he devoted his time to the revolutionary activities. Effectively this gave him a legitimate and strong position from which to continue to influence the country's policies.[36]

In this role, in 1977 al-Qadhafi called on the Libyan revolutionaries to form committees all over the country: in every educational institution and office, and in the armed forces. The Revolutionary Committees became highly organised, with a structure parallel to the People's Committees.[37]

The membership of the Revolutionary Committees is open to anyone who believes in the Leader of the Revolution's ideology, therefore it is not based on election. They are directly under al-Qadhafi's command and have enormous power. They carry out their duties with *The Green Book* as their guidance. Al-Qadhafi described the Revolutionary Committees' role as follows:

> The revolutionary committees role is to help the masses take a firm grasp of the reins of power and all sources of power within society. In a Jamahiriyya, revolutionaries are [not] simply enthusicists [sic], mere zealots; they are the prophets of a healthy civilisation and a life of dignity where man will live happily and freely.[38]

The members of the Revolutionary Committees operate outside the framework of the Popular Congresses. They are regarded as a temporary movement, performing duties which are temporary. They involve themselves in revolutionary activities at the grass-roots level. They seek to raise the level of the political awareness among the people so that the latter can practice their authority through the Basic Popular Congresses. According to one of the many pamphlets of *The Maktab al-Itiṣal Bi al-Lijan al-Thawria* [Communications Office of the Revolutionary Committees], the duties of the Revolutionary Committees are as follows:[39]

a) *Tahrid*: inciting the masses to exercise authority.

b) *Tarsikh*: firmly establishing the people's authority.

c) *Mumarasat al-riqaba al-thawriyya*: practising revolutionary supervision.

d) *Tahrik*: agitating the Popular Congresses.

e) *Tarshid*: directing the Popular Committees and the secretariats of the congresses to the right path.

f) *Ḥimaya, difaᶜa wa daᶜwa lil-thawra*: protecting, defending and propagating the revolution.

The Revolutionary Committees initially possessed no formal authority. However, from March 1979 they became responsible for supervising 'elections' at the level of the Basic People's Congresses. The Revolutionary Committees became rapidly al-Qadhafi's direct link with the masses.[40] In 1979 the Revolutionary Committees started the publication of their own newspaper. A weekly entitled *al-Zaḥf al-Akhdar* [The Green March] was followed in 1980 by 'al-Jamahiriyya'.

As mentioned earlier, the role of the Revolutionary Committees is a temporary one. Their role is to incite the people to exercise authority, to take power and revolt. As the popular masses are gradually raised to the level of the RC, the intention is that the RC will cease to exist. This stage has not been achieved, so the RCs continue to function.

The Revolutionary Committees have developed a broad power base within society and have become tools to destroy the opposition (the enemies of the revolution) inside or outside society. A wave of dissatisfaction and alienation emerged among many segments of society as

a consequence of the heavy tactics used by the Revolutionary Committees to silence any opposition. In effect, their role undermined any meaningful popular participation and stifled freedom of expression. Many citizens felt that they were not able to express themselves. They were frightened that any criticism might be misunderstood as opposition to the Revolution and its Leader.[41]

One of the problems arose when revolutionary committees intervened in the work of the PCs by putting forward their own candidates, who were enthusiastic admirers of the Leader of the Revolution and were committed to furthering the goals of the revolution. In doing so the RC usually objected to other candidates and prevented the Popular Congresses from operating as they should.[42].

The institutions of mass participation presently face a number of problems, the main one being the possibility of people's apathy towards involvement in the political process. The success of the Libyan experiment depends on citizens playing an active role in political discussions and running the government through the BPCs and PCs.

The relationship between the Leader of the Revolution and the masses is an important one. As mentioned earlier, since 1979 al-Qadhafi has given up all official posts and titles except his title as "Leader of the Revolution". His role became very visible through this new function of guiding the Revolution. This position gave him the power to instruct the Popular Congresses in how to exercise their role in running the country. In addition, people depend on al-Qadhafi giving his opinion on many issues with which the Popular Congresses deals. His role has increased as he has tried to fill the void that was created by setting up a loose political structure for a state without government.[43]

As a consequence, al-Qadhafi's involvement in every decision taken in the country has led some critics to accuse him of establishing a political system in which he has no formal role but where in practice he takes a major part in decision–making.

The following section deals with political participation in Libyan society by exploring the attitudes of university students towards the participation process and their degree of engagement with it.

7.3 The Political Participation of Students in Libyan Society: Data Analysis

Exploring attitudes to political participation among the students is the major concern of this part of the study. Three main topics relate to the political participation and attitudes of the respondents. The first deals with the experience of the respondents' participation within their own families' affairs. It may be expected that the participation of the respondents in family affairs and their relationships with their parents at different stages of their lives may affect their participation in the political system and the other activities.

The second topic concerns the respondents' participation experience at school and university, asking whether they were active at either of these institutions. The third topic covers attitudes of the respondents towards political participation and their awareness of the political process within the political system in Libya by investigating whether they were active within the institutions of political participation or not.

A general aim of this section is to find out whether there is any relationship between the political experience of the respondents in the early stages of their lives (either within the family, school or university) and their participation within the political system.

7.3.1 The participation experience of the respondents within the family

The experience of individuals within their families, and their participation in the affairs of the family may not only affect their political behaviour and their participation in the political matters within society, but may also add to an awareness of their role in the political process. The aim of this section is to explore the experience of participation in family affairs and attitudes towards this process.

The questions asked were numbers, 23, 24, 25a, 25b, 26a, 26b, 28a, and 28b in the questionnaire (see Appendix A).

The experience of individuals within their families reflects the nature of the relationship between parents and children. To explore this relationship, the respondents were asked how they would describe their parents' treatment of their children: strict or relaxed. The response to this question showed well over half of the respondents (68 percent) described their parents' treatment of their children as relaxed, while only 30 percent described their parents' treatment

as strict. Thus it seems that most of the respondents lived in a flexible and relaxed atmosphere with their parents.

The family atmosphere is very significant for the individuals. By looking at the early experiences of the individual in a family and the nature of relations among its members—that is, non–democratic or democratic—one may draw some interesting conclusions about the consequences on political participation. Therefore, the respondents were asked about the responsibility for making decisions within their family.

The survey results indicate that for 30 percent of respondents, the responsibility for decision-making within the family rested with the father. Only 5 percent indicated that the mother was responsible for decision-making. In the latter case the reason was usually due to the death of the father or to divorce between the parents and with the respondent living with his/her mother. 22 percent of the respondents said that both of their parents were responsible for decision-making, whilst 42 percent indicated that the whole family was responsible for decision-making.

The next question looked at the role of the respondents in family decision-making when they were children. It asked whether the respondent had a voice in family decisions as a child. 70 percent said they had no such voice, while 29 percent did. The decisions which they participated in related to matters concerning toys, trips, clothes, etc. Taken together the responses to these two questions show that at least 29 percent of the respondents had experienced a democratic atmosphere.

When those who answered positively were asked at what age they began to participate, 43 percent said between the ages of 6 and 11, 38 percent said between 12 and 15, 9 percent said between 15 and 18, and 5 percent said between 18 and 22. Given that the decisions in which they participated were only minor ones relating to their own personal welfare, the rate of the level of participation in family decision making (29 percent) is low.

A further question explored the attitudes of respondents towards the idea that children should take part in family discussions in general. The respondents were asked whether they favoured children's involvement in decision-making within their families. More than half of the respondents (about 66 percent) supported the idea. Those who gave a positive answer were asked at what age children should take part in family discussions. Half the respondents, about 52 percent, supported the idea of children starting to take part in family discussions when they are between 6 and 11, 31 percent said between 12 and 15, 7 percent said between 15 and 18,

and only 2 percent said between 18 and 22 years old. From the results, it is clear that respondents were generally favourable to children taking part in family discussions before the age of 15.

An individual's willingness to express himself/herself in political debate may be affected by his/her experience of freedom of expression within the family. Respondents were therefore asked whether they felt free to talk to their parents about their family's affairs. The response showed that 85 percent felt free to talk to their parents, while only 14 percent did not. Those who gave positive answers were asked with whom they did talk, father, mother or both parents. In response to this 7 percent of the respondents said they talked to their fathers alone; half of the respondents (50 percent) talked to their mothers alone; and about 42 percent felt free to talk to both parents.

7.3.2 The participation experience of respondents in school activities

The researcher assumes that the involvement of individuals in different activities, whether political or non-political, tends to strengthen the likelihood of an individual participating in the general political system. The more people were active and involved in participation in the early stages of their life, the more likely they are to be involved effectively in the political participation process. Therefore, the purpose of this section and the next is to examine the respondents' experience of participation at school and in university activities. The intention is to find out if there is any relationship between the respondents' participation in such activities at school and at university, and their participation in the political process within the regime later. This part is based on questions 29, 30a, 30b in the questionnaire (see Appendix A).

The respondents were asked first to describe their teachers at school. The object of this was to find out about the atmosphere at school and the relationship between students and teachers. More than half of the respondents, 58 percent, said that their teachers were strict, while 40 percent described their teachers as relaxed.

Next, respondents were asked about their experience of participation in political activities in the early stages of their lives. About 52 percent of the respondents participated in activities at school, whilst 48 percent did not participate. Those who gave a positive answer were asked what kind of activities they participated in. To understand the responses made to this question, it will be necessary to give some description of the character of political activities to which respondents were referring. In what follows, therefore, the researcher will give the survey result for each political activity and then describe the character of that activity. The activities

to which the respondents referred were: Ideological Preparation Camps (IPC); popular demonstration; ideological competitions; political experience through the school system; ideological revolutionary meetings; and students union activities.

About 69 percent of those who answered 'yes' participated in the Ideological Preparation Camps. These camps usually take place during summer school vacation or in the mid academic-year holiday. Students stay between 10 days and two weeks at the ideological preparation camps. They are given lectures and talks about different political subjects either related to the ideology of the regime or issues concerning the Arab nation, such as Arab unity and the Arab-Israeli conflict. These lectures are usually given by members of the Revolutionary Committees or by experts on the topics. The students in these Ideological Preparation Camps also practice other activities such as basic military training, sports, music, and art, and undertake visits to factories and other symbols of the regime's achievements. In principle the ideological preparation camps are compulsory: students have to attend, especially at school or in the early years of their university study, but 30 percent of the respondents who had participated in political activities had not been to an IPC and 48 percent of respondents had not participated in any political activities. This shows a real gap between the formal structures of participation and their actual achievement.

About 25 percent of the respondents participated in one of the popular demonstrations in which schools and universities are quite often involved. Popular demonstrations take place in different parts of the country to support the regime in its internal or foreign policies and indicate loyalty to the regime, or to show support for Arab issues such as the Palestine issue or Arab unity.

One of the other activities which some respondents were involved in was the *al-musabaqat al-aqa'idiay al-madrasiya* [ideological competitions between schools]. In these competitions students participate in academic quizzes in all the courses which they study. Part of this involves questions on the ideology of the country. 11 percent of respondents participated in these ideological competitions between schools.

Nine percent of the respondents mentioned that they had gained political experience through the school system. Each school is called *Al-Jamahiriyya al-musaghara* [the small Jamahiriyya], which is based on the people's authority system as shown in *The Green Book*. Each class within a school constitutes a Popular Congress with a Popular Committee, and therefore the students are members of these congresses through which meetings and

discussions are organised. This allows them to practice their roles for the similar system outside the school.

Multaqayat al-lijan al-thawrya [ideological revolutionary meetings] were another one of the activities in which students participated. These are the annual meetings of the Revolutionary Committees (RC). Usually those who attend such meetings are members of the Revolutionary Committees. About 3.4 percent of the respondents participated in the ideological meetings. Finally, only 1 percent of the respondents participated in students' union activities.

Those who did not participate in any of the activities at school were asked about their reasons for not participating. The results are given in Table 7.1. It seems that most reasons given for non-participation in political activities at school were not political.

Table 7.1: Reasons for non-participation in political activities at school

Reasons	Percentages [%]	Number of respondents
Radical change	2	4
Not suited	2	5
Do not like	18	47
No time	16	43
Not Serious	1	3
No opportunity	28	74
Useless	5	14
No reasons given	25	65
Family resistance/Father	3	8
Total	100	263

Source: Field survey 1994

Using the cross-tabulation procedure, the relationship between participation in political activities at school and the type of family residence of the respondents (urban and rural) is shown in Table 7.2.

Table 7.2: Participation in political activities at school by place of family residence

Category	Number of respondents	Yes [%]
Urban	428	48
Rural	72	75

Source: Field survey 1994

As shown in the Table 7.2, only 48 percent of urban respondents participated in the political activities at school, against 75 percent of rural respondents. Whilst the number of rural respondents was small in comparison to the number of urban ones, there is still a strong statistical significance. Rural respondents are more involved in the activities at school than urban respondents. The explanation for this may be the lack of other activities in rural areas. The rural schools usually are the main centres of activity for both students and their families.

Table 7.3 records the proportions of males and females who participated in the political activities at school. About 56 percent of male respondents participated in political activities as against 47 percent of female respondents. It is clear that male students were more likely to have participated in the activities than female students, although the difference is not large.

Table 7.3: Participation in political activities at school by gender

Sex	Number of respondents	Yes [%]
Male	262	56
Female	238	47

Source: Field survey 1994

Table 7.4 shows the participation of respondents in political activities at school by father's education. There is no consistent pattern.

It is clear that those whose fathers were illiterate or had less education were more active at school, although this pattern is not wholly consistent. For instance those whose father's education was intermediate do not correspond with the general trend. The low level of participation by those whose fathers had a university-level education is interesting. This could reflect cynicism. With regard to the mother's education, no significant difference in the participation of the respondents at school was found.

Table 7.4: Participation in political activities at school by fathers' education

Fathers' education	Number of respondents	Yes [%]
Illiterate	87	62
Read only	23	52
Read and write	68	52
Primary	69	62
Preparatory	65	42
Secondary	62	50
Intermediate	33	64
University and over	91	39

Source: Field survey 1994

The source of the respondents' identification (family, tribe, city, state, Muslim or Arab) is another variable which can be related to the respondents' involvement in school activities. The only result of statistical significance here was with regard to those who identify themselves by the Libyan state. Less than half of the respondents who identified themselves by the Libyan state (43 percent) participated in the activities at school, while 54 percent did not participate. But the findings show that those who were aware of the Libyan state and its political system were more involved in the activities at school.

7.3.3 The participation experience of respondents in university activities

The purpose of this section is to examine the respondents' experience of participation in university activities. This part is based on question numbers 31a, 31b, 31c, 32a, 32b, and 33 (see Appendix A).

The respondents were asked whether they participated in the political activities at university. 11 percent of the respondents gave a positive answer, while 89 percent of the respondents answered 'no'. It is clear here that the students at university participated much less in political activities than when they were at school. Such a finding can be explained in terms of most political activities at school being (in theory) compulsory. Also students at university became more interested in their future career than other activities.

Those who gave a positive answer were asked about the activities in which they participated. 38 percent said they participated in the ideological courses for new students in the first year.

Through these courses the students were instructed in the regime's ideology and some other political issues (such as Arab unity and the Arab-Israeli conflict).

24 percent of the respondents participated in national ceremonies. These ceremonies take place on certain days in the year, such as the anniversary of the Revolution. 14 percent of the respondents participated in popular demonstrations, which are a way to support the regime and its policies. Furthermore, 13 percent of the respondents participated in the ideological preparation camps and 11 percent participated in ideological meetings.

Those who did not participate in the activities at university were asked about the reasons why they did not participate. As indicated in Table 7.6, about 33 percent of the respondents mentioned that they did either not have the ability or the time to be involved. 22 percent mentioned that there was no opportunity and they preferred to keep away from such activities. 9 percent indicated that these activities were disorganised and useless, whilst 7 percent argued that there were no real political activities in Libya. 5 percent said they did not like to attend because a few people always dominate these activities, especially members of the Revolutionary Committees. 5 percent of respondents simply said they did not like to deal with politics. 2 percent of the respondents indicated that all these activities were merely propaganda for the current regime. Another 2 percent said that they were scared, because there was no freedom to express their opinion. Finally, some female respondents (about 13 percent) said that all activities were dominated by male students. Note that in Table 7.5 the respondents by percentage do not sum to 100 because some people gave more than one reason.

Table 7.5: Reasons for non-participation in politics at university

Reasons	Percentages [%]	Number of respondents
No ability to participate/No time	33.4	149
No opportunity	22.1	99
No answers	13.1	59
The political activities are disorganised and useless	9.4	42
No such political activities in Libya and are not genuine	7.0	31
The political activities are dominate by a few people	4.9	22
Do not like to do so	4.7	21
The political activities are just propaganda	2.2	10
Scared to participate	2.2	10
Male students dominate	13.2	59
Total		447

Source: Field survey 1994

Examining the participation of respondents in political activities at university by background factors might help to find some differences among the respondents in their attitudes. The first of these variables is place of family residence. The findings indicated that there was little difference between students of urban and of rural residence.

Table 7.6 shows the participation of the respondents in political activities at university by gender. The result shows that there is a statistical difference: 15 percent of the male respondents participated, but only 6 percent of the female respondents did.

Table 7.6: Participation in political activities at university by gender

Sex	Number of respondents	Yes [%]
Male	262	15
Female	235	6

Source: Field survey 1994

There is no statistically significant relationship between the parents' educational level and the respondents' political activities at university. Similarly, family income, faculty and subject of study and father's occupation all made no significant difference to the respondents'

participation in the university activities. In general, then, background variables did not make much difference; which again shows the homogeneity of the students.

The researcher assumed that those who participated in school activities might be similarly interested at university. As can be seen from Table 7.7, the result shows that among those who participated in the political activities at school, 17 percent continued at university, while among those who had not participated in the activities at school 4 percent became involved at university.

Table 7.7: Participation in political activities at university by participation in activities at school

School activities	Number of respondents	Yes [%]
Yes	295	17
No	237	4

Source: Field survey 1994

There is a relationship between participation in the activities at school and at university, but this is weak. The interesting thing about these findings is that there is a drop-off between school and university (i.e many stop participating in the activities at university).

The Students' Congress is one of the main centres of student activity in the university, and membership is open to all students. Through this Congress students discuss their problems and attempt to emulate the Popular Congresses. A question related to this point involved asking the respondents whether or not they were a member of the Student Congress in their faculty. Only 26.4 percent of the respondents were members, which represents a clear minority of students. Those who gave a negative answer were asked about the reasons for being non-members and the results are given in Table 7.8.

As can be seen in Table 7.8, there were many reasons which the respondents mentioned for non-participation. In particular, 31.2 percent of the respondents said they did not have the time or ability to participate in such activities and to study at the same time; 11.3 percent said they did not care about these matters; and 11.3 percent said there was no Students' Congress in their faculty. It should be noted that, in fact, all faculties do have such congresses, although they may not be very active. 9.7 percent said the Students' Congress did not have any decision-making power. 8.5 percent said that they did not know anything about the Students' Congress. 3 percent said that a few students dominated the Students' Congress and most of

them were members of the Revolutionary Committees. The replies indicate that the respondents were aware that those few who dominated the Students' Congress were motivated by personal interest and their personal aims rather than looking for wider solutions to problems facing the students in the university. Another factor which the respondents indicated was the lack of encouragement to attend. Some mentioned that no one would listen to their views if they attended; others that they did not like the heavy responsibilities; finally, some female respondents did not attend because they were more focused on their role at home.

Table 7.8: Reasons for not participating in students' congresses

Reasons	Percentages [%]	Number of respondents
Lack of knowledge	8.5	31
No encouragement	2.8	10
No time and ability	31.2	113
Do not care	11.3	41
Member self-interest	3.0	4
No decision-making power	9.1	33
No one will listen	2.2	8
A few students dominate	3.0	4
None in the faculty	11.3	41
Heavy responsibilities	0.8	3
As a woman I am not going to waste my time	1.1	4
Total	100	306

Source: Field survey 1994

Next, the respondents were asked whether they attended discussions in the faculty Students' Congress. The response to this question shows that only 4 percent of respondents attended regularly, 42 percent attended from time to time, and finally 53 percent never attended the Congresses. It might be useful to mention that there is a difference between membership and attending the Congresses. In theory all students should be members of these Congresses but in fact only 26.4 percent of the respondents regarded themselves as members. However, sometimes students were forced to attend the meetings by the cancellation of all the classes and the closing of the libraries in the faculty at the time of these meetings, but usually such methods did not work because students just remained at home.

It is clear that most respondents had little motivation to participate in political activities at university, given their absence from one of the main activities at university, that is, attending

the students' congress meetings. This channel of participation is similar to the main channel of participation within society, the Basic Popular Congresses . Such findings lead us to question the role of students in the political participation process and the wider decision-making process in Libyan society.

7.3.4 Political participation and awareness among the respondents

The aim of this section is to explore the role of the students in the political participation process in Libya, through the institutions and agents of the participation such as the Basic Popular Congress meetings. This part will also explore the awareness of the respondents' role in the political process within the system and their knowledge of politics. This section is based on question numbers 27a, 27b, 34, 35a, 35b, 36, 37a, 37b, 38, and 39 (see Appendix A).

The respondents were asked first whether they remembered when they first became aware of politics. 59 percent were aware of the first experience with politics; 11 percent did not remember; and 30 percent did not know. Those who remembered their first experience were then asked when they became aware of politics. 16 percent replied between the ages 6 and 12 years; 36 percent when they were between 12 and 15 years; 25 percent between 15 and 18 years; and 23 percent between 18 and 22 years.

When the respondents remembered their first involvement with politics, they mentioned political events which formed their memories of politics. The events which the respondents mentioned were attending the ideological preparation camps, the Libyan—Egyptian war of 1977, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the Sabra and Shatiyla massacre in Beirut in 1982, the Libyan—American dispute over the Sirte Gulf in the early 1980s, the American attack on Libya in 1986 and the Gulf War of 1990/91.

The most common way in which citizens (and therefore students) can participate in the political system is through the Basic Popular Congresses which are the main institutions of the peoples' authority system in Libya. Consequently, this will be the institutional focus of this section. When the respondents were asked whether they attended meetings in their Basic Popular Congress, only 6 percent of them said that they attended regularly; 43 percent of the respondents attended the meetings from time to time; and half of them never attended the meetings. It is clear that overall the students had limited interest in participating in the BPC, which is perhaps a surprising finding. As they are educated the expectation is that they will be more interested in politics and therefore more likely to participate than other strata of society.

This is especially so in Libya as the regime paid special attention to them. The regime expected the youth to be politically very active, and this expectation is clearly not fulfilled.

Figure 7.1, presents the result of an investigation as to whether participation in the general political process is related to the extent to which students participated in political activities at school. The figure shows that among those who participated in the activities at school, 9 percent regularly attended their Popular Congresses, 53 percent attended from time to time and 38 percent of the respondents never participated.

Figure 7.1: Attendance at meetings of Basic Popular Congress by participation in political activities at school



Among those who did not participate in the activities at school, 3 percent attended the meetings regularly, about 32 percent attended from time to time, and 65 percent of them never attended meetings. It is clear from the figure that activity at school is associated with attendance at the BPC, but even of those active at school only a small minority attend regularly.

Table 7.9 looks at the link between participation in political activities at university and attendance at meetings of the Basic Popular Congresses. Of those who participated in the political activities at university, 11 percent regularly attended BPC meetings; about 64 percent attended the meetings from time to time; and about 25 percent never attended the meetings.

Among those who did not participate in the political activities at university, 6 percent attended regularly the meetings of the BPC; about 41 percent attended the meetings from time to time; and more than half never attended the meetings. It seems that the more students are active at university, the more they participate in the Basic Popular Congresses , but again only a small minority attends regularly.

Table 7.9: Attendance at meetings of Basic Popular Congresses by participation in political activities at university

University activities	Number of respondents	Regularly [%]	From time to time [%]	Never [%]
Yes	53	11	64	25
No	440	6	41	53

Source: Field survey 1994

Table 7.10 shows the respondents attending the meetings in the Basic Popular Congress by place of family residence. The table shows that there are some differences between urban respondents and rural respondents.

Table 7.10: Attendance at meetings of Basic Popular Congress by place of family residence

Family residence	Number of respondents	Regularly [%]	From time to time [%]	Never [%]
Urban	428	6	40	54
Rural	72	10	61	28

Source: Field survey 1994

Rural respondents were more active politically and were more likely to attend BPC meetings than urban respondents. Only 6 percent of urban respondents regularly attended meetings of their BPCs, while 40 percent of them attended from time to time; and more than half (54 percent) never attended. In contrast, 10 percent of the rural respondents attended meetings regularly, 61 percent attended meetings from time to time, and 28 percent never attended the meetings. Nonetheless even for the rural respondents only a small minority attended regularly.

Now we turn to the proportions of male and female respondents who attended meetings of the Basic Popular Congresses. As can be seen from Figure 7.2, there is a gap between male and female participation which indicates less involvement in the BPC by women.

Figure 7.2: Attendance at meetings of Basic Popular Congresses by gender



The respondents' democratic or non-democratic experience within their families, especially the responsibility for taking decisions, might have been significant for their involvement in the political process through the BPC. The relationship between the respondents attending the Basic Popular Congress meetings and the responsibility of making decisions within their families can be seen in Figure 7.3. The figure indicates that among those whose fathers were solely responsible for taking decisions within the family, only 7 percent regularly attended the meetings of the Basic Congress, 41 percent of them did attend from time to time, and more than half of them (52 percent) never attended the meetings of the BPC. Among those whose mothers were responsible for making decisions within the family, none of them attended regularly, 39 percent of them did attend from time to time and 61 percent of them never attended any meeting. Among those for whom both of the parents were responsible for the decision making within the family, only 2 percent attended regularly, 42 percent attended the meeting from time to time and 55 percent never attended. Among those for whom all the family were responsible in decision-making within the family, 8 percent regularly attended the Basic Popular Congress meetings. 46 percent attended from time to time and 46 percent never attended. It is clear that those who experienced a democratic atmosphere within their families were more willing to attend the meetings of the Basic Popular Congress. This difference was

statistically significant, mainly due to the low attendance by those from mother-headed families.

Figure 7.3: Attendance at meetings of Basic Popular Congresses by responsibility for making decisions within the family



Another dimension of political participation is political efficacy. The concept *political efficacy* might be defined as "the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, it is the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change".[44] It is important to elaborate this definition in relation to the Libyan experiment. Accordingly, this study used two items to measure the sense of political efficacy among the Libyan students. The first deals with the students' influence on any decision taken in the Popular Congress. The second deals with the ability of the students to change any decision taken in the Basic Popular Congress.

When the respondents were asked whether they could influence any decision taken in the popular congress, 32 percent said 'yes', with 66 percent saying 'no'. It may be that some of those who were confident that they could influence any decisions taken in the popular congress were members of the Revolutionary Committees. Part of the duties of the latter is to

teach the people how to practice their 'authority' through the Basic Popular Congress and to guide the people to make the right decisions.

Among those who participated in activities at university, 53 percent felt able to influence decision-taking in the Congress, while about 45 percent of them felt unable to do that.

Table 7.11: Influence any decisions taken in the Basic Popular Congress by students' activities at the university

Activities at University	Number of respondents	Yes [%]	No [%]
Yes	53	53	45
No	440	30	69

Source: Field survey 1994

As shown in Table 7.11, among those who did not participate in the activities at university, 30 percent felt able to influence decision-taking in the Popular Congress and 69 percent felt not able to influence any decision.

A similar pattern can be seen in Figure 7.4, which shows the view of the respondents about decision-taking in the Basic Popular Congress by place of family residence. Among the urban respondents only 30 percent felt they were able to influence any decision taken in the Basic Popular Congress and 69 percent were not able.

Figure 7.4: Influence any decision taken in the Basic Popular Congress by place of family residence



Among the rural respondents, 47 percent felt able to influence a decision taken in the Basic Popular Congress, while 50 percent felt unable to do so. Rural respondents were more confident in their role to influence any decision taken in the Popular Congress. Even so, the majority of the rural respondents still did not believe they could influence decisions. There were neither significant differences between male and female respondents in their answer, nor by parental educational level or by family income.

When the influence of the source of identification was examined, the only significant relationship was in regard to the identification as 'Arab', where there was a higher incidence (40 percent) of those who felt they had some influence.

By far the most important finding here is the simple one that most students regardless of individual characteristics and regardless of their actual attendance in the meetings, felt no capacity to influence the congresses' decisions.

The second item for measuring political efficacy involved asking the respondents whether they felt they could change any decision taken in the Basic Popular Congress. 23 percent replied 'yes' and about 74 percent answered 'no'. Moreover, there was no significant difference between male and female respondents.

Figure 7.5 indicates the respondents' belief in their ability to change any decision taken in the Basic Popular Congress by the place of family residence. The result shows that there was a statistical difference. 22 percent of urban respondents thought they were able to change a decision, while 76 percent answered 'no'. Among the rural respondents, 33 percent answered 'yes'. It is clear that more rural respondents felt able to change any decision taken in the Basic Popular Congress, but even for them a large majority did not feel able.

Figure 7.5: The ability to change decisions taken in the Basic Popular Congresses by place of family residence



Figure 7.6 shows the respondents' belief in their ability to change any decision taken in the Basic Popular Congress by the responsibility of taking decisions within their families. Among respondents whose fathers were responsible for making decisions within the family, 16 percent were confident to change any decision taken in the Popular Congress. Among those whose mothers were responsible for decision-making within the family, 17 percent were able to change any decision taken in the Popular Congress.

Figure 7.6: The ability to change decisions taken by responsibility for making decisions within the family



It is clear that those who experienced participation in decision making within the family were more confident about changing decisions taken in the Popular Congress.

Table 7.12: Attendance at meetings of Basic Popular Congresses by belief in capacity to influence decision making

Regularity of attendance meeting	Number of respondents	Yes [%]
Regularly	31	68
From Time to Time	215	47
Never	252	15

Source: Field survey 1994

Table 7.13: Attendance at meetings of Basic Popular Congresses by belief in capacity to change decisions

Regularity of attendance meeting	Number of respondents	Yes [%]
Regularly	31	45
From Time to Time	215	31
Never	252	15

Source: Field survey 1994

Table 7.12 and Table 7.13 show that there is a highly significant relationship between degree of attendance at the Basic Popular Congresses and the belief in capacity to both influence and change decisions in these congresses. Of the small minority who did attend regularly, the majority believed they could influence decisions and a large minority believed they could change decisions. A large majority of non-attenders believed that they could neither influence nor change decisions. Irregular attenders (a large group) were intermediate, but even here a small majority did believe that they could even influence decisions.

The next section deals with the degree to which the respondents are informed about the political system. The respondents were asked whether they follow changes which occur in the Libyan system. The response showed that 44 percent of them regularly followed the changes, 46 percent followed the changes from time to time, and 9 percent never followed the changes. It is clear that a small majority of respondents were not very interested in following the regular changes which occur in the system.

There was no relationship between interest in changes and political participation at school. There was a slight tendency for those who participated politically at university to be more interested (53 percent versus 43 percent for non participants), but even here nearly half did not display regular interest.

Discussing political affairs with others reflects the political interests of the individuals. The respondents were asked whether they discussed political affairs, local or international, in general. The findings show a relatively high frequency of the respondents (67 percent) discussing political affairs. 33 percent did not discuss political affairs, indicating they did not have any interest in politics.

When the respondents were asked how often they discussed political affairs, it was found that 22 percent of them discussed politics everyday. 6 percent of them discussed politics once a week. Finally, 71 percent of the respondents discussed politics from time to time.

The respondents were asked with whom they discussed political affairs. The response shows that 88 percent of the respondents discussed political affairs with their immediate family; 88 percent with friends; 82 percent with relatives; 79 percent with colleagues at university; 51 percent with members of the Popular Congress; 3 percent with departmental staff, members of the Revolutionary Committee, etc. The willingness of more than half of the respondents to discuss politics with members of the Popular Congress is interesting.

It is also interesting to note that the degree of trust of the respondents in talking and discussing politics with other people is very high in the first circles of their relatives. In other words, the proportion goes up with the closeness of people to the respondents.

The respondents were asked about the mass media which they used. The response to this question shows that 16 percent of the respondents were primarily using the radio, 25 percent television, 11 percent magazines and newspapers, and 66 percent indicated that they used all the above mass media agents.

7.4 Conclusion and Summary

Since the revolution in 1969, Libya's political structure has undergone a number of changes. In the early years of the revolutionary regime, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and especially al-Qadhafi played a crucial role in both legislative and executive functions of the government. The Arab Socialist Union (ASU) was a brief experiment in the political system's structure intended to mobilise the masses and create institutions for mass participation. Then a new political experiment was set up by al-Qadhafi based on the idea of direct democracy or the people's authority. To ensure the success of this concept, Basic Popular Congresses and Popular Committees formed the core for the people's authority and new instruments of mass participation were formed at local, regional and national levels.

The exploration of the political participation experiences among the Libyan university students in terms of their attitudes and their role within the political system generated a number of interesting findings. Almost half of the students participated in the political activities at school, while only a small minority participated at university. The explanation for such differences is that most activities at school were (in theory) compulsory. However, despite the compulsory character of school activities (for example Ideological Preparation Camps) many students had never participated in them. This suggests a major gap between principle and practice.

The findings relating to the students' attitudes show that some of the respondents experienced a participatory process within their families' decision-making. However, the majority did not. The rural respondents were more involved in politics than urban respondents. The female respondents were clearly less interested in participating in politics than male students, although the findings did not show big differences between the two categories. Furthermore, most respondents do not believe in their role in the Popular Congresses. Even for those who would be interested in participation, there was a high degree of disbelief in the mechanisms of political participation of the regime.

Despite the formal requirement that all students go through the political socialisation process, the Libyan regime seems to have had very limited success in creating participant individuals who are aware of their role within the political system and are actively participating in it. One explanation could be that the machinery of the state is not very efficient in preparing people for a role in political participation. As is shown here, it is clear that even for the small minority who participated many did not believe in the efficacy of the political participation process. Indeed, a general disbelief in the effectiveness of the mechanisms was evident. Political participation is a minority activity in all societies, but a disbelief in the effectiveness of participation may indicate deep-seated structural problems.

I carried out fifteen extended qualitative interviews with respondents in order to develop and clarify the quantitative findings. In general these interviews did not add much to the quantitative findings, but I included an additional question by asking respondents for the origins of their beliefs and values (see Appendix B). The overwhelming emphasis was on the role of the family, with schools given an important subordinate role. It seems as if the family system remains most important, with activities during school years also being formative. However, post-school experience is not significant. This is clearly related to the very low level of participation both at University level and in the BPCs.

The overwhelmingly most important finding here can be summarised in terms of the relative ineffectiveness of the participatory mechanisms. Even when these were formally compulsory many did not attend. When they were voluntary at university, few attended and there were few regular attenders at the BPCs. There were some differences by background, of which the most important were by gender and between rural and urban, but non-attendance at University, non-regular attendance at the BPCs and disbelief in the efficacy of the institutions was only relatively smaller among males and rural students. It seems from these findings that the actual structures of the political participation system in Libya are not taken seriously by many

respondents. Indeed participation seems to be an activity undertaken only by a small minority much on the lines of participation in party activity in single party and multi-party regimes, although the Libyan system is explicitly not party-based.

This low level of participation might not matter, although it is very much out of line with the objectives of the regime. Clearly a significant number of respondents did believe that they could influence or change BPC decisions, but the majority were not of this opinion. The small number of regular attenders at the BPCs mostly believed that they could influence decisions; irregular attenders were divided; and most non-attenders (just over half of the total) felt they had no influence.

The above is a complex finding. It is of course reasonable that in a participatory system those who don't bother to turn up don't have a say. It is also reasonable that the degree of influence depends on the regularity of attendance. However, it is worth noting that almost a third of the small minority of regular attenders did not feel that they could influence decisions.

The unanswered question is whether people do not attend because they cannot be bothered, and, as a result, abdicate their responsibilities willingly to others, or, whether they do not attend because they think it is pointless. The answers given when I asked why people didn't participate in university and at school suggest that the reality is a mixture of both factors.

Notes to Chapter 7

[1] Vernon Bogdanor (ed), "Political Participation" in *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Science,* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), p. 461.

[2] For more details about participation see Geraint Parry (ed), *Participation in Politics*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1972). For more details about the political participation in the Arab countries see Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "Political Participation and the Authoritarian-Modernizing State in the Middle East: Activists in Syria and Egypt", *Journal of Arab Affairs*, vol. 3, no. 2, Fall 1984, pp. 131-154. See also Ali Yoosuf Ghuloom, *Political Participation in a Developing Nation: The Case of Kuwait*, (The Ohio State University, PhD thesis, 1989).

[3] Quoted in Henri Habib, *Politics and Government of Revolutionary Libya*, (Ottawa: Le Cercle du Livre de France Ltée, 1975), p. 170.

[4] Ronald Bruce St John, " Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya- Al-Jamahiriyah al-Arabiya al-Libya al-Shabiya al-Ishtirakiya" in George E. Delury (ed), *World Encyclopaedia of Political Systems and Parties*, (New York: Facts on file, 1987), p. 689.

[5] Habib, op. cit., p. 184.

[6] Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "Libya: Personalistic Leadership of a Populist Revolution", in I. William Zartman, *et al* (eds), *Political Elites in Arab North Africa,* (New York and London: Longman, 1982), p. 197. See also Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "Charisma, Revolution and State Formation: Qaddafi and Libya" in *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 6, no. 1, January 1984, pp. 59-73.

[7] Omar. I El-Fathaly, *et al*, *Political Development and Bureaucracy in Libya,* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1977), p. 95.

[8] Mohamed A. El-Khawas, *Qaddafi: His Ideology in Theory and Practice,* (Vermont: Amana Books, 1986), p. 49.

[9] Ministry of Information and Culture, *The Revolution of September 1, 1969: the Fourth Anniversary*, (Tripoli: Ministry of Information and Culture Publications, no date), p. 227.

[10] Habib, op. cit., p. 220.

[11] Omar I. El-Fathaly, *et al*, op. cit., pp. 96-97.

[12] Hinnebusch, op.cit., p. 199.

[13] Omar I. El-Fathaly, *et al*, op. cit., p. 99.

[14] El-Khawas, op.cit., p. 51.

[15] Ibid., p. 51.

[16] Muammar Al-Qadhafi, *The Green Book* , vol. 1, (Tripoli: Global centre for Study and Research on the Green Book, 1979), p. 28.

[17] Ibid., p. 28.

[18] El-Khawas, op.cit., p. 15.

[19] Muammar Al-Qadhafi, *The Green Book* , op.cit., pp. 11-16.

[20] Ronald Bruce St John, op.cit., p. 690.

[21] Declaration on the Establishment of the Authority of the People. In El-Khawas, op.cit., p. 192.

[22] Ibid., p. 192.

[23] Ibid., p. 52.

[24] Al-Qadhafi called on Libyan revolutionaries in 1977 to form their own committees throughout the country. The membership of the RC is not based on election but is open to any one who believes in al-Qadhafi's ideology and the Jamahiriyyan society. For more details see Hanspeter Mattes, "The Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Committees", in Dirk Vandewalle (ed), *Qadhafi's Libya: 1969 to 1994*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1995), pp. 89-112. More emphasis will be given to the RC elsewhere in this chapter.

[25] Ibid., p. 89.

[26]Muammar Al-Qadhafi (Speech), Celebration Mark the Eleventh Anniversary of the Great First of September Revolution, quoted in El-Khawas, op.cit., p. 58.

[27] Mohamed El-Shahat, *Libya Tabda' ʿAsr al-Jamahiriyat* [Libya Begins the Era of the Jamahiriyat], (Rome: International Publication House, 1978), p. 43.

[28] El-Khawas, op.cit., p. 52.

[29] Taoufik Monastiri, "Teaching the Revolution: Libyan Education Since 1969" in Dirk Vandewalle (ed), *Qadhafi's Libya: 1969 to 1994*, op.cit., p.75. Al-Qadhafi's proposal was refused, first, because of parents' fears that they would not be capable of preparing their children adequately for secondary and high school, especially if the parents were illiterate or had little education. Second, even parents who had the necessary competence to teach their children refused to do so due to the idea that this matter is the responsibility of the state and that this is the remit of schools. Al-Qadhafi in a speech on 15 February 1984 openly admitted that his experiment had failed.

[30] Muammar Al-Qadhafi, *The Green Book*, op.cit., p. 40.

[31] Declaration on the Establishment of the Authority of the People. In El-Khawas, op.cit., p. 193.

[32] Ibid., p. 51.

[33] Muammar Al-Qadhafi, *The Green Book*, op.cit., p. 27.

[34] Ibid., p. 28.

[35] Declaration on the Establishment of the Authority of the People. In El-Khawas, op.cit., p. 193.

[36] El-Khawas, op.cit., p. 58.

[37] Ibid., p. 57.

[38] Muammar Al-Qadhafi, "Legislation and the Crisis of Power", *Commentary on the Green Book*, (Tripoli: Global Centre for Study and Research on the Green Book, 1984), pp. 126-127.

[39] Hanspeter Mattes, "The Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Committees" in Dirk Vandewalle (d), *Qadhafi's Libya: 1969-1994*, op.cit., p. 94.

[40] Monte Palmer and Omar El-Fathaly, "The Transformation of Mass Political Institution in Revolutionary Libya: Structural Solutions to a Behavioural Problem" in E.G.H. Joffé and K.S. Mclachlan (eds), *Social and Economic Development of Libya*, (Wisbech: MENAS Press, 1982), p. 248.

[41] El-Khawas, op.cit., p. 60.

[42] Ibid., p. 60.

[43] Ibid., p. 62.

[44] Nidal Al-Hawamdeh, *Political Development in Jordan from 1988 until the Present*, (Temple University, PhD thesis, 1994), p. 360.

8. Changing Attitudes to the Role of Women in Society

8.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the attitudes to the role of women in society among Libyan students, in three main sections. The first section deals with the changing values towards women in Libyan society. This part seeks to describe traditional values and views relating to women, on the one hand, and the ideology and policies of the Libyan regime towards this stratum on the other hand. Also, the section includes a content analysis study of school curricula, looking at the image of women in these curricula—based on reading books of the ninth school grade. The aim of this part is to reveal how school curricula reflect the image of women. Finally, the section covers statistical information describing the place of women in Libyan society. The information is based on United Nations publications and official Libyan material.

The second section deals with the data analyses and the findings in response to the relevant questions of the questionnaire put to the sample. Nine questions are covered: question numbers 54, 55a, 55b, 56, 57a, 57b, 58, 59, 60, 61a, 61b, 62a and 62b in the questionnaire (see Appendix A). The questions seek to explore the attitudes of respondents towards several issues related to the role of women and their position within society. The final section is the summary and conclusion.

Through these questions the researcher examines whether there is an acceptance that men and women should have equality in human rights; whether fathers should have more authority than mothers within the family; whether differences in the role of men and women in the family stem from religion, or from customs and social values; whether women should be employed in

positions which give them authority over men; whether women should participate in governmental and political affairs; whether any differences which do exist in the desired participation of women come from religion or from customs and social values; whether there should be any differentiation between men and women in rights to education, work, freedom of thought etc.; whether women should fight alongside men in the army; whether women in Libya currently possess the same level of rights as men do; whether Libyan women should have the same rights as Libyan men to marry non-Libyan Muslim Arabs; and whether the current costs of dowry and marriage should be eliminated. There will also be an examination of the extent to which men and women in Libya hold different attitudes with regard to identity (comparing tribal, Arab, Islamic, state, family and city identities), and to the other "face sheet" variables.

8.2 Changing Values Towards Women in Libyan Society

During the past three decades, the position of women and their role in society has been one of the dominant social issues in the revolutionary regime's ideology. This part of the study covers: traditional values and views relating to women and their position in general; the revolutionary regime's ideology and policies towards women's issues through different eras since the revolution in 1969; and the image of women through a content analysis of school curricula.

8.2.1 Traditional values and views relating to women

Cultural stereotypes and traditional views of women exist not just in Arab society or Libyan society, but everywhere. Historically, it seems that women's positions in different societies were the same, whether in oriental or Western societies. Dhaher and Al-Salem state that

> The idea that women bring shame to the family, an idea reinforced in countless aphorisms, has resulted in savage customs. In the *jahiliya* (pre-Islamic times), female infants were buried alive, a custom that persisted also in China. Female children were sold as a slaves in the Far East when the family was in need, and among African tribes girls were the last to be fed, for they were transients in the family, waiting to be married off. These habits were not limited to the oriental world. As late as the 19th century, an Englishman might sell his wife and children, and this in an age which prided itself on sensibility and righteousness. Whether women were viewed as weak, fragile creatures, or shameless beings requiring strict control, the effect was the same: oppression parading under the name of benevolence or necessity.[1]

In order to understand present attitudes to the role of women in Libyan society, it is important to focus on the traditional views and attitudes which are still part of the culture. These

traditional views represent a great challenge to the process of change within any society. Some of the traditional views which still shape the attitudes of individuals in Arab society and Libyan society are: "women are weak mentally and physically; women are soft, beautiful and temperamental; women are sex symbols and a source of shame;"[2] the women's place is at home, and house work is a woman's job; and it is shameful for women to remain unmarried.

8.2.1.1 Women are mentally and physically weak

In comparison to men, the image of women traditionally was that they were mentally and physically weak. Through this idea women were seen as not being capable of taking part in heavy responsibilities in the same way as men. The main responsibilities of women were within a household, as wives and mothers. Moreover, it was very common as part of these traditional values to use religion as a tool to legitimise the women's position. For instance, it was not unusual to hear some people state the position of women according to one of the Hadith, "Women are lacking in mind and religion".

8.2.1.2 Women are beautiful, soft, and temperamental

According to this view women should be inculcated from childhood with an interest in beauty: to be beautiful and have beautiful clothes and jewellery. In his account of these views in traditional societies Attir mentioned that

> a woman aspires to possess beautiful clothes and jewellery. The quantity and quality of both are related to her family status. At the time of marriage, traditionally it is the husband's responsibility to present his bride with jewellery and expensive clothes, the exact amount of which is specified by the bride's parents or guardians. Women must wear their jewellery and expensive clothes on numerous occasions, and on some of these a woman from a well-to-do family may wear as much as two or three pounds of gold.[3]

Traditionally, women were considered temperamental and sensitive. Consequently, women were not deemed to be able to carry the responsibility of leadership or be involved in any decision-making, and were therefore excluded from leadership positions. Even in the tribal structure women never were leaders of tribes. The tribal structure was and still is dominated by males.

8.2.1.3 Women are sex symbols and a source of shame

Women traditionally were seen as a source of shame. The concept of honour was and still is linked with women. The honour of the men of the family, easily damaged and nearly irreparable when damaged, depended on the conduct of their women (wives, sisters and daughters).[4] Therefore, women were to be carefully protected. As children, girls played only with other females and attended all-female schools. Culturally, women married much younger than men. Females married in their early teens: the girl's parents were eager for her to marry at the earliest possible age in order to forestall any mishap to her virginity.[5] These protection procedures traditionally affected the right to travel, as females could only travel with a male member of the family. Attir states that to leave the country,

> a female citizen had to apply for an exit visa and include a letter from her father or her husband stating his approval of the trip. This letter was necessary even if the female was travelling with her father or husband.[6]

8.2.1.4 A Woman's place is at home, and housework is a woman's job

Traditionally, the division between women's and men's roles was very clear and fixed. The best place for women according to this view was at home, to practice their duties as wives and mothers away from any significant role outside the home. Housework was a women's job, it was a part of their duties. The place of men was outside the home and that of women was inside. It was shameful for men to work at home and to do domestic work like cooking, cleaning, and taking care of the children. As Lorfing and J. Abu Nasr state:

> The traditional role of women was confined to their being mothers and wives in a patriarchal family system. Their sphere of action is limited to their home; they are expected to be modest, obedient, and self-effacing. The persistence of these traditional values and attitudes among people of both sexes keeps women within the walls of their domestic world, a situation that is incompatible with the demands of economic participation.[7]

Until recent years, the traditional views about the role of women at home were emphasised through school curricula in Libya. Reading textbooks indicated the division of roles between men and women. These books introduced the women's role mainly as that of mother through her duty at home, which involved cooking, cleaning and taking care of children. Even as late as 1986, the ninth-grade books still were repeating the traditional views, as can be seen from this example:

> this is my father, my father goes to work, this is my mother, my mother is working at home... ʿAi'sha at home, ʿAi'sha is an active mother, she works at home, ʿAi'sha cleaning the house, cooking the food and washing the clothes.[8]

The school curricula were permeated with the traditional image of women as housewives, but the men were displayed as having different responsibili*ties usually outside the home.*

8.2.1.5 It is shameful for women to remain unmarried

Culturally, women were under greater pressure than men to get married. Within society it was acceptable to be an unmarried man, while it was almost shameful for a woman to remain unmarried.[9] This was one of the main factors behind the increasing number of unmarried men compared to unmarried women.

The common view within society was that the right place for women was in their homes with their husbands and children. Marriage was seen as providing security and a guarantee for a woman's future.

8.2.2 Ideology and policies of the Libyan regime towards women

The ideology and policies of the Libyan regime need to be examined within the context of policies pursued by the monarchical regime before 1969. The latter are covered in 8.2.2.1 below, before proceeding to the post-1969 policies in 8.2.2.2.

8.2.2.1 Policies of the monarchical regime before 1969

The increasing numbers of schools during this period for both sexes followed the introduction of a law making education compulsory at elementary level for all children, either male or female. This encouraged parents to send their children to schools, with females gaining much from such policies, although their numbers in the education system lagged behind those of males, especially during the 1950s and 1960s. This was partially due to the early marriage of females.

In this period, the involvement of women in the labour force was quite limited, except for farming. Although government regulations did not discriminate against women in salaried employment, women were neither qualified nor skilled for such positions. As a result, as Attir states,

> Women were only eligible for those jobs requiring little or no training and that could be performed in segregated quarters. Thus, women tended to occupy positions such as housemaids or office janitors.[10]

During the 1950s and 1960s, women were affected by a number of regulations and laws which had been introduced to organise family life. For instance, women were given the right to choose their husbands from the age of sixteen and the right to seek divorce in the same way as men. Women also received the right to participate in politics through their right to vote, the right to buy and sell property, and the right to establish their own associations, which were beginning to be formed in the main urban centres.[11]

Although all these rights were given to women in principle, in practice they existed only on paper. Only a few women gained from these rights. Women were still not participating in daily activities in the same way as men.

8.2.2.2 The ideology and policies of the revolutionary regime since 1969

During the 1970s, the revolutionary regime carried through a number of policies which aimed at changing the character of Libyan society. The regime's policies sought to enable women to play a crucial role in society, and to participate in building the country in the same way as men. However, the ideology of the regime at the same time emphasised the physical and biological differences between male and female.[12] There was a role for each to play, matching their different natures. Through *The Green Book*, the ideology also paid attention to the family as a social unit;[13] the role of women as mothers was highly respected. The woman was supposed to be fully responsible for raising her children. This notion was emphasised by al-Qadhafi when he stated that

> Nothing else would be appropriate for mankind's [sic] nature, and would suit his dignity, except natural motherhood, (that is, the child is raised by his mother) in a family where the true principles of motherhood, fatherhood and brotherhood prevail.[14]

In principle, the ideology of the regime did not reject women working, but limited them to fields which "suited" them and their nature. In *The Green Book* al-Qadhafi argues that

> The question is not whether the woman works or does not work. For it is a ridiculous materialistic presentation. Work should be provided by the society to all able members—men and women—who need work, but on condition that each individual should work in the field that suits him, and not be forced to carry out unsuitable work.[15]

One of the main successes of the revolutionary regime was with women's educational policy. By law education is compulsory, and women must attend schools until the intermediate level. As a consequence, the number of schools for women increased all over the country after 1969. The increasing level of education among women during the 1970s affected many other aspects of their traditional life. This was visible in the widespread 'unveiling' among women,

especially in urban areas; and in the increasing number of females participating in shopping and driving, and travelling without a male companion.

Women have been encouraged to participate actively in political life within the framework of the political system of the regime (that is, People's Committees and the Basic People's Congresses). They have also been encouraged to form their own Revolutionary Committees which work within the framework of the Revolutionary Committees in general, with the special aim of strengthening female political and administrative roles.[16]

From the beginning of the 1980s, a number of new ideas and policies were introduced by the regime to encourage women to take a more prominent place within the society. First, all Libyan males and females were to undertake and have continuous military training if medically able.[17] Article 3 of Law No. 3 stated that military science was one of the main topics which students should study at all levels above primary level. Both male and female students above primary level were required to wear a standard military uniform and attend daily military exercise, though in the past few years this was reduced to one day a week. At university level, students had to attend training camps, but they were not required to wear military uniforms when attending classes. Since 1990, university students have not received any military training during their studies but they have to do military service after their graduation for at least a year, except for those who were successful in their military training under Law No. 3 regarding the People's Army.

Second, women were encouraged to attend the Women's Military Academy (WMA), which was established in 1979. Graduates of this academy have been promoted to the rank of lieutenant.[18]

Third, Law No. 176 of 1972 regarding women's rights in marriage and divorce was annulled and replaced by Law No. 10 in 1984, issued by the General People's Congress after the Basic People's Congresses agreed upon it. But because many women were absent from the BPC, despite encouragement by the regime, the law showed the effect of having been shaped by male members of the BPCs who were opposed to any major change in women's position. Finally, some articles of the law were reformed by Law No. 22 of 1991. The purpose of these changes in the law of marriage and divorce was to give women a better position and stronger rights within marriage. According to Article 13 of Law No. 22, a man is no longer allowed to take a second wife without the permission of his first wife or through the issue of a permit from a court.[19]

Fourth, women were encouraged from the beginning of the 1990s to participate in the judicial system. Women had not previously been accepted as judges for cultural reasons. Law No. 8 of 1989 gave women the right to hold judicial jobs, under the same conditions as men. The jobs included those of judges, public prosecutors, and case administrators.[20] Thereafter the first women were appointed to these positions.

Fifth, women were encouraged in this period to hold positions in the political system. A number of women were elected to participate in the Secretariat of the General People's Congress and the General People's Committee Secretariat. But still women and their participation in politics and political affairs was limited compared to their roles in other activities.

Finally, the regime introduced a number of organisations and concepts which were intended to promote the role of the "new woman". The main ones were those of the Women's Revolutionary Committees; the Female Guards; and the Revolutionary Nuns.

a) **Women's Revolutionary Committees** (*al-lijan al-thawrya al-nisa'iya).* Women were encouraged to form these committees at schools, places of work, and in the communities at large. The duties of women's Revolutionary Committees were the same as those of the Revolutionary Committees in general (mentioned in Chapter 7): to develop a core of believers in al-Qadhafi's Third World Theory (*The Green Book*). The Women's Revolutionary Committees in the late 1980s were encouraged by al-Qadhafi to organise the Festival of Women's Freedom. In order to prepare for this festival, Women's Revolutionary Committees studied the position of women and their problems in courts, at work, at home and in every place where women were humiliated or subjugated. The twentieth anniversary of the revolution was the day of the Festival of Women's Freedom (1 September 1989). The reason behind this festival was to encourage women to fight and obtain full rights and to create better positions for women within society.

b) **The Female Guards**: These form part of the Green Revolutionary Guards (*al-haras al-thawri al-akhdar),* which include both males and females. Members of the Revolutionary Guards tend to be members of the Revolutionary Committees. The Female Guards come from all strata of society and have different professional backgrounds and ages and come from all areas of Libya. All are volunteers and unpaid.

They uphold the principles of the revolution and the Third Universal Theory and *The Green Book*. Their aim is to protect the revolution and its leader, al-Qadhafi.[21]

c) **The Revolutionary Nuns**: The idea of revolutionary nuns (*al-rahibat al-thawriyat)* was introduced by al-Qadhafi in February 1981 when he addressed a group of women's Revolutionary Committees. He explained his objectives as follows: "this idea did exist before Islam and Christianity, before the Roman Empire ...A certain number of people have felt a strong need to stop their life to serve what is sacred for the nation, what is necessary for their civilisation, their beliefs, their lives themselves. These people stop everything to serve an ideal; God, Christ, the sacred fire, or any other target."[22] Al-Qadhafi stated that Revolutionary Nuns must be totally devoted to the revolution, they must be ready to sacrifice their lives, they must give up any personal private life and marriage, to put an end to reaction, Zionism, the Crusades, divisions, and to push forward socialism, progress and Arab unity. The movement should be capable of stopping the regression of the Arab nation.[23] Al-Qadhafi asked for only 5 percent of females to be part of this movement. He justified the reason for being single as: "marriage places responsibilities on other people, it leads to successive problems. What value does (traditional) marriage have today? in the end you study for a diploma to, give yourself to a nobody, who only sees in you a maid, a cook, and a breeding-machine, and who disclaims you for a 'yes' or 'no' without regard for your university diploma".[24]

These organisations and concepts have brought some Libyan women into the elite. But the notions have not been popular among women at the grassroots nor among the vast majority of Libyans in general. Especially the idea of Revolutionary Nuns has been regarded by the people as an anti-Islamic idea and therefore neither acceptable nor natural.

In the mid-1980s, the activities of the Islamists in Libya became more visible. Although the regime adopted different policies to control them, Islamists increased—especially among the younger generation, including women. This has affected the attitudes of the new generation of women who were brought up in the revolutionary ideology and inculcated with its values. The use of the veil (*al-hijab*) is widespread nowadays, especially among female university students. This has increased in the 1990s. Al-Qadhafi in many of his speeches has attacked the veil and emphasised that women should protect themselves by education, and that they should have a strong self-identity and confidence in their ability to perform many tasks that were traditionally reserved for men.

Even when the regime introduced its ideology and policies towards women, still women did not accept full responsibility within society. Their role was still a limited one compared to the regime's policies. The traditional culture factor still plays a crucial role in stopping women from being active members of Libyan society.

8.2.3 The image of women through a content analysis of school curricula

In this part the researcher will examine the changes which have occurred through the textbooks prescribed by the school curricula. The analysis of the values towards women in these books will be taken as evidence of the views and attitudes which the regime tries to inculcate in the new generation of Libyan citizens. The aim is to understand the nature of the values which are conveyed.

The researcher assumes that the content of the school textbooks—reading books of *marhalat al-taʿlim al-'asasi* [the primary and preparatory schools]—reflects the image of Arab women and their roles in political, economic and social fields which the regime has wanted to inculcate in school children.

Readers of the first grade up to and including, the ninth grade will be examined and analysed. Readers are used in all grades in the Libyan school system, from first grade until the final year (before university), both in humanities and sciences. These books are part of the Arabic language textbooks and they have different subjects including general knowledge, history, literature, stories. These topics vary from year to year, and with the grade.

Content analysis, as described by El-Mogherbi, is a systematic way of collecting and sorting information acquired from written or spoken communications. Systematic content analysis attempts to analyse material so as to demonstrate objectively the nature and strength of the stimuli applied to the reader or listener.[25]

The three main analysis units for any communication are words, themes, and space/time. This study will adopt themes as the unit of analysis. Themes refer to any proposition contained in the communication and can be found in clauses, sentences, paragraphs, or entire stories. It is important to specify whether the mentioning of a theme is substantial (that is, found in a paragraph or an entire story) or minor (that is, found in a phrase or sentence). The former will be identified as a major theme, and the latter as a sub-theme. Major themes, then, occur when

women constitute the central element in the topic treated, while sub-themes occur when the central topic is on a different matter.

The study is based on a sample of one book from each year [first grade to ninth grade], chosen from *kutub al-qira'a al-madrasiya*. The analysis here is based on the latest copies of these books which witnessed a clear change in the form and the content, in which there is more emphasis on the ideology of the regime. The teaching of these books started in the academic year 1987-1988 in Libya.

Through content analysis a number of themes and categories of values with respect to women have been identified. These themes are the following:

1) Women and education
2) Women at work and production
3) Women and armed training
4) Women and fighting (traditional)
5) Women and authority
6) Islam and women
7) Female virtues
8) Women as mothers and wives
9) Characteristics of Arab women

A statistical frequency analysis of these themes, by major and sub-themes, can be seen in Table 8.1. This is further broken down into each grade in Table 8.2.

8.2.3.1 Women and education

This was one of the main themes in the reading books, describing education as an important natural right for women, equal to that of men. Moreover, the books emphasised the significance of education for women from childhood. One of the topics of the first grade reading-book reflects this. "Widad goes to school, Widad sits on the chair. In Widad's hand is

a pencil. Widad reads, writes and draws."[26] In a ninth grade reading-book, under the title "To my daughter", one reads:

> To my daughter: today you go to school. I do not how much time you will spend on this through the years of your life, but I know that you will gain from science and knowledge as much as you can, because you carry in yourself an ambition, and a strong desire to have more knowledge and to be armed with science.[27]

Table 8.1: General distribution of frequencies of themes about women by major themes and sub-themes

Themes	Major themes	[%]	Sub-themes	[%]	Total	[%]
Women and Education	4	10.5	8	17.4	12	14.3
Women at Work and Production	6	15.7	11	23.9	17	20.2
Women and Armed Training	5	13.2	5	10.9	10	11.9
Women and fighting (traditional)	6	15.7	4	8.7	10	11.9
Women and Authority	0	0.0	2	4.3	2	2.5
Islam and Women	5	13.2	4	8.7	9	10.7
Female Virtues	1	2.6	0	0.0	1	1.1
Women as Mothers and Wives	9	23.6	12	26.1	21	25.0
Characteristics of Arab Women	2	5.2	0	0.0	2	2.4
Total	38	100	46	100	84	100

Source: Amal Suleiman. M. Obeidi, "The Political Socialisation of Arab Women: Influence of the School Curriculum", unpublished paper, Conference on Women in the Arab Society, October 1988, Benghazi, Libya.

As shown in Table 8.1, the total frequencies of the category "women and education and its significance" in all grades was 12 themes, 4 of which were major themes and 8 were sub-themes. The total percentage of this theme was 14.3 percent, (10.5 percent major themes and 17.4 percent of sub-themes). As can be seen in Table 8.2, this theme was not systematically

distributed between all the grades, but appeared only in the first, third, eighth and ninth grades.

Table 8.2: Distribution of themes about women in reading books by grade level (Gr.)

Themes	Gr. 1	Gr. 2	Gr. 3	Gr. 4	Gr. 5	Gr. 6	Gr. 7	Gr. 8	Gr. 9	T
Women and Education	**4**	**0**	**6**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**12**
• Major themes	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	4
• Sub-themes	2	0	5	0	0	0	0	1	0	8
Women at Work	**1**	**9**	**3**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**17**
• Major themes	1	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	6
• Sub-themes	0	5	3	1	1	0	1	0	0	11
Women and Armed Training (Traditional)	**0**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**10**
• Major themes	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	10
• Sub themes	0	1	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	5
Women and Fighting	**0**	**0**	**2**	**2**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**10**
• Major themes	0	0	0	2	0	1	1	1	1	6
• Sub themes	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	4
Women and authority	**0**	**0**	**0**	**2**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**2**
• Major themes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
• Sub themes	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
Islam and Women	**3**	**2**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**9**
• Major themes	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	5
• Sub themes	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
Female Virtues	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**
• Major themes	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
• Sub themes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Women Mothers and Wives	**4**	**3**	**3**	**3**	**3**	**3**	**0**	**0**	**2**	**21**
• Major themes	0	3	1	0	2	2	0	0	1	9
• Sub themes	4	0	2	3	1	1	0	0	1	12
Characteristics of Arab women	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**2**
• Major themes	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2
• Sub themes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Gr.: Grade level (grades 1 up to 9) **T: total**

Source: Amal Suleiman M Obeidi, "The Political Socialisation of Arab Women: Influence of the School Curriculum", unpublished paper, Conference on Women in the Arab Society, October 1988, Benghazi, Libya.

8.2.3.2 Women at work and production

This theme stresses the importance of women as part of the labour force. In the reading book of the second grade, under the title "My Productive Family", one reads:

> My father is working at the shoes factory, he makes the shoes. My mother is a teacher, my mother is teaching at school. My mother is teaching reading and writing. My sister is working at the clothes factory. My sister makes the clothes.[28]

As shown in Table 8.1, the total frequency of this idea was 20.2 percent, 15.7 percent of major themes and 23.9 percent of sub-themes. The idea of women at work and production was distributed among most of the grades, except the sixth and eighth grades, as shown in Table 8.2. The highest frequency of this idea was in the second grade: 4 major themes and 5 sub-themes.

8.2.3.3 Women and armed training

In this category the reading books reflect one of the main policies which the regime seeks to achieve: encouraging women to have the same role as men in the army and to be trained. This theme is based on a common idea in the regime's ideology, namely that the defence of the homeland is the responsibility of every citizen, male and female. In the reading book of the second grade, for instance, one reads:

> The Jamahiriyan society, "the society of the masses", believes that Arab women have the right to defend their homeland, also one of its aims is to establish the army of the people, in which authority, wealth and arms are in their hands.[29]

In the same book, women's military training is related to the needs of the country:

> The Jamahiriyan society believes that the defence of the country is the responsibility of all the citizens, men and women. Therefore, the society has established a women's military academy which provides military training for Arab women...[30]

Throughout the reading books, the regime has clearly tried to emphasise the need for women to be in the army, seeking to inculcate this idea in the younger generation.

As shown in Table 8.1, 11.9 percent was the total percentage related to this idea (13.2 percent of major themes and 10.9 percent of sub themes). Moreover, this idea has been introduced in all of the grades except the first.

8.2.3.4 Women and fighting (traditional)

This idea has strong links with the previous idea, which was women at arms. Women and fighting is an idea reflected through number of stories. The participation of Arab women in *jihad* battles [Holy war] was the main form of this idea, both historically and in recent times. The books tell stories of Arab women who participated in battle and were as fit to do this as men. As an example, in the fifth and sixth grades one finds the stories of *Umm Myisara* and *Khaula bint al-Azwar*, famous historical figures who served in the Muslim army in the early stages of the Islamic state. The reading books also reflect the courage of Arab women in recent times. The fourth grade reader presented the story of *Sana'a Muhaydli*, a Lebanese lady who attacked Israeli soldiers in the South of Lebanon during the Israeli invasion in 1982.

The incidence of this idea as shown in Table 8.1 was 11.9 percent (15.7 percent of major themes and 8.7 percent of sub-themes). Looking at Table 8.2, this idea was presented in most of the grade levels, except for the first and second grades.

8.2.3.5 Women and authority

This theme covers the role of women in authority and their right to take part in political decision-making through the political structure based on the Basic Popular Congresses and Popular Committees. Surprisingly, although the regime's ideology encourages women's involvement in political decisions, the reading books include very few examples of this theme. (2.5 percent). It is only found in the fourth grade and then merely as a sub-theme.

8.2.3.6 Islam and women

The theme reflects the attitude of Islam towards women, with a comparison between the situation of women before and after Islam. The reading books present this as Islam having given women the same rights as men. These rights include the practise of their religion, the right to education, the right to work and the right to defend their countries. They also focus on the role of Muslim women in recent times, through their participation in society. This theme was found among most of the grades except the third, sixth and ninth grade. As shown in Table 8.1, the total percentage of this theme in the reading books was 10.7 (13.2 percent of major themes and 8.7 percent of sub-themes).

8.2.3.7 Female virtues

The reading books pointed out that many of the most important elements in the universe are signified by female terms in Arabic, such as those for the sun and the earth. Through these examples it is suggested that school children should appreciate the role of females in general. This was mentioned in the context of the role of mothers and their duties towards children. As Table 8.2 indicates, this idea was mentioned only in the sixth grade as a major theme.

8.2.3.8 Women as mothers and wives

One of the major ideas in the reading books was the role of women as mothers and wives, through painting a positive picture of bringing up children and caring for them. Many stories showed that women as wives and mothers, were still able to participate in many duties within society. They showed women who are working, and also socialising their children. Mothers were portrayed as brave, not crying for their children lost in battles in defence of their country. In the sixth-grade reader one can read about a mother addressing her daughter, "oh daughter, the Arab mother has no son but has a homeland". In the same book on another topic one can read: "As every Arab woman, you should believe in the slogan 'you do not have a son, but you have a homeland."[31]

The books portray women as productive mothers and wives, according to the ideal "Jamahiryan society family, the productive family". This term, according to the ideology of the regime, indicates a family where members are working and receiving military training. Some of the historical stories about women's role as wives were also presented. One of these stories was the story of the first wife of prophet Mohammed, Khadija Bint Khowaild. As a historical figure married to Mohammed, she helped and supported him, providing assistance and encouragement at the time when he was trying to spread Islam.

As Table 8.1 indicates, this theme amounted to 25 percent (total), with 23.6 percent of major themes and 26.1 percent of sub-themes. It had the highest theme frequency for the majority of grades, the exception being the seventh and eighth grades. The total frequencies of this theme was 21, 9 were major themes and 12 were sub-themes, as shown in Table 8.2.

8.2.3.9 Characteristics of Arab women

This theme links up directly with the previous ones, dealing with the main characteristics of Arab women. The readers portrayed women in a positive light, as being brave, hard working, clever, sacrificing, etc.

As shown in Table 8.1, this theme covered about 2.4 percent of the total themes (5.2 percent of major themes, with no sub-themes). The idea was emphasised in the reading books of the sixth and seventh grades.

To conclude, the most common single idea among these themes was the traditional role of women as mothers and wives. This idea reflects part of the state ideology, especially that found in *The Green Book,* about the natural role of women as mothers. However, while this theme only accounted for 25 percent of the theme frequencies, it must be pointed out that the other official policies of the regime towards women, were given substantially less stress.

This lack of focus might be explained in that there were other important themes which the *Lijan tathwir al-manahij* [Committees to Revolutionise the Curricula] emphasised more like the political and economic achievements of the revolution. Another possible explanation is that the regime prioritised "practical" programmes to involve women more in politics etc. (for example Basic Popular Congresses and judicial system) rather than setting about to indirectly change the population's views on women's roles.

Also, the regime and the *Lijan tathwir al-manahij* [Committees to Revolutionise the Curricula] never investigated the success of inculcation of ideas into the younger generations. They may in fact have been unaware that instead of their views on women, the traditional views (women as housewives) have remained quantitatively dominant in the school books.

8.2.4 Statistical information on the role of women in Libyan society

Before proceeding to a discussion of the findings of the survey, it is useful to include some contextual material describing the place of women in Libyan society. This information is based on United Nations publications and official Libyan material, including the census of 1984.

The United Nations World Population Prospects in 1992 estimated that the Libyan population in 1995 would be 5,475,000. Of this it was estimated that females would number 2,624,000 and males would number 2,852,000.[32] The percentage of women aged between 15 and 49 in

1995 was estimated 44.3 percent. Generally, the sex ratio for the whole country was 104 males to 100 females. In 1984, according to the official census held in the Municipality of Benghazi, the sex ratio varies from one place to another, increasing in urban areas such as Tripoli and Benghazi, to 106 males to 100 females. This surplus of males is characteristic of societies with good health care and a young population.

The revolutionary regime since 1969 tried to encourage women to take a more active role in society. In the early days of the revolution, al-Qadhafi announced in one of his speeches (delivered at El-Fatih university in Tripoli) that "women are half of the society. They play a very important role in the life of a society and in the process of revolutionary development."[33] As a result, the opportunities for Libyan women have increased considerably over the last two decades. In the field of education, for example, one of the revolution's most impressive achievements is the rate at which access to education for females has advanced at all levels as can be seen from Table 8.3 which presents the development of female education during the period 1969/70 and 1987/88.

Table 8.3: Development of female education in Libya, 1969/70 and 1987/88

Levels of Education	1969/1970 Females	1987/1988 Females
Elementary Schools	107047	39,2700
Preparatory Schools	5707	132,500
Secondary Schools	1071	54,000
Vocational Schools	—	5,600
Religious Education	—	200
Teacher training	1676	20,000
University and higher education	410	10,800
Total	115911	615800

Source: General People's Secretariat of Planning, Social and Economical Achievements during 19 years of al-Fatih Revolution, January 1989, p. 37.

United Nations sources show that, in 1990, the number of females in education came to about 445,000 students at the first level (elementary), 232,000 at the second level (preparatory and secondary), 196,000 students in the general and 11,000 at the third level (higher education). However, the UN figures underestimate the rate of women's participation in the Libyan education system. This is partly due to the Libyan side not providing the UN with up-to-date

information and to the rapid increase in students numbers, especially the number of female students.

Women have played a minimal role in the economically active population, more as a result of cultural conditioning than of a natural aversion on their part. In the 1973 census, females were not numerous in the work force and constituted just 7 percent of the economically active population. However, increasing opportunities for women to be educated encouraged greater, though still limited participation in the labour force. In 1994 females constituted 10 percent of the total labour force in Libya.[34]

It is worth noting that the absence of reliable updated statistical information about Libyan women in the labour force, either in the urban or the rural sectors, hinders a proper understanding of the role of women in Libyan society, and of the changes over the last decade. UN sources[35] show that, between 1982 and 1991, the number of women in the Libyan labour force increased from 64,000 to 109,000 (from 7.6 percent to 9.3 percent). The largest absolute shift was in service occupations, where the numbers increased from 32,000 to 60,000 (7.0 percent to 8.9 percent). Whereas female employment has increased in agriculture, male employment has declined. Women now form more than 24 percent of the agricultural labour force. However, this is not a relevant sector for the university students. It is clear from observation and press coverage that educated women have entered into a variety of professional occupations from which they were previously excluded. The most notable example is the judiciary, which is a radical development in an Islamic society.

Available UN and World Bank data[36] indicate that Libya continues to have a very high 'Total Fertility Rate' (the number of children a woman will bear during her lifetime, given prevailing age-specific fertility rates), amounting to 6.7 for the years 1990-95. Conventional wisdom asserts that once women complete secondary education, this level drops dramatically. Again observation of contemporaries suggests that this is true for educated women in Libya.

8.3 Exploration of Attitudes Towards Role of Women: Data Analyses and Findings

The aim of this section is to explore attitudes of the samples' respondents towards the role of women in society, based on the following questions:

a) Men and women have equal human rights. Do you agree?

b) Do you think that, within a family, the father should have more authority than the mother? If yes, are your reasons for this based on: religion, social values and customs and traditions, etc.?

c) Do you consider it acceptable for a woman to hold a job which involves authority over men?

d) Do you think it is important for women to participate in governmental and political affairs? This was followed by a second part. If not, why not? Are your reasons for this based on: religion, social values and customs and traditions, or family responsibilities?

e) There should be no discrimination between male and female in the right to education, work, freedom of thought, etc. Do you agree?

f) Do you think women should fight along side men in the army?

g) Do women currently possess adequate rights in Libya?

h) Women should have the same right as men to marry other Arabs or non-Libyan Muslims. Do you agree? If you disagree, why?

i) Do you think it is important for women and men to avoid exaggeration in the cost of marriage? If not, why not?

The aim of these questions was to find out what the attitudes are among the new generation (university students) towards the gender question. The methods of analysis included frequency counts and cross tabulations for categorical variables. The first examination of the attitudes of respondents towards gender or the role of women in society covered equality in human rights between men and women.

8.3.1 Attitudes towards equality in human rights between men and women

The exploration of the attitudes towards the gender question among the respondents of this study was based on two main questions. The first question involved asking the respondents whether they accept that women have equal human rights to men. The second question is a control question which deals with the same idea as that in the first question, but in a more specific context. The respondents were asked whether there should be discrimination between males and females in the right to education, work, freedom of thought, etc.

The response to the first question shows that the majority of respondents either strongly agree or agree with equality in human rights between males and females. Only a minority disagree or strongly disagree. Figure 8.1 indicates that 36 percent of respondents strongly agree with equality in human rights and 43 percent agree, while 10 percent disagree and 10 percent strongly disagree.

Figure 8.1: Attitudes towards equality in human rights between men and women: total sample



When respondents were asked whether there should be no discrimination between male and female in the right to education, work and freedom of thought, etc., the vast majority of respondents agreed there should be no discrimination. As Table 8.4 indicates, those who strongly agree cover 50 percent of respondents, 35 percent agree that there should be no discrimination, while only 7 percent disagree and 8 percent strongly disagree.

Table 8.4: Attitudes toward discrimination between male and female: total sample

Categories	Number of respondents	[%]
Strongly agree	250	50
Agree	174	35
Disagree	36	7
Strongly Disagree	39	8

Source: Field survey 1994

Table 8.5 shows the attitudes of respondents towards equality in human rights between male and female by gender. There is a difference between men and women in their attitudes towards this question. The result is statistically significant, with women as more positive (87 percent) on the human rights question than men (74 percent), but men were generally positive on the issue.

Table 8.5: Attitudes of respondents towards the equality of human rights between male and female

Categories	Male [%]	Female [%]
Percent positive	74	87
Number of Respondents	260	238

Source: Field survey 1994

Figure 8.2 indicates the attitudes of respondents towards discrimination between men and women in education, work, etc. There is a tendency to positive attitudes among the males towards this issue, although women have stronger positive attitudes than men.

Figure 8.2: Attitudes of respondents towards the proposition that there should be no discrimination between male and female



Figure 8.3 indicates attitudes towards gender equality in human rights by place of family residence (urban/rural), divided between male and female. It seems that there are no great differences between urban and rural males in their attitudes on this question. The same applies to urban and rural females, although the number of rural female respondents is low therefore weakening the basis for generalisation.

Figure 8.3: Men and women have equal human rights, by place of family residence, male and female



The educational background of the respondents' fathers did not make any significant difference in respondents' attitudes towards gender equality in human rights. Neither was there any significant difference among male students according to the level of education of their mothers. However, for female students mother's the educational level was associated with some difference in their attitudes towards this question. Moreover, this did not correlate simply with level of education (that is, the higher education the mother has, the more in favour of women's rights), but rather a complex pattern emerged instead. See Table 8.6.

Table 8.6: Equality in human rights by mother's education (female respondents only)

Mother's education	Number of respondents	Strongly agree [%]	Agree [%]	Disagree [%]	Strongly disagree [%]
Illiterate	100	42	46	7	5
Read Only	13	46	46	0	8
Read & Write	17	59	29	0	12
Primary	29	38	52	7	3
Preparatory	33	27	49	15	9
Secondary	18	39	33	17	11
Intermediate	15	47	53	0	0
University and over	13	77	15	0	8

Source: Field survey 1994

Table 8.6 shows that among those respondents whose mothers' educational level is a university one, 77 percent strongly agree about equality in human rights although the number of respondents is only 13. Among those whose mothers are not or are hardly educated, for instance those whose mothers are illiterate, there is strong agreement about the equality on human rights between male and female. One can explain this situation by the fact that these respondents represent the first generation to gain university education and differ from their mothers who did not have any opportunity for education for various reasons such as early marriage.

Examining the attitude to equality in human rights between men and women by fathers' occupations of both sexes of the respondents does not show any statistical significance. Also there was no significant difference by family income.

Table 8.7 and Table 8.8 show the attitudes of respondents towards equality in human rights between the two sexes by sources of identification. There were some differences among male respondents which are interesting. Those males with Arab, city, state and family identification were clearly more favourable to female equality than those with tribal or Islamic identification.

Table 8.7: Equality in human rights by sources of identification (male only)

Sources of identification	Number of respondents	Strongly agree [%]	Agree [%]	Disagree [%]	Strongly disagree [%]
Family	50	32	48	12	8
Tribe	21	24	43	10	24
City	24	46	38	4	13
State	17	29	53	12	6
Islam	97	24	41	17	18
Arab	49	37	37	14	10

Source: Field survey 1994

Table 8.8 indicates the attitudes of female respondents towards equality in human rights by sources of identification. The interesting thing about this table is that it does show a slight difference from male attitudes.

Table 8.8: Equality in human rights by sources of identification (females only)

Sources of identification	Number of respondents	Strongly agree [%]	Agree [%]	Disagree [%]	Strongly disagree [%]
Family	33	33	49	12	6
Tribe	8	62	38	0	0
City	25	44	44	8	4
State	18	17	61	17	5
Islam	85	46	47	2	5
Arab	67	46	36	8	10

Source: Field survey 1994

Those female respondents who identify themselves by Islam have much stronger positive attitudes towards gender equality in human rights than do men with the same identification (Islam). The explanation for such a difference might relate to the understanding of female Islamists about the principles of Islam as a religion, which is seen as based on giving rights for women as well as men, while male respondents were dominated by cultural myths about women and their role within the society. Likewise, women for whom tribe was the first source of identification were strongly in favour of women's rights, whereas men with this first source of identification were less favourable. Not much can be made of this, given the small number

of women with a 'tribal' identification, but the finding reflects the paramount status of gender for women overall. The researcher wonders what rank women would have given to gender as a source of identity if this had been asked of them.

In general, the female respondents seem very much oriented towards equality between the two sexes. However, male respondents do not seem to have strong traditional attitudes towards this question, with the vast majority having no problem accepting the principle of equality in human rights. The most interesting difference was that noted between the Islamist respondents, with female Islamists having stronger positive attitudes towards this question than male Islamists.

8.3.2 Attitudes towards the role of men and women within the family

The purpose of this part is to deal with the attitudes of respondents towards the role of men and women within the family. The main question in this part involved asking the respondents whether the father should have more authority than the mother within the family. This question was followed by a second, asking about the reasons behind their views.

As can be seen from Table 8.9, more than half of respondents (63 percent) answered 'yes', with 36 percent saying 'no'.

Table 8.9: Attitude of respondents towards father's authority

Categories	Number of respondents	Percentage [%]
Yes	316	63
No	181	36

Source: Field survey 1994

The respondents who replied 'yes' gave various reasons for favouring the authority of the father rather than the mother within the family. For 55 percent it was religion, 46 percent said traditions, custom and social values, 9 percent said that the father was better equipped to deal with family matters, 3 percent said that there should only be one head of the family which was the father, 2 percent said that men have more capability than women, and 1 percent justified the fathers' authority as being due to the mind of man and his knowledge. Note that as respondents could give more than one reason these percentages sum to more than 100.

Figure 8.4 shows the attitudes of respondents towards the father's authority by gender. About three-quarters of male respondents (74 percent) favoured the authority of father rather than the mother. However, the female respondents were almost equally divided on this question, 51 percent answering 'yes' and 48 percent no. The differences were statistically significant.

Figure 8.4: Attitudes of respondents towards the father's authority by gender



The respondents' reasons for their positive answer towards the father's authority within the family can be seen in table Table 8.10.

Table 8.10: The reasons for favouring the father's authority

Categories of reasons	Male [%]	Female [%]
Religion	62	44
Traditions and customs	45	48
Father better equipped to deal with family	7	12
There should only one head of the family	2	4
The mind of man and his knowledge	2	0
Women are lacking in religion and mind	0	0
Biological and psychological reasons	0	0
Men have capability	0	6

Source: Field survey 1994 (zeros indicate that the rounded percentage came to this)

Table 8.10 shows the respondents' reasons for their positive answers towards the father's authority within the family. As shown in the table the main two reasons given were religion and traditions and customs.

Figure 8.5 indicates the attitudes of the respondents towards father's authority by place of family residence (urban—male/female and rural—male/female). There were some differences between urban and rural respondents. The urban respondents either male or female, seem less supportive of the father's authority than rural respondents.

Figure 8.5: Attitudes towards father's authority within the family by place of family residence



It is clear from the figure that female respondents, either urban or rural, gave less support to the father's authority within the family in comparison to male respondents. Educational background of the parents (mothers and fathers), father's occupation and family income did not show any differences among the respondents for this question.

Table 8.11 shows the attitudes of respondents towards the father's authority question by sources of identification (family, tribe, city, state, Islam and Arab). There were some significant differences between male and female respondents in their attitudes towards this question.

Table 8.11: Attitudes towards father's authority within family by sources of identification

Sources of identification	Number of male respondents	Yes male [%]	Number of female respondents	Yes female [%]
Family	50	80	33	52
Tribe	21	90	8	38
City	24	67	25	36
State	17	82	18	67
Muslim	97	76	85	53
Arab	49	61	67	55

Source: Field survey 1994

Among male respondents with all identities except Arab, and to a lesser extent city, were strongly supportive of the father's authority within the family. Among female respondents, those who identified themselves by state, family, Islam and Arabism were more supportive of the father's authority within the family.

8.3.3 Attitudes towards women holding jobs which involve authority over men

The main aim of this part is to explore the attitudes of respondents towards women at work, where women hold jobs which involve authority over men. Respondents were asked whether women should be employed in positions which give them authority over men.

The overall analysis of the respondents' attitudes shows that 45 percent of them accepted and 55 percent rejected the idea that women could hold a job involving authority over men. Figure 8.6 shows the attitudes of male and female respondents. Only 29 percent of male respondents answered 'yes', while 63 percent of female respondents said 'yes' to this idea. The result shows that female respondents have a much more positive attitude towards this question than male respondents.

Figure 8.6: Attitudes towards women holding job involving authority over men



Table 8.12 shows the attitudes of respondents (male and female) towards women holding jobs involving authority, by place of family residence (urban/rural). There are some differences between male and female on the one hand and between urban and rural on the other hand. 31 percent of urban males said 'yes', while 23 percent of rural males answered 'yes'. Among urban females 64 percent said 'yes' and 47 percent of rural females said 'yes'.

Table 8.12: Attitudes towards women holding job involving authority by place of family residence

Categories	Number of male respondents	Yes male [%]	Number of female respondents	Yes female [%]
Urban	209	31	219	64
Rural	53	23	19	47

Source: Field survey 1994

There is a significant difference among female respondents by place of family residence. It seems that urban females are willing to accept the idea of women holding jobs involving

authority over men more than rural females, although even for rural females 47 percent were in favour, that is, much more than the men.

The variables father's and mother's educational level, father's occupation and family income did not make any statistical significant differences in the respondents' attitudes towards this question. However, the variable by source of identification (family, tribe, city, state, Muslim and Arab) did. The strongest positive attitude among male respondents towards this question was among those who identified themselves with Islam or Arabism. As can be seen in Table 8.13, 31 percent of Islamists and 35 percent of Arabists supported the idea of women holding authority over men. Tribal identifiers were lowest.

Table 8.13: Attitudes towards women holding job involving authority by source of identification

Source of identification	Number of male respondents	Yes [%]	Number of female respondents	Yes [%]
Family	50	28	33	76
Tribe	21	19	8	50
City	24	21	25	76
State	17	25	18	56
Muslim	97	31	85	66
Arab	49	35	67	51

Source: Field survey 1994

The female respondents had a stronger positive attitude than the males, as can be seen among the Islamists at 66 percent and Arabism identities identifiers 51 percent. The percentage of positive attitudes towards this question among those who were family-oriented and state oriented were high, at 76 percent each. Even the women with a tribal identification (a small number) were 50 percent in favour.

8.3.4 Attitudes towards women participating in governmental and political affairs

The aim of this part is to explore the attitudes of the respondents towards the political participation of women in government and political affairs. The main question was asked to the respondents whether women should participate in governmental and political affairs. The general response reflected a positive attitude, with more than half answering 'yes' (54 percent).

Figure 8.7 shows the most important reasons why those respondents who gave negative answers did so. These reasons include religion, family responsibility, traditions and social values, and the views that women have no capability for dealing with politics, that politics is not women's business - and that women have other duties such as bringing up the children. 49 percent gave religion as a reason for their negative attitude, 43 percent mentioned family responsibility, 28 percent highlighted social values and traditions, and only 1 percent indicated that women had no capability to deal with the relevant problems. Not more than 1 percent believed that politics is not women's business, and 1 percent mentioned that women had other duties such as bringing up the children. It is worth mentioning that as more than one answer was possible, the figures do not add to 100 percent.

Figure 8.7: Reasons for a negative attitude among the respondents towards participating in politics and governmental affairs



Figure 8.8 shows the difference between male and female respondents towards women's participation in governmental and political affairs.

Figure 8.8: Attitudes of respondents towards women participating in governmental affairs



A general pattern was that female respondents have stronger positive attitudes towards this issue than male respondents.

The respondents, male and female, who rejected the idea that women should participate in governmental and political affairs gave a number of reasons for their negative attitudes. These different reasons can be seen in Table 8.14. Effectively, male students gave more emphasis to the religious factor (57 percent) and female students to family responsibilities (55 percent). However, it is surprising that 12 percent of the female respondent 'negatives' said 'women lack the capability', while only 4 percent male respondents said so.

Table 8.14: Reasons for rejecting women's participation in governmental and political affairs

Categories	Male [%]	Female [%]
Religion	57	29
Social values and traditions	28	28
Family responsibilities	38	55
Women lack of capability	4	12
Politics is not women's business	1	3
Women have many other duties	1	1
Country does not need women as politicians	1	1

Source: Field survey 1994

Table 8.15 shows the attitudes of respondents to the same question by place of family residence (urban and rural). The results indicated that urban female respondents and rural male respondents were more favourable to women participating in governmental and political affairs. 36 percent of urban male respondents said 'yes' to the idea, while 45 percent of rural male respondents said 'yes'.

Almost three quarters of urban females (74 percent) said 'yes' to the idea that women should participate in governmental and political affairs. Among rural female respondents, 47 percent of them supported the idea although the number of female rural among the respondents is very small in general.

Table 8.15: Attitudes of respondents towards women participating in governmental and political affairs by place of family residence

Categories	Number of male respondents	Yes [%]	Number of female respondents	Yes female [%]
Urban	208	36	215	74
Rural	53	45	19	47

Source: Field survey 1994

Examining the attitudes of respondents towards the idea that women should participate in government and political affairs by the respondents' parents' education did not show big differences. However, one interesting point was that female respondents whose mothers were illiterate had very strong positive attitudes towards participation compared to the other categories of mothers' education. Yet again we can see the effect of being "first generation" educated women.

A similar analysis of cross-tabulation by father's occupation did not reflect any significant differences.

Another cross-tabulation related the attitudes of the respondents towards the idea that women should participate in governmental and political affairs by family income. For male respondents the family income did not make any difference. However, among female respondents there were some differences. The strong positive attitudes among females were concentrated among those whose family income was between 200-300 Libyan dinars (73 percent) and 301-500 Libyan dinars (63 percent).

This issue was also examined by source of identification of the respondents (family, tribe, city, state, Muslim and Arab). The results show that the main differences between the two sexes towards this question was among the Islamists. Females who were Islam-oriented had a much stronger positive attitude (73 percent) towards women participating in governmental and political affairs than male Islamists (37 percent).

8.3.5 Attitudes towards women in the army

The establishment of the Women's Military Academy (WMA), on 2 February 1979, has increased the number of Libyan women involved in the army over the last decade. The idea that women should be involved in the army was based on the ideological vision of al-Qadhafi when he introduced the notion of 'people in arms', which is distinctive from that of a professional army.

In May 1978 a new law announced compulsory military training. This was justified by al-Qadhafi, who stated that as soon as the state of the 'people in arms' is achieved, the law establishing compulsory military service would be abolished.[37] Since then a militarisation of Libyan society has been implemented, affecting all sections of the population. Under the law, the following measures were taken:[38]

a) In the second cycle of school studies (15 to 18 years), the pupils — girls and boys — received training twice a week, relating in particular to fist fighting.

b) The pupils of the military secondary schools learned, under the aegis of professional officers, how to use heavy weapons. Moreover, each school had a speciality connected to a particular area (land defence, air defence etc.). Its pupils were prepared to serve as assistants to specialists in these weapons.

c) All the men, depending on their ages, were compelled to have repetitive periods of training:

- between 18 and 45, they had to take part in general training each year, for quite a long period (some weeks);
- from 45 to 55, they were trained for the specific tasks of popular resistance;
- some of those over 55 were to take part in *kata'ib al-mujahidin* [warrior corps], operating, for example, as coast guards (some of whom remained permanently armed).

d) As for women, married or single, volunteers for military training were called to exercises several times a week in a school in their area.

In theory, the capacity of the Women's Military Academy is 1,000 students, but this number has never been reached to date. Recent figures about the numbers of the students in the WMA are not available, but Maria Graeff-Wassink mentions that between 1980 and 1988 the numbers varied for students between 170 and 410 per session, and for officers between 80 and 210 per year.[39] It can be estimated that since the foundation of the WMA fifteen years ago it has trained roughly 3,000 officers, and approximately eight times as many soldiers.

The idea of women at arms reflects the Libyan regime's policies towards women and their role in society, and the changing attitudes of Libyan society towards women. This section seeks to explore the attitudes of respondents towards the role of women in the army alongside men.[40]

When respondents were asked whether women should fight alongside men, 56 percent said 'yes'. Examining the attitudes by gender, the result shows that there were some differences. Among male respondents 43 percent supported the idea, whilst among female respondents 70 percent did.

Figure 8.9 shows the attitudes of respondents towards women fighting alongside men by place of family residence (urban and rural) for males and females. Rural respondents, whether male or female, were more willing than urban dwellers of both sexes to accept the idea.

Figure 8.9: Attitudes of respondents towards women fighting alongside men by place of family residence



Parents' education had no effect on male and female attitudes towards this question. Fathers occupation and family income as background variables did not make any difference either.

Table 8.16 shows the attitudes of respondents towards women fighting alongside men by source of identification. The majority of female respondents by all sources of identity were in favour, while male respondents who identified themselves by tribe, city and Arab identification were also in favour.

Table 8.16: Attitudes of respondents towards women fighting alongside men by source of identifications

Source of identification	Number of male respondents	Yes [%]	Number of female respondents	Yes [%]
Family	50	28	33	79
Tribe	21	52	8	63
City	23	57	25	76
State	17	41	18	78
Muslim	97	38	85	67
Arab	49	55	67	66

Source: Field survey 1994

8.3.6 Attitudes as to whether women currently possess adequate rights

The purpose of this section is to explain how respondents describe the current position of women in Libyan society. Respondents were asked whether women currently possess adequate rights. The general pattern among respondents shows that about 69 percent of them agreed.

Table 8.17 shows the attitudes of respondents towards the current position of women by place of family residence. There were some differences between rural males and females, although in general gender made no difference to views here.

Table 8.17: Do women currently possess adequate rights by place of family residence

Categories	Number of male respondents	Yes male [%]	Number of female respondents	Yes female [%]
Urban	209	70	219	67
Rural	53	65	19	84

Source: Field survey 1994

Examining the same question by parental education (father's and mother's educational level) showed that there was no impact of this variable on the respondents' attitudes. However, the family income was significant: The higher the family income the more respondents thought that women did currently possess adequate rights.

There were no differences between respondents (male and female) in their attitudes towards this question by source of identification.

It is interesting to explore the overall pattern of answers to the foregoing set of questions as a whole by source of identification for both male and female respondents. This has been done by creating a new variable, covering the five variables dealing with women's equality in human rights. Where the answers strongly agree and agree were available these have been designated as positive and given the value 1; assigning the value 1 to 'yes' answers to the questions dealing with women's general participation in political activity and in the armed forces, and having jobs involving authority over men; and assigning the value 1 to 'no' answers to the question dealing with father's authority in the family. The new variable is the sum of these scores and ranges in value from 0 to 5, with a score of 5 indicating strong feminist views.

When this variable was related to main source of identity there was an interesting pattern of scores as shown in Table 8.18, which shows the mean score by identity and gender.

Table 8.18: Strength of feminist attitudes by identity and gender

Source of Identity	Number of Males	Mean Score	Number of Females	Mean Score
Family	50	1.5	32	3.1
Tribe	20	1.4	8	2.9
City	24	2.0	25	3.5
State	16	1.4	17	2.6
Muslim	97	1.5	85	3.0
Arab	49	2.1	67	2.7

Source: Field survey 1994

The main difference is plainly by gender, but there are interesting gender differences by identity which confirm the analyses for the individual variables. Women whose main identity source is Islam have a high score on this gender equality variable, whilst men with Islam identification have a generally low score. There is of course some inconsistency in answers to the individual questions, but summing scores tends to overcome this problem and is the best way to summarise overall attitudes.

8.3.7 Exploring attitudes of respondents towards social issues

This section deals with some other social issues related to the right of choice in personal decisions. One of these was the right of women to marry other Arabs or Muslims who were non-Libyan. The other issue was the exaggeration of dowry and costs of marriage.

The respondents were first asked whether women should have the same right as men to marry other non-Libyan Arabs or Muslims.

Figure 8.10 shows the attitudes of respondents towards this question, with 70 percent of men either strongly agreeing or agreeing, compared with 60 percent of women. Therefore women were less willing.

Figure 8.10: Attitudes towards the right of women to marry other Arabs



The previous question was followed by another which involved asking the respondents who disagreed what the main reasons were for their negative attitudes. The responses to this question showed that among male and female respondents, traditions and customs was the main reason given. Among male respondents 39 percent said traditions and customs; 7 percent said that 'it goes against the social system'; and 5 percent mentioned that 'they are not Libyan'. Among female respondents 46 percent said traditions and customs; and 17 said that these Arabs or Muslims are not Libyan. This reason is quite popular among female respondents in particular. There were some other reasons which female respondents mentioned, as can be seen in Table 8.19.

Table 8.19: The reasons of the disagreement about the right of women to marry Arabs and Muslims non Libyan

Categories	Male [%]	Female [%]
Traditions and customs	39	46
Society will not accept	1	4
Discrimination against other countries	5	6
Caring about tribal unity	4	7
The gap between Libyan and other societies	4	4
No successful experience with such marriages	4	1
Social and economic problems	1	4
They are not Libyan	5	17
To protect the woman's rights	0	1
Changing undeveloped customs	0	1
It goes against the social system	7	5

Source: Field survey 1994

The other question deals with one of the major social customs in Arab and Libyan society. This custom is *mahr* [dowry], and the concern is with its prohibitive size. This is also coupled with the exaggeration in the costs of marriage. The *mahr* sometimes goes up to 3,000 and 4,000 Libyan dinars[41], excluding gifts (*al-biyan*) that the husband-to-be must offer his bride during the marriage week, such as clothes, jewels, perfumes, and so forth.[42] However, nowadays many families do not ask for the *mahr,* but accept 25 Libyan Dirhams. While many accept this arrangement in theory, in practice the actual costs to the bridegroom's family may be much higher. This has led to an exaggeration of the marriage costs. It is now quite common for the bridegroom to provide his bride with an independent house from that of his family, as well as the furniture.

There are some advantages and disadvantages of the *mahr* and all the financial clauses of the marriage contract. The advantage is that the dowry is the woman's alone, and she can obtain all her needs of her wedding without burdening her family with the expenses. Moreover, the gifts, particularly gold and jewels, are an insurance for whenever she may need money in the future.[43] Similarly with the house and the furniture, as by law the house belongs to the wife and her children after divorce. Nowadays however, with the increasing numbers of educated women holding jobs, many are taking part in the preparation of their houses by providing some of the furniture. The brides' families now also spend a fortune on providing their

daughters with the gifts which the brides' family must provide, usually jewellery, gold, clothes and some furniture.

However, there are a number of disadvantages with the *mahr*. First, all these expenses may close the door for young men who want to marry, but can not afford to. This, gives the opportunity to older men who can better afford the marriage contract. As a result this could lead to a big age gap between the spouses and it also enables older men to marry more than one wife (i.e polygamy). Second, the husband may have borrowed money in order to cover all expenses; as a result the couple starts their life with a huge debt. Third, some young men who do not wish to remain bachelors but are unable to afford marrying a Libyan, frequently resort to marrying non-Libyans, while Libyan women rarely have a reciprocal option.[44]

This section is based on a question which involved asking the respondents whether Libya should lower the costs of marriage. The response to this question among respondents male and female can be seen in Figure 8.11.

Figure 8.11: Attitudes of respondents towards abandoning exaggeration and lowering the costs of marriage



As the figure shows, male respondents had more positive answers for this question than females. This difference reflects the fact that men usually suffer from the custom more than females do. 94 percent of male respondents favoured Libya should ban the exaggeration of costs of marriage. Among female respondents, 88 percent said 'yes', which is a less positive answer than male respondents, but still very supportive of the idea.

Those respondents who did not support the lowering of the costs were asked for their reasons. 44 percent of male respondents, compared with only 15 percent of female respondents, cited traditions and customs. Only 13 percent of males, but 31 percent of female respondents used the explanation 'to protect the women's rights'. The other main reasons given were that low costs of marriage would give men the opportunity to leave their children and get married to a second wife, leading to polygamy, and that men do not like a women with a low dowry. One reason mentioned by only female respondents was that women cannot trust men, therefore, they prefer a high dowry as a way to feel secure. The final reason was linked with the fact that life was getting more difficult, therefore asking for a high dowry would help women to secure their future.

8.4 Conclusion and Summary

The main aim of this chapter was to explore the attitudes of respondents, the university students, towards the role of women in Libyan society. This chapter began with a general review of the traditional views about women in Libyan society which regarded women as a source of shame, and considered the nature of women in general, that they are beautiful and fragile.

The chapter continued with a review of the present Libyan regime's ideological position regarding women, and of its policies towards women. The results of a content analysis of schools curricula "reading books" up to the ninth grade showed that the dominant idea among these themes was the traditional role of women as mothers and wives (25 percent of the themes). Hence, the curricula themes did not adequately reflect the practical and widely publicised official policies of the regime towards women.

A review of statistical information about the place of women in Libyan society showed increasing numbers of women in the education system at all levels. However, despite the increasing number of females in the education system, women still play a minimal role in the

economically active population. According to the United Nations source, in 1994 females constituted only 10 percent of the total labour force in Libya.

The respondents' attitudes towards women were explored through questions which dealt with the role of women and their rights in the society. The findings showed that the ideology of the regime has been transmitted with considerable success in this arena. Libyan male students displayed progressive attitudes on the question of gender as expressed through their responses except on authority issues.

The female respondents seemed to have strong feminist views and were very much oriented towards equality between the two sexes. Male respondents did not have strong traditional attitudes towards these issues. The vast majority did not have a problem in accepting the principle of equality in human rights between the two sexes. The only difference was between the Islamist female respondents and Islamist male respondents. This difference reflected the female Islamists' strong positive attitudes towards gender equality and female rights as a whole.

In general, it seems that the regime was more successful in inculcating its values on gender issues with these students than was the case for any other value set, apart from its position on Arab issues as will be shown in Chapter 9.

As has generally been the case, background variables made little difference to views. There were some differences by 'source of identity', but these became most interesting when explored further in relation to gender. Overall the women were substantially more feminist in their views than the men, and this difference related particularly to public roles in politics and employment. It is worth noting that whilst a majority of the male students asserted the principles of equal rights for women, when it came to family matters, authority in employment, participation in the armed forces, and political roles for women, a majority of the male respondents asserted traditional values. Women were much more assertive as to equality on these matters of practice. It was particularly interesting that women with an Islamic source of identity were generally among the most feminist in their view.

These gender differences show that the regime's ideology of gender equality has been taken up in different ways by men and women. Although a minority of men do agree with practical implementation, the majority subscribe to equality in principle only. For women there is a stronger commitment to genuine implementation. It has to be said that the reality in Libyan society corresponds to the male position. Women lack authority and participate less (see

Chapter 7), so have less capacity for forcing these issues. However, these gender differences, which do not change for those with a religious identity, could have profound significance in the future, especially given the strong formal commitment of the regime to gender equality.

Notes to Chapter 8

[1] Ahmad J. Dhaher and Maria Al-Salem, "Women in the Gulf" in Tawfic E. Farah and Yasumasa Kuroda (eds) *Political Socialisation in the Arab States*, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987), p. 92.

[2] Mustafa O. Attir, "Ideology, Value Changes, and Women's Social Position in Libyan Society", in Elizabeth Warnock Fernea (ed) *Women and Family in the Middle East: New Voice of Change*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991), pp. 122-131.

[3] Ibid., p. 122.

[4] Harold D. Nelson (ed), *Libya Country Study*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office for Foreign Areas Studies, 1979), p. 108.

[5] Ibid., p. 108.

[6] Mustafa O. Attir, op.cit., p. 122.

[7] Lorfing and J. Abu Nasr, "Sex-Role Orientation of Arab University Students" in Julinda Abu Nasr *et al* (eds), *Women Employment and Development in the Arab World*, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1985), p. 131.

[8] This is a part of the old curricula "reading books" for the primary level, which Libyan students were studying until 1986. *Al-Qira'a lil-Saf al-'Awal*, [The first grade reading book], (Al-Lajna al-Sha^{c}biya al-^{c}Ama lil-Ta^{c}lim wa al-Bahth al-^{c}Ilmi, 1986), pp. 158-160.

[9] Note that the term ^{c}anis [spinster] for an unmarried woman has a negative connotation, whilst "bachelor" for a man is neutral or even positive.

[10] Mustafa O. Attir, op.cit., p. 123.

[11] Ibid., p. 124.

[12] See Muammar Al-Qadhafi, *The Green Book*, vol. 3, (Tripoli: Global Centre for Study and Research on the Green Book, 1979) (section on women), pp. 92-106.

[13] See Ibid., (the section on family), pp. 79-84.

[14] Ibid., pp. 95-96.

[15] Ibid., pp. 105-106.

[16] Ronald Bruce St John, *Historical Dictionary of Libya*, (London: The Scarecrow Press, 1991), p. 119.

[17] "Mada 2, Qanuwn Raqam 3 Lisant 1984 Bisha'n al-Sha^{c}ab al-Musalah, ", (Article 2, in Law No. 3 of 1984: People's Army), in *Al-Mawsu^{c}a al-Qanwniya: al-Mar'aa fi al-Tashriy^{c}at al-Libiya* [The Encyclopaedia of Law: Women in Libyan Legislation], (Tarablus: Shu'wwn al-Mar'aa bi-A'mana Mu'atamar al-Sha^{c}b al-^{c}Aam, 1994), pp. 35.

[18] See, Maria Graef-Wassink, *Women at Arms: Is Ghadafi a Feminist?*, (Edinburgh: Darf Publishers, 1993)

[19] "Mada 13, Qanuwn Raqam 22 Lisant 1991 Bita^{c}dil Ba^{c}d Ahkam al-Qanuwn Raqam 10 Lisanat 1984 Bisha'n al-Ahkam al-Khasa bi al-Zawaj wa al-Talaq wa Atharihma," [Article 13, in Law No. 22 of 1991: Reform of the Marriage and Divorce and their Effects], in *Al-Mawsu^{c}a al-Qanwniya: al-Mar'aa fi al-Tashriy^{c}at al-Libiya* [The Encyclopaedia of Law: Women in Libyan Legislation], op.cit., pp. 117-118.

[20] "Mada 1, Qanuwn Raqam 8 Lisanat 1989 Bisha'n Haq al-Mar'a fi Tawali al-Waza'if al-Qadai'iya," [Article 1, in Law No. 8 of 1989: Rights of Women to Participate in Judicial jobs], *Al-Mawsu^{c}a al-Qanwniya: al-Mar'aa fi al-Tashriy^{c}at al-Libiya* [The Encyclopaedia of Law: Woman in Libyan Legislation], Ibid., p. 232.

[21] See for more information about revolutionary female guards, Maria Graef-Wassink, op.cit., pp. 151-153. See also *The Guardian*, 19.7.1995, p. 9.

[22] Muammar Al-Qadhafi, *Political Speech*, Benghazi, 13 February 1981.

[23] Maria Graef-Wassink, op.cit., pp. 155-158.

[24] Ibid., p. 155.

[25] Mohamed Z El-Mogherbi, *The Socialisation of School Children in the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya*, (University of Missouri, PhD thesis, 1978), pp. 7-8.

[26] *Al-Qira'a lil-Saf al-'Awal min al-Taᶜlim al-'Asasi* [The First Grade Reading Book], (Al-Lajna al-Shaᶜbiya al-ᶜAama lil-Tᶜalim wa al-Bahth al-ᶜIlmi, 1987-1988), p. 136.

[27] *Iqra'a lil-Saf al-Tasiᶜ min al-Taᶜlim al-'Asasi* [Read to the Ninth Grade], (Al-Lajna al-Shaᶜbiya al-ᶜAama lil-Tᶜalim wa al-Bahth al-ᶜIlmi, 1988-1989), pp. 137-141.

[28] *Al-Qira'a lil-Saf al-Thani min al-Taᶜlim al-'Asasi* [The Second Grade Reading Book], (Al-Lajna al-Shaᶜbiya al-ᶜAama lil-Taᶜlim wa al-Bahth al-ᶜIlmi, 1988-1989), pp. 67-70.

[29] Ibid., p. 88.

[30] Ibid., p. 88.

[31] *Al-Lugha al-Arabiya lil-Saf al-Sadis*, [The Arabic Language for the Sixth Grade], (Al-Lajna al-Shaᶜbiya al-ᶜAama lil-Taᶜlim wa al-Bahth al-ᶜIlmi, 1987-1988), pp. 140-146.

[32] United Nations, *World Population Prospects: The 1992 Revision*, (New York: United Nations Publications, 1993), pp. 532-533.

[33] Muammar Al-Qadhafi, *Thawrat al-Shaᶜb al-Libiy*, [The Revolution of Libyan People], (Tarabulus: No Publisher, 1974), p. 403.

[34] The World Bank, *The World Bank Atlas 1996*, (Washington, DC: 1995), p. 9.

[35] United Nations, *African Statistical Year Book 1990/91*, v. 1, part 1, North Africa, p. 13-1.

[36] Ibid., p. 12.

[37] Maria Graef-Wassink, op.cit., p. 48.

[38] Ibid., pp. 49-50.

[39] Ibid., p. 85.

[40] For more information about women in the army and the development of mentalities among the younger generation in Libya, see Maria Graeff-Wassink, ibid., pp. 177-247.

[41] Libyan Dinar = £2 Sterling and one Dinar = 1000 Dirham

[42] Marius K Deeb and Mary Jane Deeb, *Libya Since the Revolution: Aspects of Social and Political Development*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), pp. 56-62.

[43] Ali al-Fenaish, *Al-Mujtamaᶜ al-Libiyi wa Mushkilatihi* [Libyan Society and its Problems], (Tarabulus: 1967), pp. 47-48. See also Marius K. Deeb and Mary Jane Deeb, *Libya Since the Revolution: Aspects of Social and Political Development*, op.cit., pp. 56-62.

[44] Deeb and Deeb, ibid., p. 58.

9. Attitudes Towards Arab Issues

9.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to focus on some of the Arab issues which the Libyan regime deems directly relevant to Libya, namely Arab unity and the Palestinian problem. Both issues have constituted significant elements of the state ideology, since the revolution in 1969. The chapter therefore seeks to examine and explore the attitudes of the respondents of this study towards Arab unity and the Palestinian problem.

Some of the questions asked, especially those on Arab nationalism and Arab unity, are modelled on a previous study by Saad Eddin Ibrahim *et al Itijahat al-Ra'i al-ᶜAam al-Arabiy Nahwa Mas'alat al-Wahda* [Trends of Arab opinion toward the issue of unity]. This study was undertaken in ten Arab countries to explore public opinion towards Arab unity in the late 1970s. Using some of these questions in the current study does not mean that comparison between the results will be useful. There are many differences in the aims and the nature of each study and in the size of the samples. Moreover, the circumstances facing Arab countries and the Middle East region as a whole are now very different from two decades ago.

The current study is an attempt to explore attitudes of a certain stratum within Libyan society towards Arab unity, seeking to ascertain whether the regime has succeeded in instilling its values and ideology in this stratum of its citizens.

There is a link between the concerns of this Chapter and those of Chapter 5. It will be recalled that Arabism identity was one of the possible elements of identification, the others being family, tribe, city, state, and Islam. This chapter will focus on the respondents' attitudes

towards actual policy issues, rather than their beliefs. In other words, the practical side of their attitudes towards Arabism will be explored.

The Chapter has four main sections. The first focuses on Arab unity and the Palestinian problem in the state ideology of the regime in Libya. The second seeks to explore the attitudes of the respondents towards Arab nationalism and Arab unity. This section is based on 12 questions which deal with these issues, namely questions 40, 41, 42, 43a, 43b, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, and 50 (see Appendix A). The third section examines the attitudes of respondents towards the Palestinian problem through three main questions, numbers 51, 52 and 53 (see Appendix A). The final section is the conclusion.

9.2 Arab Unity and the Palestinian Issue as Components of State Ideology in Libya: A Review

The main ideological elements which have shaped the Libyan regime's foreign policies since the revolution in 1969 have been Pan-Arabism, anti-Zionism, and anti-colonialism. All these elements stem from Nasir's ideology which has greatly influenced the state ideology in Libya and created a framework for its polices.

Pan-Arabism, Arab unity and Arab nationalism are not new political ideas in Libyan society. They formed part of the political culture of the generation of the 1950s and 1960s. The monarchical regime did not have any programme for inculcating its citizens, especially young people, with such values but yet they were transmitted through the Egyptian radio station, *Sawt al-Arab* [the voice of the Arabs], and through Egyptian school textbooks, which school children studied after independence. This unplanned socialisation process created a political culture which was different from that of the monarchical regime, which had strong ties with the West but weak ties with the Arab region, by creating citizens who were in favour of Arab nationalism and Arab unity. The youth admired Nasir, who became their hero as evidenced by his picture being everywhere in Libya. Arab unity was one of the major concerns of the generations of the 1950s and 1960s, of which al-Qadhafi and the free officers were a part.

Libyan identities were based on tribe and regional identification with specific parts of Libya (Cyrenica, Tripolitania, and Fazzan), as well as a wider identification with Arabism and Islam. Historical evidence can be found to support the wider Arab-Islamic identity. For example, during the popular liberation war against Italy, from 1911 there were a number of

Arab fighters from different Arab countries such as Yemen and Syria fighting with the Libyans. Moreover, during the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, numbers of Libyan volunteers participated in the Arab armies. Yet, identification with Libya as a whole seems to have been relatively weak.

Arab unity, became one of the major concerns of the new regime since 1969. As Deeb and Deeb argue,

> Arab unity is major concern to foreign-policy makers in Libya to which al-Qadhafi was always sympathetic since his youth, when he listened to that powerful source of political socialisation of late 1950s and the 1960s, the voice of the Arabs broadcast from Cairo. Libya's historical divisions into Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fazzan, and consequently the lack of a clearly defined Libyan identity, pushed al-Qadhafi to go beyond his own borders, to seek a wider identity in Arab unity.[1]

Arab unity has been one of the main elements of the foreign policy in Libya since the revolution. Practically, the regime has attempted to bring about Arab unity through unification agreements with a number of other Arab countries. Al-Qadhafi persuaded several Arab leaders to unite their countries with Libya. His quest took him to Egypt, Sudan and Tunisia during the seventies, and Syria and Morocco in the early eighties. These attempts have earned the country a reputation as "Arab Prussia."[2] However, none of these schemes succeeded.

Some of the countries with which unity was agreed were different from Libya ideologically and politically, for example Morocco. Such differences did not discourage the Libyan regime in their campaign. El-Khawas states:

> In August 1984, Al-Qadhafi and King Hassan of Morocco agreed to merge their countries despite their ideological and political differences: Qadhafi's Libya is revolutionary with close ties to the Soviet Union; this stance contrasts with Morocco's conservative monarchy, which has been a traditional ally for the U.S.[3]

The Palestinian issue has also been an integral part of Libya's Arab nationalism. The Libyan regime regarded the Palestinian issue as an Arab issue, for which all Arabs must accept responsibility, working together to destroy the racist and Zionist state.[4] Thus al-Qadhafi adopted the concept of *Qawmiyat al-Maᶜraka* [the pan-Arabisation of the struggle], asking the Arab countries to stand and fight against Israel.

The only solution to the Palestinian problem, according to al-Qadhafi, was the liberation of all Palestine. This is because he doesn't accept the existence of the state of Israel. For him the Palestinian problem started already in 1948 when part of Palestine was transformed into

Israel. This is different from many other Arab governments who seem to have accepted U.N. resolution 242. Al-Qadhafi, has persistently criticised the Arab governments which concentrated their efforts on the return of the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967.[5]

The Libyan regime was consistently against any peaceful settlement of the conflict. From the beginning, as Deeb and Deeb indicate,

> [he] opposed U.N. Resolution 242 of November 1967, supported the idea of an Arab Palestine where only those indigenous Jews who had lived there during the British Mandate would be incorporated in this state, and did not approve of the idea of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as the solution to the Palestinian problem.[6]

These attitudes remain distinctive of the Libyan regime's policies towards the region. Despite all the changes in the region since Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977, the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, the Madrid conference, the direct negotiations between the PLO and Israel and the other Arab countries, and the establishment of the "limited Palestinian authority" in Gaza Strip and West Bank, Al-Qadhafi maintained his stand.

These positions on Arab issues in general and on the Palestinian issue in particular are strongly expressed in the official socialisation mechanisms described earlier. They are presented within the schools through the content of history and geography books, are asserted in specific sessions devoted to Arab Unity in the Ideological Preparation Camps, and through the mass media. Al-Qadhafi's political speeches focus on precisely these matters and the students will have been exposed to all of these from childhood. It should also be noted that the parents of the students, who come from that generation of the 1950s and 1960s which adopted Nasirism as explained above, are likely to have expressed these views in the home as part of family socialisation. In a sense the impact of the radio station *Sawt al-Arab* [the voice of the Arabs] persists through the generations. For the generations of the 50s and 60s Nasir's Egypt became the centre and symbol of Arab unity and assertiveness, following the defiant seizure of the Suez Canal from British control in 1956. Al-Qahdafi was part of that era. To al-Qahdafi, listening to Radio Cairo's Voice of the Arabs and plotting to depose the Libyan monarchy, Nasir was a hero and role model.[7]

9.3 Exploring Attitudes Towards Arab Nationalism and Arab Unity

The purpose of this section is to explore attitudes towards Arab nationalism and Arab unity in the sample of Garyunis University students, taking first the awareness of Arab unity as a notion, second, the attitudes of respondents towards the types and forms of Arab unity, and finally attitudes towards the practical side of Arab unity.

9.3.1 The awareness of Arab unity as a notion among the respondents

The examination of awareness of Arab unity started by asking the respondents whether Arab nationalism was a coherent idea. 73 percent answered "yes" and 27 percent "no". The majority of respondents clearly believed that Arab nationalism was an important element and a coherent idea, reflecting the ideas of the revolutionary regime about Arab unity. However, there was a substantial minority who did not share this view. The latter phenomena indicates the likely strength of other forms of identification. It is generally held that such identifications have become more significant in other Arab countries.[8]

When respondents were asked about the meaning of *al-watan* [fatherland] for them, more than half of the respondents (69 percent) replied that they see *al-watan* as the wider Arab fatherland, 23 percent said that *al-watan* was the existing state in which they were living, and 4 percent referred to the wider Islamic fatherland. The 23 percent that identified *al-watan* with the existing state supports the reasoning for the negative answers about Arab nationalism discussed above.

A small minority mentioned other definitions of the 'fatherland'. Among these were: a place where people believe in God; any place where people can live in peace and express themselves without fear and where they can find the satisfaction of all their needs; the whole world irrespective of the religious beliefs, ethnic identification or political beliefs; and an Islamic state which has an Islamic democratic system. A small number said that the term *al-watan* does not mean anything nowadays.

When respondents were asked to describe how they regarded Arab nationhood, 57 percent said Arabs belonged to one Arab nation which was artificially divided; 29 percent thought of the people in Arab countries as belonging to one nation but each with different and special features; 9 percent viewed the people in the Arab countries as belonging to different nations

with few strong ties between them, and 4 percent described Arabs as belonging to different nations, but with strong ties between them. Again these figures support those given earlier regarding the rationale of the minority who reject Arab nationalism.

As the Islamic religion is a significant element for many respondents, as was shown in the identity question, the respondents were asked whether Islamic religion was a vital factor for Arab unity. 62 percent said "yes" and 38 percent "no".

The findings show that most respondents were oriented towards Arab unity and believed in Arab nationalism as a means towards Arab unity. This was illustrated by their definition of the concept of *al-watan* and their description of nationhood. Emphasising Islam as one of the vital factors of Arab unity reflected the ideology of the regime, previously discussed (Chapter 5). Overall, the majority of responses here corresponds to the regime's position. The significant minority who do not accept this position generally gave answers which indicated their identification with Libya as a specific state.

The next question involved asking the respondents about the factors which they thought caused disunity between Arab countries. 40 percent identified the main factor as being the role of ruling elites within Arab countries. 37 percent attributed it to the role of non-Arab powers such as Israel and the United States, 24 percent to the role of ethnic minorities, 7 percent to attempts by particular groupings to protect their economic interests, 6 percent to the disunity between Arab countries and to the strong loyalties which populations had to existing Arab states, and finally, a small minority mentioned such factors as the failure to uphold correct Islamic practices. These percentages come to more than 100 because some mentioned more than one factor.

Though not directly comparable, Ibrahim's study[9] found that the majority of respondents in his survey attributed disunity mainly to the role of ruling Arab elites, with the role of non-Arab powers coming second. This is similar to the pattern in the present study.

The role of non-Arab powers, especially the United States, is popularly given as a reason to explain the failure of attempts at Arab unity. El-Khawas states that

> Qadhafi has blamed the U.S. for his failure to bring about Arab unity. The U.S. has played up the Soviet threat as a means to divide the Arab world and to further its own strategic and economic interests in the region. Washington has never looked favourably on any drive to achieve Arab unity for fear that it might hinder Western interests in the

area and, further, might place the U.S. in an awkward position because of its commitment to the survival of Israel.[10]

9.3.2 Attitudes of respondents towards the types and forms of Arab unity

The purpose of this section is to explore the attitudes of respondents towards different approaches to Arab unity. This enquiry began by asking the respondents whether the Arab League had proved a successful expression of Pan-Arabism and Arab nationalism. 34 percent of respondents gave a positive answer for this question, whilst almost two thirds (66 percent) were negative.

When the respondents were asked about the type of Arab unity which was most desirable, 37 percent said that this should take place through a merger, with one central government overseeing the affairs of all peoples. 31 percent favoured federation, with a unitary security and military policy, but with individual domestic policy remaining the responsibility of existing governments. Finally, 30 percent thought co-operation among existing Arab states was the best way forward.

When respondents were asked whether Arab unity should be based on a smaller regional grouping such as the Gulf states, the Nile valley states, and the Maghrib states, only 20 percent accepted this idea, with 78 percent rejecting it. A comparison of this finding with Ibrahim's study, shows a similar trend among his respondents, less than half of whom favoured smaller regional groupings (42 percent). The reason for rejecting the idea, as Ibrahim noted, was that unity based on regional grouping was a relatively new idea in the Arab national stage. Also, the idea was linked sometimes with Western projects in the area.[11]

The Libyan regime's position towards the idea of Arab unity based on regional groupings was to accept it as an alternative route to Arab unity after the failure of a number of attempts to bring about general Arab unity.

9.3.3 Attitudes towards the practical sides of the Arab unity

It was deemed important to explore the practical side of attitudes to Arab unity and Arab nationalism among the respondents, in order to see if there are any differences between theory and practice. It should be noted, however, that asking people questions about their practical

attitudes towards Arab unity does not necessarily reveal how they actually behave – as people do not necessarily practice what they preach.

Respondents were first asked whether they supported moves towards Arab unity. 91 percent gave a positive answer, with only 9 percent rejecting the idea. The second part of the question involved asking those who gave a positive answer whether they continued their support for Arab unity despite the following statements: first, "even if this means sharing Libya's oil wealth with other Arabs"; second, "even if this means letting other Arabs work and live in Libya"; third, "even though Arab governments are not supporting Libya over the sanctions issue."

67 percent were willing to share Libya's oil wealth with other Arabs; 79 percent were willing to let other Arabs work and live in Libya; and 67 percent supported moves toward Arab unity even though Arab governments did not support Libya over the sanctions issues.

These findings show the positive attitudes of the students towards Arab unity, reflecting the revolutionary regime's ideology. One of the main slogans which al-Qahdafi announced on many occasions since the end of 1970s was that "Libya is the land of all Arabs." According to this approach all Arabs have the right to live and work in Libya, with the same rights as Libyans. Libya in its development programme has depended on foreign manpower, owing to the small number of the Libyan population. The census of 1973[12] indicated that 9 percent of the total population were foreigners, of whom 85-90 percent were Arabs, 5 percent Europeans and the rest from Asia, Africa, and South and North America. The majority of the non-Libyans were Egyptians.[13]

When respondents were asked whether Libya should seek unity with Arab states which had a different political system (monarchical, for instance), 63 percent of the respondents said "yes" and 36 percent opposed it. The result here is not surprising, given Libyan ideological and practical moves to bring about Arab unity. In September 1987 al-Qadhafi announced a 'project for Arab unity' to unite the Arab states and to build an economical and defence power despite the differences in political systems.[14] Practically al-Qahdafi moved to achieve unity with Morocco in 1984 despite the political and ideological differences between the two countries.

In another question, the respondents were asked whether they supported the removal of border and passport controls as a step on the road to Arab unity. 69 percent of respondents accepted this practical step.

In the late 1980s the borders between Libya and Tunisia, and Libya and Egypt were reopened, and the movement of their citizens became easier. However, United Nations sanctions against Libya over the Lockerbie planecrash affair took effect in April 1992. The immediate effect of the sanctions was on the travel side. An air embargo shut down all international flight connections. Thus the main gates of Libya became Tunisia, Egypt and Malta, as new land and sea routes were established to circumvent the air embargo.[15] Moreover, opening the borders with other Arab neighbours helped Libyans to continue to connect with the outside world.

To examine "national expression", a new variable (SNP) was created. National expression in this chapter refers to Arab nationalism, that is, the degree of expression of Arab unity and Arab nationalism. This variable ranked respondents by the number of positive answers to all the questions which addressed the practical expression of Arab unity. These were the statements dealing with sharing Libya's oil wealth with other Arabs, letting other Arabs work and live in Libya, and supporting moves towards Arab unity despite the lack of support from Arab governments. It was created by giving a score of one to all positive answers and totalling these scores. The scores on this new variable, were ranked as strong (all positives); intermediate (some positives) and weak (no positives). These were related to the background variables, such as place of family residence, family income, parental educational levels and so forth. Some of the results show interesting and significant developments.

The first of the background factors to be examined relates this national expression to that of place of family residence (urban or rural). There was no statistical significance by place of family residence.

Figure 9.1 examines the degree of national expression by gender. Although the results were not highly significant, there were some interesting differences, in that male respondents had a lesser degree of national expression than female respondents.

Figure 9.1: Gender by degree of national expression



Figure 9.2 records the degree of national expression by the respondents' family income. Strong positive degrees of national expression were concentrated on those with incomes below 300 L.d., although the category with family income of less than 120 L.d. had the largest proportion of those with a 'none' score. In general, the higher the income, the lesser the degree of national expression. This was statistically significant.

Figure 9.2: Respondents' family income by degree of national expression



Tribe was one of the main sources of the respondents' identification which had a statistical significance when it was examined by the degree of national expression, as is shown in Table 9.1. The stronger the tribal identification, the lesser the degree of national expression. Only 21 percent of the tribally identified had a strong degree of national expression, about 43 percent had an intermediate degree of national expression, and 36 percent had none. Among those with other sources of identification 50 percent had a strong degree of national expression, 39 percent had an intermediate degree and 11 percent have none.

Table 9.1: Degree of importance of tribalism in the respondents' identification by degree of national expression

Source of Identification	Strong [%]	Intermediate [%]	None [%]	Number of respondents
Tribe Id	21	43	36	28
Others Id	50	39	11	447

Sig = 0.0002
Tribe Id = Tribe as most important source of identification
Others Id = Other sources of identification such as family, city, state, Arab, Muslim.
Source: Field Survey, 1994

Table 9.2 shows the relationship between those who identified with Arabism and the degree of national expression. The results as can be seen from the table were statistically significant, but this is only as would be expected. The more people identify themselves as Arabs the more positive and stronger their degree of national expression is likely to be. Among those who identified themselves with Arabism, 64 percent of them had a strong degree of national expression, 33 percent had an intermediate degree and only 3 percent had none.

Table 9.2: Degree of importance of Arabism in the respondents' identification by degree of national expression

Source of Identification	Strong [%]	Intermediate [%]	None [%]	Number of respondents
Arabs Id	64	33	3	111
Others Id	43	41	15	364

Sig = 0.00005
Arabs Id = Arabism as most important source of the identification
Others Id = Other sources of identification such as tribe, family, city, state, Muslim.
Source: Field Survey, 1994

Overall, it is interesting that the females again seem somewhat more strongly attached to views which conform with the regime's. Again we find that the majority of students are expressing views which reflect those of the regime.

9.4 Exploring Attitudes Towards the Palestinian Issue

As Palestine has been given considerable attention by the regime in Libya, within the context of the regime's concern for Arab issues, we will now explore the attitudes of respondents towards this issue. First, we examine attitudes towards the relationship between Libya and the Palestinian problem. Then we look at attitudes towards possible solutions to the Palestinian

problem, and finally we cover attitudes of respondents towards the Declaration of Principles between the PLO and Israel in September 1993.

9.4.1 Attitudes towards the relationship between Libya and the Palestinian problem

The examination of respondents' attitudes on this issue began with the question as to whether the Palestinian issue was directly relevant to Libya or not. 73 percent of the respondents indicated that this was the case, whilst only 27 percent said "no".

As Pan-Arabism and the Palestinian question were thought to be related directly to each other, we examined the degree of national expression by the question which involved asking the respondents whether the Palestinian issue was directly relevant to Libya. As can be seen in Figure 9.3, the results were statistically significant and also expected. The stronger the national expression, the more positive answers about the relevance of the Palestinian issue to Libya. These are 'obvious' findings but they do reflect consistency in patterns of response, which supports the view that the responses do represent valid indicators of attitudes and beliefs.

Figure 9.3: Palestinian issue directly relevant to Libya by degree of national expression



9.4.2 Attitudes towards possible solutions to the Palestinian problem

When the respondents were asked about the best solution to the Palestinian problem, the vast majority were not willing to accept any peaceful solution to the issue, with 86 percent preferring the forceful liberation of all Palestine.

Numbers in favour of other options were small, with 8 percent preferring the creation of a secular state for both Arabs and Jews, 3 percent accepting the idea of a peace treaty with Israel, and 1 percent wanting a peace process with no pre-conditions, linked with UN resolution 242.

Table 9.3 shows the preferred solutions to the Palestinian problem, by the degree of the respondents' national expression. More than half of those who accepted the liberation of all Palestine as a solution (52 percent) had a strong degree of national expression, while 37 percent had an intermediate degree and only 11 percent had none.

Table 9.3: Solution to the Palestinian problem by degree of national expression

Categories	Strong [%]	Intermediate [%]	None [%]	Number of respondents
Peace process with no pre-conditions linked with UN resolution 242	33	67	0	6
The liberation of all Palestine	52	37	11	409
The creation of a secular state for both Arabs and Jews	37	45	18	38
Peace treaty with Israel	8	75	17	12
Use of military means against Israel	0	33	67	3
Arab revolution to destroy all the obstacles	0	100	0	1
The unification of all Islamic states against Israel	0	0	0	0
Arab unity will lead to a return of Palestine	0	0	100	3

Sig = 0.0001
Source: Field Survey, 1994

Among those who suggested the creation of a secular state for both Arabs and Jews, 37 percent had a strong degree of national expression, 45 percent had an intermediate degree and only 18 percent had none. Among the small number of respondents who suggested a peace treaty with Israel, 8 percent had a strong degree of national expression, 75 percent had an intermediate degree, and 17 percent had none.

A small minority of the respondents suggested some other solutions to the Palestinian which were not statistically significant due to the small number of respondents (see Table 9.3). These suggestions were the use of the military means against Israel; Arab revolution to destroy all the obstacles between Arab countries in order to unite against Israel; unification of

all Islamic states against Israel; and finally, Arab unity as one of the factors leading to the return of Palestine.

9.4.3 Attitudes towards the Declaration of Principles between the PLO and Israel

The aim of this part is to explore the attitudes of the respondents towards the Declaration of Principles between the PLO and Israel in September 1993.[16] Firstly, respondents were asked whether they accepted the Declaration. Only 6 percent of respondents were positive, while the vast majority (92 percent) were against.

Secondly, Figure 9.4 examines the attitudes of respondents towards the Declaration of Principles by the degree of national expression. The result shows that among those who gave a positive answer, 25 percent had a strong degree of national expression (but then the number of respondents here was small – this group consisted of only seven individuals), 50 percent had an intermediate degree and 25 percent had none.

Figure 9.4: Accept Declaration of Principles between PLO and Israel by degree of national expression



Among those who rejected the Declaration of Principles between the PLO and Israel, 50 percent had a strong degree of national expression, 39 percent had an intermediate degree and

only 12 percent of them had none. It seems that the more respondents opposed the Declaration of Principles, the stronger the degree of national expression. This shows that respondents with a strong degree of national expression were not willing to accept any agreement with Israel. In addition, they were not ready to accept any peaceful solution to the Palestinian issue, unless it achieved a full Palestinian state. Again this is expected but is useful as a demonstration of consistency.

It seems that most respondents agreed with the regime's ideology towards the Palestinian issue, based on rejecting any peace agreement with Israel. This position was pursued by the Libyan government through rejecting the Declaration of Principles between PLO and Israel and later the Oslo Accord in September 1993. Moreover, Libya began expelling Palestinian workers and their families from Libya in an effort to undermine the Israel-PLO peace Accords. Al-Qahdafi announced that all Arab countries should send Palestinians to Gaza and the West Bank to overwhelm the Israelis attempting to absorb them.[17] PLO-Libyan relations were not good before the Oslo Accord, especially when Libya sent its pilgrims to Jerusalem instead of Mecca to protest against the embargo imposed by the United States and applied by all Arab states without exception.[18]

9.5 Conclusion and Summary

Arab unity and the Palestinian problem are the two main issues which have shaped the Libyan revolutionary regime's policies both domestically and in the Arab region since 1969. To these two issues the regime paid great attention ideologically and in practice. Moreover, they were a significant part of the values which the regime tried to inculcate in its citizens, especially in the younger generation. Therefore, this chapter dealt with the attitudes of the university students towards these two issues.

It appears that the regime has had considerable success in creating certain values related to these issues among its citizens. For instance, as far as Arab unity is concerned, a substantial majority of respondents agreed that Arab nationalism is a coherent idea. The type of Arab unity which was desirable among them was a merger, with one central government overseeing the affairs of Arab nations. However, the vast majority rejected Arab unity based on smaller regional groupings.

On the practical side the majority of the respondents gave positive answers indicating that they supported moving towards Arab unity. These included statements like letting other Arabs work and live in Libya, willingness to share Libya's oil wealth with other Arabs and support for Arab unity even though Arab governments did not support Libya over the sanctions.

More than half of the respondents supported the idea that Libya should seek unity with Arab states which have different political systems (monarchical systems for instance). They also supported the removal of border and passport controls as a practical step on the road of Arab unity. In general, the respondents show a strong and positive degree of national expression towards Arab unity.

As far as the Palestinian problem is concerned, the vast majority of respondents thought it to be directly relevant to Libya. Those who accepted this link showed a strong degree of national expression. The most popular solution to the Palestinian problem was the liberation of all Palestine. The respondents show that they were not willing to accept any peaceful means.

The attitudes of the respondents towards the Declaration of Principles between the PLO and Israel was very negative. The vast majority were not willing to accept it, instead supporting military means as a tool for the liberation of all Palestine.

It does seem that the popular ideology of the regime about Arab unity and Palestinian issues has been successfully inculcated into these students, although there were always some who did not agree with the regime's positions. It is worth noting that this minority was very small on the Palestinian issues, but became much larger when dealing with forms of Arab unity and still larger when dealing with practical ways in which Libya and Libyans could assist other Arabs. In this last case a third of the respondents were not in favour of sharing oil wealth, opening borders and so forth. This sort of position may well have become more general as UN sanctions have an effect on living standards in Libya and Libya becomes more isolated. At the time of the survey, living standards were beginning to be affected and it would be logical for this to have an effect on attitudes, first in relation to practical matters.

The regime has not had a consistent record of upholding its own ideological positions. In the late 1970s and early 1980s Egyptian and Tunisian workers were expelled from Libya. The Egyptian expulsions were a response to Sadat's peace treaty with Israel, and the Tunisian expulsions also originated in political differences between the Libyan and Tunisian regimes.

Recently, after the execution of the survey, the Libyan regime has expelled thousands of Arab workers including hundreds of Palestinians.[19] This was identified as a repeat of early uses of deportation for reasons of political pressure, in this case against the Palestinian authorities who signed the Oslo Accord.

It was not possible in the survey to explore these contradictions between the regime's ideology and practice. It is worth repeating that the substantial minority of respondents who did not accept the rights of non-Libyans in Libya and so forth may represent a view which became more general under conditions of economic difficulty.

Notes to Chapter 9

[1] Marius K. Deeb and Mary Jane Deeb, *Libya Since the Revolution: Aspects of Social and Political Development* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 127.

[2] I. William Zartman and A. G. Kluge, "Heroic Politics: The Foreign Policy of Libya" in Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (eds), *The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change*, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1991), p. 236.

[3] Mohamed A. El-Khawas, *Qaddafi: His Ideology in Theory and Practice,* (Vermont: Amana Books, 1986), p. 129.

[4] Ibid., p. 129.

[5] Ibid., p. 129.

[6] Marius K. Deeb and Mary Jane Deeb, op.cit., p. 134.

[7] I. William Zartman and A. G. Kluge, op.cit., p. 237.

[8] See results of Faisal S. A. Al-Salem, "The Issue of Identity in Selected Arab Gulf States", in Tawfic E. Farah and Yasumasa Kuroda (eds), *Political Socialisation in the Arab States*, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987), pp. 47-63.

[9] Saad Eddin Ibrahim, *Itijahat al-Ra'i- al-ᶜAam al-Arabiy Nahwa Mas'alat al-Wahda* [Trends of Arab Opinion Toward the Issue of Unity], (Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 1980), pp. 159-183.

[10] Mohamed A. El-Khawas, op.cit., p. 129.

[11] Saad Eddin Ibrahim, *Itijahat al-Ra'i- al-ᶜAam al-Arabiy Nahwa Mas'alat al-Wahda* [Trends of Arab Opinion Toward the Issue of Unity], op.cit., pp. 132-133.

[12] *Population Census of 1973*, Department of Statistics and Planning, Tripoli, Libya.

[13] For more details about the total distribution of non-Libyan in different cities in Libya in 1973, see Sa'ad Kezeiri, *The Aspects of Change and Development in the Small Towns of Libya*, (University of Durham, PhD thesis, 1984) p. 206.

[14] Muammar al-Qadhafi, *Political speech*, Tripoli, September, 1987.

[15] *The Middle East and North Africa 1996*, (London: Europa Publications, 1995), pp. 721-723.

[16] The researcher carried out the survey of this study between January and May 1994 so the respondents were asked only about their attitudes towards the Declaration of Principles between the PLO and Israel, not about subsequent developments.

[17] *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, October/November 1995, vol. xiv, no. 4, p. 26.

[18] See *Middle East Mirror*, 11th August, 1995, pp. 9-10.

[19] Ibid., pp. 9-10.

10. Summary and Conclusion

10.1 Summary of the Thesis

The return of political culture as a central concept in many recent studies indicates that "there was an earlier time when political culture studies were here at hand and prospering, that this was followed by a time in which this approach declined, and that these studies are once again prospering."[1] The main focus of the literature on political culture has related to the experience of societies in three regions only: Western industrial societies, Communist societies, and East Asian societies. The key works on the political culture of Western societies have generally focused on the United States, Britain and Germany. Among these studies are those by Almond and Verba (1963), Inglehart (1975), Kavanagh (1980), and Barnes and Kaase (1979). On Communist societies, key works include those by Brown and Gray (1977 and 1984), and White (1979), while the key works on the political culture in East Asian societies include those by Hofhcinz and Calder (1982), Davis (1987) and Pye (1985).[2]

Little attention has been paid to the political culture of the Middle East and that of the Arab countries in particular. Although there are a few studies based on empirical approaches, such as those by El-Menoufi (1980), Entelis (1981), Daher (1987) and Farah (1987), the main approach in studying Arab political culture has been historical and has concentrated on the political traditions of Islam.[3]

The purpose of this study has been to investigate political culture in Libya through exploring the attitudes of Libyan university students towards some of the major elements of the revolutionary regime's ideology. This was based on a survey carried out by the researcher in the spring and summer of 1994 among 500 Libyan students, both male and female at Garyunis University in Benghazi.

Historically, the religion of Islam, social institutions (especially those related to tribe) and education have played key roles in shaping political culture in Libya. The significance of the ideological factor in nation-building in Libya became crucial after the revolution in 1969, since the revolutionary regime has depended on it as one of the main sources of its legitimacy.

Demographic challenge has affected Libya in the same way as other developing countries.[4] This is shown in increasing population size and the large proportion of the population made up by young people. Libya must be considered as a youthful country, as those under the age of 25 represent almost 60 percent of the population.

The young generation has been targeted by the revolutionary regime through a political socialisation process which was intended to create activist, participant, nationally conscious and motivated citizens with a commitment to Arab nationalism and Arab unity, and to equality for women. The vast majority of young people receive a state education, and are therefore exposed to the socialisation process through education, i.e. school routines, curricula and text books. Of course, the Libyan regime hoped to inculcate their values into students. However what has remained unknown is whether the young people actually accepted these values, which is where this study comes in. I hope to have uncovered where and to what extent the socialisation process was "successful", and in which areas people resisted it.

10.2 The Objectives Revisited

The objectives of this study were identified in Chapter 1 as follows:

a) To explore the attitudes of the students towards some elements of the state ideology of the revolutionary regime.

b) To investigate the extent to which political culture is still influenced by traditional values and ideas which reflect the social life of Libyans before the combination of ideological, economic and social changes which have occurred since the 1960s.

c) To examine the role of the regime's ideology, structures, and particularly the school system in inculcating national identity, and belief in Arab unity and Arab nationalism.

d) To examine the values of a generation which has gone through the school system and the ideological preparation camps to see whether their values are congruent with the

values taught to them in those institutions. Particular attention was paid here to views on women's rights and gender roles.

To achieve these objectives, the study has tried to compare the actual values, identities and the level of political participation of students, with what these ought to have been if the regime's processes of political socialisation had been fully successful.

This study combines both quantitative and qualitative methods to explore the attitudes of Libyan university students. I explored the influence of background variables (i.e. social status, gender, place of family residence) on attitudes towards critical elements of the political culture which the revolutionary regime has sought to purvey. These latter elements were those of identity, tribalism, political participation, the role of women, and Arab issues such as the Palestinian problem, Arab unity and Arab nationalism. The results of the survey showed that whilst there were differences, background was generally not a significant source of them—other than in terms of the influence of gender on attitudes to the role of women. The social background from which students came was not generally important to aspects of their political culture. This is because the students have gone through a common educational system and have been exposed to the same values in that process. Furthermore, the majority of respondents were the first generation in their families to gain a higher education. Only gender was a major discriminator among them, although there were occasional interesting differences between the rural minority and the urban (mainly Greater Benghazi) majority. The weakness of face-sheet or background variables in producing different attitudes among the respondents of this study indicates the extent to which political culture variables act differently in a country like Libya from Western countries. In general, background factors such as social status have a much greater impact on attitudes in the latter societies.

First, the study explored the question of identity among the university students (Chapter 5). In general, the students were not prepared to distinguish between Islam and Arabism as a source of identity. The majority stated that these two elements were both equally important for them. This is consistent with the regime's ideology in which Islam and Arabism as identities are "inextricably linked."[5] This finding was further supported by the fact that religion (Islam) was the highest ranked reason for being an Arab. The existing state, on the other hand, was ranked low as a source of identification among the respondents. This latter finding is to some extent the counterpart to the respondents' strong identification with Islam and Arabism. This may be compared with al-Salem's study on the Arab Gulf States. Al-Salem's findings showed that the only identity which had developed among the students was the sense of citizenship of the

state.[6] In this case the awareness of the state among the students may be attributed to the generous benefits available to them as citizens through the educational, medical, and social welfare systems of the Gulf States. The benefits are similar to what Libyans have, and the difference may come from the ideological factor: the Libyan revolutionary regime emphasises wider Arab citizenship through the socialisation process. Some other factors can be added to explain the low level of identification linked with the state among the Libyan respondents, such as the low level of national consciousness and national identity which had existed in Libya ever since independence. As St John (1987) states:

> The advent of independence unified Libya's three provinces but failed to forge a deep-rooted sense of national identity as did the bitter war of independence in Algeria. For most part, Libyans continued to think of themselves as Tripolitanian, Cyrenaican or Fezzanes, not as a Libyan.[7]

This lack of national consciousness continued after independence. It was significant that the rising tide of Arab nationalism in the Middle East and anti-colonial agitation in neighbouring North African states coincided with the rise of statehood in Libya. The monarchical regime was not able to overcome the negative impact of tribal, provincial and religious loyalties and the positive appeal of a vibrant pan-Arabism.[8]

Moreover, Libyans have not had much historical experience with the state. This is illustrated by the following statement from Davis (1987):

> the theoretical and speculative interest of the Libyan phenomenon is its non-state, 'stateless' characteristics: those acts of will and determination which deny the utility and desirability of the structures imposed by the General Assembly. The will comes from a deeply entrenched image of statelessness which Libyans locate in the recent past, and from the failure of the Italian colonial authority to make the state in the least bit attractive and respectable. And it is made possible by the freedom conferred by oil wealth, by a version of Islam which denies hierarchy, and by the failure of progressive and revolutionary forces to guide the Libyan coupists along a more conventional path. The result is extremely uncomfortable for statesmen; but it is an expression of that strand of human activity which, imperfectly, with many hesitations and inconsistencies, denies *The Leviathan* almost root and branch.[9]

The absence of sufficient institutions that distinguish the state from other systems and that reflect the idea of 'modern civil society' may be another reason for the low identification with the state. At the same time we must consider the role of other institutions which individuals ranked higher than the state, especially tribe and family. Tribal/family units clearly function as important social networks. In Libya these social organisations represent an alternative to the institutions which might exist in a modern civil society.

The detailed examination of 'identity factors' and the exploratory construction of identity types showed that the majority of respondents expressed identities which corresponded quite closely to that which the regime would regard as desirable, like identification with Islam and Arabism for instance. There was a minority who expressed family/tribe orientations, reflecting a localist position, and there was an interesting difference in the degree of emphasis given to Islam, but the majority were much as the regime would want them to be. Of course, this to some extent reflects the Libyan character of the regime itself and the extent to which its values corresponded to those of the respondents' parents' generation.

The second issue was that of tribe and tribalism. The findings of the study indicated that more than half of the respondents were not ready to drop their tribal identification, and that tribe was still a major source of personal identification in Libyan society. The vast majority of the respondents were not willing to change their tribe. There were some small differences between respondents according to background factors. One of these differences was that those who came from a poorly educated background were less in favour of the tribal identification, apparently regarding tribalism as a network of privilege. They seemed to believe that they did not derive any benefit from the tribe, unlike those who came from a higher educational and social background.

Another interesting finding from the survey came from exploring the relationship between strength of attachment to tribe and willingness to drop tribal identity. Surprisingly, 31 percent of those who were strongly attached to their tribe were willing to drop tribes. It appears that a substantial minority of students would prefer not to have a tribal system, but live with it because it is there and is important, in the Libyan context.

The views expressed by the students can be considered to belong to three sets. The first was represented by those who were (strongly) attached to their tribe and who did not wish to drop tribal identities. They seemed likely to have both an instrumental and a non-instrumental view of the role of tribes. For those who wanted to drop tribal identities and were not attached to their tribes, both the instrumental and non-instrumental bases were rejected. Those who were willing to drop tribe identity but remained attached were probably somewhat instrumental in their view of the tribe — it had a role so they remained part of it. The regime's position has tended to either extreme of this continuum. At first it tried to reject tribes, but subsequently it has in ideological terms asserted their non-instrumental role. At the same time it has accepted their instrumental role outside the formal political sphere.

It is worth noting that the regime has been inconsistent towards the role of tribes since the beginning of the revolution, having wavered between hostility and respect for the role of the tribe (as a social organisation, a source of security and socialisation for individuals).[10] Since the beginning of the 1990s, the tribe has become a source of political legitimacy for the regime. The regime has needed to rely on tribal organisation for the reasons which follow:

- The tribe has succeeded in the socialisation of individuals, socially and politically, in some elements where the formal socialisation mechanism of the regime has failed.[11]
- Communication within the tribe, especially between the leader of the tribe (*al-shayikh)* and the individual members of the tribe, has proved a useful means of conveying information.
- The nature of the tribe is such that the political culture of tribal members has inevitably been based on their respect for and loyalty to their leader.
- Customary practices and tribal councils are efficient for solving many tribal disputes and problems, compared to the weakness and inefficiency of the official courts within Libyan society.

The third issue concerning the political culture of the revolutionary regime which was explored was political participation. Almost half of the respondents participated in political activities at school, while only a small minority participated at university. The explanation for this difference is that most activities at school were (in theory) compulsory. However, despite the compulsory character of school activities (e.g. ideological preparation camps), many students never participated in them. Those who came from a rural background were more involved in politics than urban respondents. The female respondents were less interested in participating in politics than male students, but the difference between the two sexes was not great. Most respondents did not believe that they could play a genuine role in participating in decision-making in the popular congresses. The degree of disbelief in the mechanisms of political participation of the regime was quite high among respondents.

Despite the fact that all students go through the political socialisation process, the Libyan regime seems to have had limited success in creating participant individuals who are aware of their role within the political system and the political participation process. One explanation could be that the machinery of the state is not very efficient in preparing people for a role in political participation. As the findings show, it is clear that even for the small minority who

participated, many did not believe in the efficacy of the political participation process. It may be suggested that some of those who participated in political activities did so as a means towards gaining a particular kind of employment or to gain some other self-interest. It seems from these findings that the actual structures of the political participation system in Libya are not taken seriously by many of the respondents. As in many other societies, participation seems to be an activity restricted to a small minority. In the Libyan case, the main participants are the members of revolutionary committees, much on the lines of participation in party activity in single party regimes, although the Libyan system is explicitly not party-based, as it is against political parties.[12]

One general explanation for the lack of participation among the Libyan students can be found in El-Mogherbi's arguments about Arab political culture and the issue of democracy (see Chapter 2). El-Mogherbi argues that Arab political culture represents a subject political culture, in which individuals are aware of the output of the political system, but unaware of their role and their influence on the system. He adds that the submission, fear and the pattern of non-democratic behaviour characterised by the lack of free discussion and unwillingness to accept different opinions are a consequence of the process of social and political socialisation through the formal educational institutions and informal socialisation agents such as the family.

The fourth issue which this study has explored is the role of women in society. A general review of the traditional views about women in Libyan society showed that women were regarded as constituting a source of shame; that women were regarded as being beautiful and fragile, and mentally and physically weak; that their place was at home; and that it was shameful for women to remain unmarried.

A review was given of official attitudes regarding women through a content analysis of school curricula "reading books" up to the ninth grade. The most common single idea among these themes was the traditional role of women as mothers and wives (25 percent of the themes). The themes about the role of women which were covered in the school curricula did not adequately reflect the practical and widely-publicised official policies of the regime towards women. The latter policies were aimed at encouraging women to play a significant role in the social, political and economic changes within Libyan society.[13]

Nevertheless, the findings of the study showed that the ideology of the regime has been transmitted with considerable success in this arena, especially through the regime's practical policies towards women's role in society. Libyan male students displayed progressive rather

than traditional attitudes on the question of gender in their responses. The females generally had strong feminist views and were very much oriented towards equality between the two sexes. The vast majority of males and females did not have a problem in accepting the principle of equality in human rights between the two sexes. The only difference was between the female Islamist respondents and the male Islamist respondents. The female Islamists have much stronger positive attitudes towards gender equality and female rights as a whole, than male Islamists do. The explanation for such a difference might be that female Islamists understand the principles of Islam as a based on giving rights to women as well as men, while male respondents were dominated by some cultural myth about women and their subjugated role within society. Overall, the women were substantially more feminist and progressive in views than the men and this difference related particularly to public roles in politics and employment.

The fifth issue which this study explored related to Arab unity and the Palestinian problem. These two concerns have shaped the Libyan revolutionary regime's policies both domestically and regionally since 1969. The regime has paid much attention to them, ideologically and in practice. They have also formed a significant part of the value-system which the regime tried to inculcate in its citizens, especially in the younger generation.

The findings of the study have shown that the revolutionary regime has had considerable success in creating positive attitudes over Arab unity and the Palestinian problem among the new generation. The vast majority of the respondents' answers indicates that they supported moving towards Arab unity. This included allowing other Arabs to work and live in Libya, willingness to share Libya's oil wealth with other Arabs, and support for Arab unity even though Arab governments did not support Libya over the sanctions question. However, on the question of social integration, especially over women's marriage to non-Libyan Arabs or Muslims, only male respondents were in favour, but the idea was not popular among female respondents. Some of the reasons given for disagreeing with the right of women to marry non-Libyan Arabs and Muslims that it is anti-traditional and that other nationalities were not acceptable, simply because they were not Libyan.

Some other ideas which the regime presented through its ideology towards Arab unity were popular among the respondents. More than half of the respondents supported the idea that Libya should seek unity with Arab states which have a different political system (the monarchical system for instance). They also supported the removal of border and passport controls as a practical step towards Arab unity. In general, the respondents showed a strong

and positive degree of national expression towards Arab unity. Their attitudes reflected the regime's ideology and policies towards this issue.

On the Palestinian problem, the vast majority of respondents indicated that the Palestinian issue was directly relevant to Libya. Moreover, the most popular possible solution to the Palestinian problem among the respondents was the liberation of all Palestine. The majority of respondents showed that they were not willing to accept any peaceful means. The attitudes of the respondents towards the Declaration of Principles between the PLO and Israel were very negative. The vast majority were not willing to accept it, instead supporting military means as a tool for the liberation of all Palestine.

We can conclude that the revolutionary regime in Libya has had considerable success in creating certain values among the younger generation. The regime was most successful in inculcating its values on gender issues and Arab nationalism, Arab unity and the Palestinian problem (Chapters 8 and 9). However, the regime has failed to create participant individuals and to develop alternatives to kinship ties. Tribes remain a source of identity, economic welfare and to some extent political identity.

The regime's 'failures' would seem to be accounted for by different factors: in the case of political participation, the government's efforts have been thwarted by a basic lack of political trust; in the case of kinship ties, the regime's own message has been two-sided (supporting them in some ways, yet rejecting any political dimension to them). In those factors where the regime succeeded (Arab issues and the role of women), the message put across was clear and untainted by domestic political interests.

It may be useful to compare the case of Libya with the experience which some other mobilizational regimes have had in seeking to shape the attitudes of citizens, generate legitimacy and create new citizens. The comparison with Cuba seems particularly relevant. Both regimes have sought to create the "new man". Creating a new "Cuban socialist man" was connected with major campaigns of mobilisation for purposes of defence, literacy, sugarcane-harvesting, and revolutionary-military activities abroad.[14] For the first two decades these campaigns had moderate success in creating regime legitimacy, the acceptance of the norm of activism in the implementation of goals, and the acceptance of socialism in the diffuse sense of that term.[15] This success, however, may not be of lasting significance. In recent years Cuban experience has witnessed a growth of bureaucratisation, less stress on utopian ideals and mass mobilisation, and more on efficiency and regimentation.[16]

The Libyan regime has also sought to inculcate citizens with the values and ideology of the revolution. The objective has been to create the "Jamahirian man": the activist, participant, nationally-conscious and motivated citizen with a commitment to Arab nationalism and Arab unity, and to equality for women. The transformation and mobilisation process targeted the youth in Libya through the education system, the ideological preparation camps, media and the militarisation process of the society in general. When this experience is compared with that of Cuba, the overall conclusion must be that success in the Libyan case was more limited : the transformation and mobilisation of the society was successful in some aspects and a failure in some others. Success and failure for the regime in shaping political culture in Libya is laid out in Table 10.1.

Table 10.1: Elements of Libyan political culture: measurement of the regime's success and failure

Elements of political culture	Regime's values	Respondents' values	Measurement of success
Identity	Arabism and Islam (IP)	• Arabism and Islam • Localist source of identity (family and tribe)	positive negative
Tribalism	inconsistent • hostility to tribes (P) • respect for the social role (I) • source of political legitimacy since 1990s (P)	• strong tribal loyalty and attachment • tribe source of personal and political identity • an efficient organisation in the absence of a stable state • tribalism as a network of privilege	negative positive in some aspects
Political participation	encouraging mass participation through Basic Popular Congresses (I-P)	• degree of disbelief in the mechanisms of political participation • machinery of the state is not very efficient in preparing people for a role in political participation	negative
Women's rights	• consistent support for the women's rights (I-P)	• strong support for women's rights from both sexes in general • females showed more assertiveness on the equality question	positive
Arab nationalism, Arab unity and Palestinian problem	• consistent support for Arab unity, Arab nationalism and the Palestinian issue (I-P)*	• strong support on Arab issues (Arab unity and Palestinian issue)	positive

I- Ideology P- Practice (I-P)* It is worth noting that the regime has not had a consistent record of upholding its own ideological positions. The Libyan regime has expelled thousands of Arab workers, including Palestinians, using deportation as a tool for reasons of political pressure against their authorities (see Chapter 9).

The thesis has shown that the study of political culture enables an effective examination of certain fundamental variables which affect the political system, such as legitimacy, identity and attitudes towards political participation. The purpose of this thesis has not been to test a theory in which political culture plays the role of independent variable. Rather it has attempted to provide data which could be used in future work to test such a theory against alternatives such as political economic or political institutional analysis.

10.3 Further Work

From the findings of this study, some questions arise and which necessitate further research. These questions relate to two different issues, as follows:

a) Islamic fundamentalists: Islamic fundamentalists have been rapidly gaining ground in many Arab countries, especially in North Africa and Algeria in particular. In Libya this phenomenon has become evident as well, especially in the 1990s. The question which can be raised is: Does the value system found among the Libyan students, in particular those strongly identifying with Islam and Arabism, lie at the backbone of an increase in Islamic fundamentalism? The existence of a significant number of students who identified strongly with Islam is interesting. In the light of developments of Islamic fundamentalism in Libya subsequent to this survey, especially in the Benghazi area, it may be that it is this sort of identity which has become translated into support for 'fundamentalist' groups. In conditions of tension such an identity might well turn towards fundamentalist solutions. The increasing numbers of veiled women within society has become a visible phenomenon, and the increased use of violence by the Islamists in Libya is further evidence of the trend.

b) Pariah state and changing values: Libya has became a pariah state among nations, especially after the United Nations sanctions over the Lockerbie plane crash affair took effect in April 1992. The immediate effect of the sanctions was on the travel side. An air embargo shut down all international flight connections. The reader may wonder whether the sanctions against Libya as an external pressure have had any effect on the main elements of the political culture. Do the people now hold different attitudes towards Arab unity and Arab nationalism and the Palestinian issue, as a result of the economic difficulties which the sanctions against Libya have caused? A contemporary survey of this would be useful.

The researcher suggests that both of the above mentioned questions are of crucial importance and should be investigated in further research.

Notes to Chapter 10

[1] Gabriel A. Almond, "Foreword: The Return to Political Culture" in Larry Diamond (ed), *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), p. ix.

[2] Some of the key work on political culture in different areas are: Inglehart, Ronald, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Style Among Western Publics*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1975); see also Roy Hofhcinz and Kent Calder, *The East-Asia Edge*, (New York: Basic Books, 1982); see Archie Brown and Jack Gray (eds), *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States*, (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1977); see also Archie Brown, (ed), *Political Culture and Communist Studies*, (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1984).

[3] See Elie Kedourie, *Democracy and Arab Political Culture*, (London: Frank Cass, 1994).

[4] For more details about the demographic challenge, see Paul Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century*, (London: Fontana Press, 1994).

[5] Ronald Bruce St John, *Qaddafi's World Design: Libyan Foreign Policy, 1969-1987*, (London: Saqi Books, 1987), p. 33.

[6] Faisal S.A. AL-Salem, "The Issue of Identity in Selected Arab Gulf States", in Tawfic E. Farah and Yasumasa Kuroda (eds), *Political Socialisation in the Arab States*, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987), pp. 47-63.

[7] Ibid., p. 16.

[8] Ibid., pp. 16-17.

[9] John Davis, *Libyan Politics: Tribe and Revolution*, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1987), p. 259.

[10] See, Muammar Al-Qadhafi, *The Green Book*, vol. 3, (Tripoli: Global Centre for Study and Research on th Green Book, 1979), section on the tribe, pp. 81-84.

[11] In the fifteen extended qualitative interviews which the researcher carried out with respondents in order to develop and clarify the quantitative findings, 9 respondents out of 15 indicated that tribe was the third socialisation agent after family and school inculcating its individuals with values and patterns of belief and behaviour, whether religious, social or political.

[12] See Muammar Al-Qadhafi, *The Green Book*, vol. 1, (Tripoli: Global Centre for Study and Research on the Green Book, 1979), section on the party, pp. 11-16.

[13] Libya appointed as its permanent representative in the Arab League a woman, Salma Rashid. She was the first female representative of any Arab state in this organisation since its formation 51 years ago. *Asharq al-Awsat*, 11.9.1996, p. 1.

[14] Gabriel A. Almond, *A Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects in Political Science*, (New Park, CA, and London: Sage Publications, 1990), pp. 165-167. See, Richard R. Fagen, *The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 33-137.

[15] Gabriel A. Almond, *A Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects in Political Science*, p. 166.

[16] Ibid., p.166.

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Appendix A: The Questionnaire

1. Place of family residence
2. Place of birth
3. Age
4. Sex
   a) Male
   b) Female
5. Marital status
   a) Married
   b) Single
6. Year of university study or number of semesters
7. Faculty and subject of study
8. Father's occupation
9. Level of father's education
   a) Illiterate
   b) Can read only
   c) Can read and write
   d) Primary
   e) Preparatory
   f) Secondary
   g) Intermediate
   h) University and over
10. Level of mother's education?
   a) Illiterate
   b) Can read only
   c) Can read and write
   d) Primary
   e) Preparatory
   f) Secondary
   g) Intermediate
   h) University and over

11.

a) Does your mother work?

i) Yes

ii) No

b) If yes, what is your mother's occupation?

12. How many people live in your household?

a) Less than 2

b) 2-4

c) 5-7

d) 8-10

e) 11-13

f) 14-16

g) 17-19

h) 20 and over

13.

a) What is your family income (per month in Libyan Dinar)?

i) Less than 120

ii) 121-199

iii) 200-300

iv) 301-500

v) 501 and over

b) How would you classify - categorise the social status of you family?

i) Labour category

ii) Lower Middle

iii) Middle

iv) Upper Middle

v) Upper

14.

a) What kinds of home do you live in?

i) Villa

ii) Apartment/Flat

iii) An old Arabic house

iv) Hut

v) Other (Specify)

b) How many rooms are there in your house?

15. Which of the following items does your family have? (please tick)

a) A car

b) More than one car

c) Refrigerator

d) Washing-machine

e) Colour television

f) Air conditioning

g) Telephone

h) Radio recorder

i) Video recorder

j) Satellite dish

16. Which of these is most important to your identity? (Please tick the relevant box)

a) Being an Arab (Arabism)

b) Being a Muslim (Islam)

c) Both equally

17. How do you identify yourself? (Please rank in descending order a-g)

a) I am a son / daughter of a specific family

b) I belong to a specific tribe

c) I come from a particular city within Libya

d) I am citizen of the Libyan state

e) I am a Muslim

f) I am an Arab

g) Other (please specify)

18. I am an Arab because of: (Please rank in descending order a-d)

a) My religion

b) My language

c) I belong to an Arab state

d) Other reasons (specify)

19.

a) Do you belong to a tribe?

i) Yes

ii) No

b) If yes, to what extent do you feel loyal and attached to your tribe?

i) Very attached

ii) Attached

iii) Not attached

20. If it were possible, would you like Libyans to drop their tribal identifications and think of themselves only as Libyan?

a) Yes

b) No

21. If you had the chance would you like to change to another tribe?

a) Yes

b) No

22.

a) Generally speaking, do you think that one should be careful when dealing with other people?

i) Yes

ii) No

b) Which of the following statements do you agree with?

i) I trust most people

ii) I trust some people

iii) I don't trust any one outside my family

23. How would you describe your parents' treatment of their children?

a) Strict

b) Relaxed

24. Who is usually responsible for making decisions in your family?

a) Father

b) Mother

c) Both

d) All the family

25.

a) Did you have a voice in family decisions as a child?

i) Yes

ii) No

b) If yes, at what age?

26.

a) In general, do you think it is a good idea that children take part in family discussions?

i) Yes

ii) No

b) If yes, at what age should they start taking part?

27.

a) Do you remember when you became aware of politics?

i) Yes

ii) No

iii) Don't know

b) If yes, how old were you?

28.

a) Did you feel free to talk to your parents about your or your family's affairs matters?

i) Yes

ii) No

b) If yes, who did you talk to?

i) Father

ii) Mother

iii) Both

29. When you were a pupil at primary, preparatory, and secondary school, how would you describe your teachers?

a) Strict

b) Relaxed

30.

a) Did you participate in any political activities when you were a pupil at primary, preparatory, and secondary school, such as the ideological preparation camps and popular demonstrations?

i) Yes

ii) No

b) If yes, what kind of activities did you participate?

c) If not, why not?

31.

a) Have you ever participated in any students' political activities at the university?

i) Yes

ii) No

b) If yes, what kind of activities have you participated in?

c) If not, why not?

32.

a) Are you a member of the Students' Congress in your faculty?

i) Yes

ii) No

b) If not, why not?

33. Do you attend discussions in the Students' Congress in your faculty or university?

a) Regularly

b) From time to time

c) Never

34. Do you attend meetings of the Basic Popular Congresses?

a) Regularly

b) From time to time

c) Never

35.

a) Do you think that you can influence decision making in your Basic Popular Congress or students' union?

i) Yes

ii) No

b) Do you think that you can change any decision making in your Basic Popular Congress or student's union?

i) Yes

ii) No

36. Do you follow the changes which occur in the Libyan political system?

a) Regularly

b) From time to time

c) Never

37.

a) Do you discuss political affairs, local or international?

i) Yes

ii) No

b) If yes, how often do you discuss political affairs, local or international?

i) Every day

ii) Once a week

iii) From time to time

38. Do you discuss political affairs, local or international, with: (Tick each category with which you discuss politics.)

a) Your family

b) Your relatives

c) Your friends

d) Colleagues and comrades at university

e) Members of the Popular Congress

f) Others than of the above-mentioned, namely

39. What kind of mass media do you make use of? (Tick each category which you usually use)

a) Radio

b) Television

c) Newspapers

d) Magazines

e) All of the above

40. Is the idea of Arab nationalism a coherent idea?

a) Yes

b) No

41. Do you think of the word fatherland (*al-watan*) as:

a) The existing state in which you are living

b) The wider Arab fatherland

c) I have different view which is:( )

42. How would you describe the people in the Arab countries? (Please tick one of the following)

a) They belong to different nations and there are no strong ties between them.

b) They belong to different nations but they have strong ties between them.

c) They belong to one nation but they have different and special features.

d) They belong to one nation which is artificially divided.

43.

a) Do you support moves towards Arab unity?

i) Yes

ii) No

b) If yes, would you continue your support despite the following statements?

i) Even if this means sharing Libya's oil wealth with other Arabs.

a) Yes

b) No

ii) Even if this means letting other Arabs work and live in Libya.

a) Yes

b) No

iii) Even though Arab governments are not supporting Libya over the sanctions.

a) Yes

b) No

44. According to some scholars, the Islamic religion is a vital factor for Arab unity. Do you agree?

a) Strongly agree

b) Agree

c) Disagree

d) Strongly disagree

45. Which are the most important factors causing disunity between Arab countries?

a) Ruling elites within Arab countries protecting their interests

b) The role of non-Arab powers

c) Attachment and loyalty of the population to existing states

d) Attempts by groupings to protect their economic interests

e) The role of ethnic minorities

f) Other factors (specify)

46. Do you think that the Arab League is successfully expressing Pan- Arabism and Arab nationalism?

a) Yes

b) No

47. Which type of Arab unity is most desirable in the present time?

a) A merger with one central government overseeing the affairs of the Arab nation.

b) A federation with a unitary security and military policy, but with individual domestic policies remaining the responsibility of the existing governments.

c) Co-operation among existing Arab states.

48. Should Arab unity be built on the basis of smaller regional groupings, e.g. the Gulf states, the Nile Valley states, the Maghrib states?

a) Yes

b) No

49. Do you think Libya should seek unity with Arab states which have a different political system (e.g. Monarchy)?

a) Yes

b) No

50. As a practical step on the road to Arab unity, do you support the removal of all border and passport controls?

a) Yes

b) No

51. Do you think that the Palestinian issue is directly relevant to Libya?

a) Yes

b) No

52. Which of these statements do you prefer as a solution to the Palestinian problem?

a) A peace process with no pre-conditions linked with UN resolution 242.

b) The liberation of all Palestine.

c) The creation of a secular state for both Arabs and Jews.

d) A peace treaty with Israel.

e) A different strategy (Please specify)

53. Do you accept the "Declaration of Principles" which has been signed between the PLO and Israel ?

a) Yes

b) No

54. "Men and women have equal human rights". Do you agree?

a) Strongly agree

b) Agree

c) Disagree

d) Strongly disagree

55.

a) Do you think that, within the family, the father should have more authority than the mother?

i) Yes

ii) No

b) If yes, what are your reasons for this based on? (Please tick whichever word is most relevant)

i) Religion (Islam says so)

ii) Social values

iii) Traditions and customs (It has always been so)

iv) Other factors (Please mention)

56. Do you consider it acceptable for a woman to hold a job which involves authority over men?

a) Yes

b) No

57.

a) Do you think it is important for women to participate in governmental and political affairs?

i) Yes

ii) No

b) If not, why not? Are your reasons for this based on: (Please tick whichever is most relevant)

i) Religion

ii) Social values

iii) Traditions and customs

iv) Family responsibilities

v) Others (please mention)

58. There should be no discrimination between male and female in the right to education, work, freedom of thought, etc. Do you agree?

a) Strongly agree

b) Agree

c) Disagree

d) Strongly disagree

59. Do you think women should fight alongside men in the army?

a) Yes

b) No

60. Do women currently possess adequate rights in Libya?

a) Yes

b) No

61.

a) Women should have the same right as men to marry other Arabs or non-Libyan Muslims. Do you agree?

i) Strongly agree

ii) Agree

iii) Disagree

iv) Strongly disagree

b) If you disagree, why?

62. .

a) Do you think it is important for women and men to avoid exaggeration in the dowry and cost of marriage?

i) Yes

ii) No

b) If not, why not?

Appendix B: The Interview

1. Case Number
2. Date of the interview
3. Place
4. Place of family residence
5. Place of birth
6. Age
7. Sex
   a) Male
   b) Female
8. Marital status
   a) Married
   b) Single
9. Year of university study or number of semesters
10. Faculty and subject of study
11. Father's occupation
12. Level of father's education
    a) Illiterate
    b) Can read only
    c) Can read and write
    d) Primary
    e) Preparatory
    f) Secondary
    g) Intermediate
    h) University and over
13. Level of mother's education?
    a) Illiterate
    b) Can read only
    c) Can read and write
    d) Primary

e) Preparatory
f) Secondary
g) Intermediate college
h) University and over

14.
a) Does your mother work?
   i) Yes
   ii) No
b) If yes, what is your mother's occupation?

15. How many people live in your household?
a) Less than 2
b) 2-4
c) 5-7
d) 8-10
e) 11-13
f) 14-16
g) 17-19
h) 20 and over

16.
a) What is your family income (per month in Libyan Dinar)?
   i) Less than 120
   ii) 121-199
   iii) 200-300
   iv) 301-500
   v) 501 and over
b) How would you classify - categorise the social status of you family?
   i) Labour category
   ii) Lower Middle
   iii) Middle
   iv) Upper Middle
   v) Upper

17. How do you identify yourself? (Please rank in descending order a-g)
a) I am a son / daughter of a specific family
b) I belong to a specific tribe
c) I come from a particular city within Libya
d) I am citizen of the Libyan state
e) I am a Muslim
f) I am an Arab
g) Others (please specify)

18. I am an Arab because of: (Please rank in descending order a-d)
a) My religion
b) My language
c) I belong to an Arab state

d) Other reasons (specify)

19.

a) Do you belong to a tribe?

i) Yes

ii) No

b) If yes, to what extent do you feel loyal and attached to your tribe?

i) Very attached

ii) Attached

iii) Not attached

20. Who is usually responsible for making decisions in your family?

a) Father

b) Mother

c) Both

d) All the family

21.

a) In general, do you think it is a good idea that children take part in family discussions?

i) Yes

ii) No

b) If yes, at what age should they start taking part?

22.

a) Did you participate in any political activities when you were a pupil at primary, preparatory, and secondary school, such as the ideological preparation camps and popular demonstrations?

i) Yes

ii) No

b) If yes, what kind of activities did you participate?

c) If not, why not?

23. Do you attend meetings of the Basic Popular Congresses?

a) Regularly

b) From time to time

c) Never

24. Do you follow the changes which occur in the Libyan political system?

a) Regularly

b) From time to time

c) Never

25. Is the idea of Arab nationalism a coherent idea?

a) Yes

b) No

26. Do you think of the word fatherland (*al-watan*) as:

a) The existing state in which you are living

b) The wider Arab fatherland

c) I have different view which is:( )

27.

a) Do you support moves towards Arab unity?

i) Yes

ii) No

b) If yes, would you continue your support despite the following statements?

i) Even if this means sharing Libya's oil wealth with other Arabs.

a) Yes

b) No

ii) Even if this means letting other Arabs work and live in Libya.

a) Yes

b) No

iii) Even though Arab governments are not supporting Libya over the sanctions.

a) Yes

b) No

28. As a practical step on the road to Arab unity, do you support the removal of all border and passport controls?

a) Yes

b) No

29. Do you think that the Palestinian issue is directly relevant to Libya?

a) Yes

b) No

30. Do you accept the "Declaration of Principles" which has been signed between the PLO and Israel ?

a) Yes

b) No

31. Do you consider it acceptable for a woman to hold a job which involves authority over men?

a) Yes

b) No

32.

a) Do you think it is important for women to participate in governmental and political affairs?

i) Yes

ii) No

b) If not, why not? Are your reasons for this based on: (Please tick whichever is most relevant)

i) Religion

ii) Social values

iii) Traditions and customs

iv) Family responsibilities

v) Others (please mention)

33. Do women currently possess adequate rights in Libya?

a) Yes

b) No

34.

a) Women should have the same right as men to marry other Arabs or non-Libyan Muslims. Do you agree?

i) Strongly agree

ii) Agree

iii) Disagree

iv) Strongly disagree

b) If you disagree, why?

35.

a) Do you think it is important for women and men to avoid exaggeration in the dowry and cost of marriage?

i) Yes

ii) No

b) If not, why not?

36. Many religious, social and political values and beliefs have different sources. Rank the following sources according to their influence on you.

a) Family

b) Tribe

c) Peer groups and colleagues

d) School and school curricula

e) Mass media

f) Mosque

g) Personal experience

h) Others (Please specify)

Appendix C: Structure of People's Authority System



Source: Muammar Al-Qadhafi, *The Green Book*, vol. 1, (Tripoli: Global Centre for Study and Research on the Green Book, 1979).